Imagination in thought and action by A. Ichino
1 
 
 
 
 
Imagination  
in  
Thought and Action 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Anna Ichino 
 
Thesis submitted to the University of Milan  
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
 
May 2015 
 
 
  
2 
 
  
3 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 
 
 
In this thesis I ask what the role of imagination is in our representation of the world 
and interactions with it. A standard answer to this question is that imagination has no 
direct role: imagination’s proper function is rather to allow us to disengage from reality; 
its motivating power, if it has any, is basically limited to children’s pretence. I argue 
that this standard answer is mistaken: imagination’s role is much larger than that. I 
consider a number of cases – including cases of superstitious and religious actions, or 
so-called ‘expressive behaviours’ – where we are moved to act by representational 
states that are not sensitive to real-world evidence, nor integrated in our whole system 
of beliefs. I argue that at least some degree of sensitivity to evidence and inferential 
integration are necessary for a state to count as belief; hence the representational states 
that play the relevant motivating role in the cases I consider cannot be beliefs. I suggest 
that imagination is the best alternative candidate. This supports an account of 
imagination according to which its functional profile is the same of belief with respect 
to emotional and behavioural outputs, while it critically differs from belief with respect 
to cognitive inputs (and related normative constraints). Imaginings dispose us to act 
and react in the same ways in which belief do; but they are not (nor ought be) formed 
and maintained in response to real-world evidence as beliefs are (and ought to be).  
On this view, many cognitions that are standardly classified as beliefs – like 
superstitious, ideological and religious ‘beliefs’ – turn out to be better understood as 
imaginings. Imagination does not just allow us to ‘escape’ from reality into fictional 
worlds, but plays a key, direct role in our representation of (and practical engagement 
with) reality. 
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This thesis is dedicated to my parents, 
who taught me to walk in the realm of imagination. 
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INTRODUCTION  
 
 
 
 
This thesis offers an account of the imagination which is to some extent revisionary 
but not so revisionary that we have left the folk conception of the imagination entirely 
behind. I argue that the imagination to which we so often appeal in ordinary thought 
and talk has some surprising features, including a capacity to inform behaviour in ways 
normally understood to be the province of belief alone.  
In Chapter 1 I address some methodological issues that the project faces. What 
is it that makes one account of such things as imagination, belief, desire, emotion, etc. 
better than another? I identify three basic dimensions along which we can measure the 
success of such an account: (1) closeness to folk-psychological assumptions; (2) 
explanatory power concerning various aspects of our experience/behaviours; and (3) 
integration with the best scientific theories of cognition.  
Chapter 2 starts from the examination of paradigmatic cases of human 
behaviour that we confidently assign to imagination, and those we confidently assign to 
belief. For example, in daydreaming, engagement with fictions, pretence games, or 
thought experiments, it is widely accepted that subjects imagine, rather than believe, 
the contents of the relevant daydreams, fictions, pretences, and thought experiments. I 
argue, as others have, that imaginings are not distinguished from beliefs by their 
contents, but rather by their functional roles. Though I observe that also at the 
functional level there are notable similarities. Both imaginings and beliefs ‘regard their 
contents as true’, in a phenomenological as well as in a cognitive sense – which I seek 
to clarify. 
It then remains to be explained how imagination and belief differ. In Chapter 3 
I introduce the Standard Answer to this question. In the paradigmatic cases just 
mentioned, imagination and belief seem to differ in two key respects. First, beliefs are 
formed in response to real-world evidence, while imaginings are formed in response to 
the will, or to other evidence-insensitive factors. Second, believing that p motivates 
actions that would promote the satisfaction of one’s desires if p were true, while 
imagining that p does not motivate actions in this way. However, I claim that only the 
first of these provides a reliable criterion to distinguish imagination from belief, since 
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motivational differences between imaginings and beliefs are actually merely apparent. I 
bring some initial support to this claim on the basis of an analysis of pretence actions. 
My central argument for this claim is then developed in the following two chapters.  
In Chapter 4 I consider a range of actions very pervasive in our lives: what I call 
‘superstitious’ and ‘magic’ actions (broadly construed). I argue that in all these cases we 
are moved to act by representational states that are not sensitive to real-world 
evidence, nor integrated in our whole system of beliefs. I argue that sensitivity to 
evidence and inferential integration are necessary features of belief. Hence, the 
cognitive states that motivate superstitious and magic actions in conjunction with 
subjects’ desires cannot be beliefs. Imagination is the best alternative candidate.  
In Chapter 5, developing a suggestion by J. David Velleman, I argue that if it is 
true that such cases are explained in terms imaginings, then we should recognize that 
imagination has the same motivating power of belief. Imaginings and beliefs dispose us 
to act in the same ways, and do that under the same conditions; they may contingently 
differ with respect to the satisfaction of such conditions, but their dispositional 
connection to action is precisely the same. 
In Chapter 6 I conclude by considering some implications of my view for our 
understanding of religious cognition. I argue that so-called religious beliefs are, in many 
cases, not beliefs. Lacking such crucial features of belief as responsiveness to evidence 
and holistic coherence, they display many typical features of imaginings (notably, 
subjection to the will). I make my case on the basis of two sorts of arguments: 
empirical arguments drawing on recent anthropological and psychological studies of 
religion; and arguments suggesting conceptual reasons why religious propositions are 
more apt to be imagined than to be believed. 
 
Insofar as my arguments in this thesis are successful, many cognitions that are 
standardly classified as beliefs – including superstitious, ideological and religious 
‘beliefs’ – turn out to be better understood as imaginings. Imagination plays a larger 
role in our thought and action than it is commonly taken to play: it does not just allow 
us to ‘escape’ from reality into fictional worlds, but plays a key, direct role in our 
representation of – and practical engagement with – the real world. 
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Chapter 1 
ACCOUNTS OF FOLK-PSYCHOLOGICAL STATES 
 
 
 
 
In order for the arguments I am going to present in favour of my account of 
imagination to be properly assessed, I should first of all say something on what I take 
the measures of success for such an account to be. In this chapter I consider this 
question at a quite general level – a level at which it can be asked about any other  folk-
psychological mental state: what is it that makes an account of such things as 
imagination, belief, desire, emotion, etc. good, or (at least) better than other rival 
accounts? I identify and discuss three features that seem important for a good account, 
having to do, respectively, with: closeness with  folk-psychological assumptions (§1), 
explanatory power (§2), and integration with the best scientific cognitive theories (§3).  
 
1. MATCHING  FOLK-PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSUMPTIONS 
Since the notions here in question are  folk-psychological notions originally featuring in 
the view that ordinary people have about how the mind works, I take it that a good 
account of these notions should match, at least to some extent, such commonsensical 
view. That is, it should match, at least to some extent, the basic assumptions which 
underlie our understanding, ascribing, predicting, and manipulating our own and other 
people’s mental states and overt behaviours. The specification ‘at least to some extents’ 
is important: matching our folk-psychological view is a more difficult task than it might 
initially seem to be, and there are limits to the extent to which an account can be – and 
also, I will argue, ought to be – committed to such task. 
A first difficulty here arises from the fact that the folk-psychological assumptions 
which inform our view of the mind are seldom explicit in our thoughts and talk. Of 
course, this doesn’t mean that we seldom seek to understand ourselves and others in 
mentalistic terms. On the contrary, we do that all the time. We ascribe to each other 
mental states such as beliefs, desires, emotions, and interpret/predict reactions and 
behaviours in the light of those ascriptions. Practices like these reveal various general 
ideas about how the mind works, i.e. about how the environment affects our mental 
states, how different mental states interact to affect behaviours, ‘what it is like’ to be in 
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a certain state, and so on. But the point is that these general ideas, typically, are not 
fully articulated in our discourse; they are rather tacitly assumed. And making them 
explicit might not be straightforward, also because our ordinary linguistic uses in this 
respect can be misleading. On one hand, we happen to use the same expression to 
name states which are in fact different, and which we treat in different ways (compare, 
e.g. “I imagine I can fly” with “As I imagine you all know...” – where the latter seems 
rather a way to say ‘As I believe you all know...’). On the other hand, our rich mentalistic 
vocabulary often provides us with different expressions to refer to one and the same 
state (like with “to think”, “to take it”, “to have it”, “to hold”, “to reckon”, all meant 
as ways to express a belief). Working out what our mentalistic explanations precisely 
are, and what kinds of assumptions underlie them, will then require careful empirical 
observations of our verbal and behavioural practices.1 This arguably constitutes the 
first important step for any good account of folk-psychological states. 
But note that developing such an account is not just a matter of making our folk-
psychological assumptions explicit and gathering them all together (see Lewis 1994: 416 
– pace Lewis 1972). One obvious reason why that is not enough is that our folk-
psychological assumptions might not naturally form an orderly and coherent system: 
indeed, they often happen to be vague and, notably, inconsistent with each other. A 
way to deal with inconsistencies that we might discover within our folk-psychological 
assumptions is to include in our account only those assumptions that are ‘commonly 
shared’ among us in the sense that (almost) everyone makes such assumptions, 
(almost) everyone assumes that (almost) everyone else makes them, and so on (see 
                                                          
1 A point is worth clarifying here, concerning two different senses in which we can talk of folk-
psychological assumptions ‘underlying’ our mental states ascriptions: one sense having to do with the 
underlying mechanisms which are causally responsible for such ascriptions; another having to do with the 
underlying principles which seem to be (implicitly) presupposed by such ascriptions. It is this latter sense of 
‘underlying’ that I am appealing to. What I am interested in are the folk-psychological assumptions that 
explain why we make the mentalistic ascriptions we make. The question of how we are able to make such 
ascriptions – and whether our folk-psychological assumptions play any role in that – is a much debated 
empirical question, which I am not going to address here (for a review of the debate between theory-
theorists and simulation theorists concerning such question, see Stich and Nichols 2003). So the folk-
psychological assumptions I discuss should not be understood as internally represented assumptions 
which actually drive our ascriptions of mental states. They should rather be understood as the 
assumptions which inform our folk-psychological view of the mind in the sense that they are part of 
what we mean when we ascribe mental states to each other (and that we take others to mean when they 
use mentalistic predicates). 
The distinction I just made between two senses of ‘underlying folk-psychological assumptions’ closely 
parallels the distinction that Stich and Ravenscroft (1995) make between internal vs. external accounts of 
folk psychology. External accounts of folk psychology are concerned with the sets of general principles 
that can be used to explain and systematize our understanding of the mind and mentalistic ascriptions; 
but are not (necessarily) internally represented and causally responsible for such ascriptions (we can 
imagine them to be used by an external observer in order to explain and predict our ascriptions). Here I 
will offer an external account of this sort. 
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Lewis 1972: 256).2 To do that, we should focus on uncontroversial cases where our 
ascriptions of mental states and predictions of future behaviours are almost 
unanimously agreed upon, and work out the set of general assumptions that they seem 
to reveal. Consider, for example, a driver who stops in front of a red traffic light. 
Almost everyone will agree that the driver behaves in that way because she sees the red 
light, she forms the related belief that there is a red light in front of her, she also has a 
prior belief that traffic norms require cars to stop and wait in front of red lights, and 
she desires to conform to those norms. From the analysis of a case like this we could 
then extrapolate such common assumptions as: ‘visual perceptions are caused by such-
and-such physical stimuli and generate beliefs with corresponding contents’; ‘different 
beliefs relate to one another in such-and-such ways’; ‘beliefs and desires are likely to 
bring about actions in such-and-such ways’… And/or any other assumptions that can 
plausibly explain the ascriptions in question. 
Focusing on similar examples that reveal commonly shared folk-psychological 
assumptions, though, might still not be enough to avoid inconsistencies: sometimes 
unacknowledged inconsistencies occur also within the set of our commonly shared 
assumptions. To take a classic example, our explicit talk, thoughts and behaviours seem 
to reveal both the common assumption that we do have genuine emotions towards 
fictional characters (ones that we do not believe exist in reality), and the common 
assumption that it is not possible to have genuine emotions towards someone we 
know not to exist. These two assumptions are obviously in tension. To resolve such 
tension, a good account of the folk-psychological states involved here – i.e. emotion, 
imagination, belief – will have to drop at least one of them, thereby departing, at least 
in some respect, from folk-psychological intuitions.3  
The suggestion so far, then, is that a good account of mental states such as 
imagination, belief, desire, etc., should try to match common folk-psychological 
assumptions concerning those states, even though there are a variety of limitations and 
complications in the extent to which this match can be achieved. Achieving it is not 
just a matter of forming a big conjunction of common folk-psychological assumptions 
which are readily available in our discourses, because: (i) the assumptions in question 
                                                          
2 Lewis talks in terms of ‘common knowledge’ of folk-psychological platitudes. I prefer to avoid this 
expression because, as I shall argue, some of such common assumptions may be false – while knowledge 
implies truth. Perhaps ‘mutual belief’ is more appropriate. 
3 Though note that a good account will not simply renounce one of the inconsistent assumptions, but 
will also have to justify such move by explaining why that assumption is commonly made, and why it 
should be sacrificed in favour of the other that contradicts it. 
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are generally tacit – so they must first of all be made explicit; and (ii) they can at times 
be inconsistent with each other – so some of them might have to be dropped. 
2. EXPLANATORY POWER 
Matching common folk-psychological assumptions is not the only concern that a good 
account of folk-psychological states should have: the sort of account I am interested in 
should do more than that. Indeed, folk-psychological assumptions might be wrong: 
there might well be discrepancies between the ways in which folks think the mind 
works and the ways in which the mind actually works. And a good account of folk-
psychological mental states should deal also with that – in the ways I am going to 
suggest. 
2.1. ‘ACCOUNTS OF FOLK-PSYCHOLOGICAL STATES’ VS. ‘FOLK-PSYCHOLOGICAL 
ACCOUNTS’ 
It is important to note the difference between ‘account of folk-psychological mental 
states’ and ‘folk-psychological accounts of mental states’. These are to some extent 
stipulative labels; so let me briefly clarify what I mean with them. With ‘folk-
psychological account of mental states’ I mean an account which simply reflects the 
view that ordinary folks have of such states. This is not (necessarily) the sort of 
account I wish to offer. What I wish to offer is an ‘account of folk-psychological states’ 
– which, in my sense here, is an account concerned with those mental states that 
feature in our folk-psychological view; but need not necessarily be a ‘folk-psychological 
account’. I’d say even more: if it wants to be a good account, it cannot be ‘folk-
psychological in principle’. That is, it cannot uncritically begin with the assumption that 
the view that ordinary folks have of mental states is correct. What it should do is asses 
that view critically, with the best available methods (such as, I shall argue, those of 
scientific psychology), and consider what reasons there are to take it to be correct, 
accepting the existence of something like the mental states featuring in it. Of course, in 
order to do that our account will first need to spell out precisely what such a folk-
psychological view is like; this is why that account must be concerned with folk-
psychological assumptions in the way discussed above (§1). Matching (to some extents) 
those assumptions is necessary for any account to be an account of folk-psychological 
states, rather than an account of something else (of some different, ‘non-folk’, 
psychological states). But this will be just a first step. Once this first step is made, a 
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good account of folk-psychological states will have to weigh up the reasons (if any) 
that there might be to think that similar states actually exist.  
2.2. HOW GOOD ARE FOLK-PSYCHOLOGICAL EXPLANATIONS?  
Arguably, the basic reason we have to think that beliefs, desires and the other folksy 
states exist is that they allow us to explain a number of phenomena: to make rational 
sense of important aspects of our own and other people’s experience, to predict other 
people’s behaviours. A crucial question to address, therefore, is whether folk-
psychological explanations are good explanations and, notably, whether there are better 
explanations available. Depending on how we answer this question, we might have 
different kinds of account of folk-psychological states. Let’s then consider three possible 
answers to this question, and the kinds of account to which they would respectively 
lead. 
2.2.1. CONSERVATIVE ACCOUNTS. At one end of the spectrum, we have answers that 
are extremely positive about the explanatory power of folk-psychological explanations. 
After careful examination, we might conclude that our folk-psychological view as it is 
reasonably approximates the best account we can aim to for how the mind works: 
assuming the existence of things with the properties commonly associated to beliefs, 
desires, imaginings and all the other folk-psychological states, allows us to explain 
almost every aspects of our behaviour and experience that seem to deserve a 
mentalistic interpretation – i.e. any aspects of our behaviour and experience that we 
might want to rationalize in some way. Behaviours and experiences that are not 
explainable in these terms are indeed unintelligible: lacking a folk-psychological 
explanation is tantamount to lacking rational mentalistic explanation at all. Our folk-
psychological characterizations of mental states might need some minor revisions, but 
they are basically correct; and commonly recognized  folk-psychological states taken all 
together exhaust the taxonomy of causally distinctive mental states. A good account of 
folk-psychological mental states, then, will remain very close to our folk-psychological 
account of them.  
2.2.2. REVISIONIST ACCOUNTS. Less positive views of folk psychology’s explanatory 
power will lead to more revisionist accounts of folk-psychological states. Note that 
‘less positive’ does not necessarily mean ‘negative’. We might for example think that 
mental states with the properties commonly associated to beliefs, desires, etc. provide 
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satisfactory explanations for many, or even most, relevant aspects of our experience; 
but there still remain a number of phenomena which cannot be explained in those folk-
psychological terms, hence require us to postulate some additional, non-folk-
psychological mental states. Similar additions will necessarily have some impact on our 
account of folk-psychological mental states: our common view of such states will have 
to be updated, at least with respect to their relations with the newly introduced (non-
folksy) states. Other more substantial revisions might also turn out to be necessary. 
Insofar as we’ll find out that mental states with some, but not all, the properties 
commonly associated with belief, desires, etc. would explain our behaviour/experience 
better than mental states with precisely the same properties commonly associated with 
belief, desires, etc., we will have to change our folksy characterizations accordingly, 
concluding that belief, desires, etc. are not precisely as we commonly take them to be. 
A good account of such folk-psychological mental states will then be a (more or less) 
revisionist account.4 
Here of course the question arises of how much we can change our folksy 
characterizations for it to still make sense to keep talking in terms of ‘beliefs’, ‘desires’, 
etc. I shall say something more on this question shortly. For the moment, let’s just 
assume that there must be a limit beyond which it no longer makes sense.  
2.2.3. ELIMINATIVIST ACCOUNTS. Beyond that limit, rather than arguing that, say, 
beliefs are somewhat different from how we commonly take them to be, we will have 
to conclude that nothing like the state we use to call ‘belief’ (i.e. nothing which is 
enough similar to it to deserve the same name) actually exists. What we use to explain 
in terms of belief is better explained by appealing to a different mental state that 
doesn’t belong to our folk-psychological picture of the mind. We should then embrace 
an ‘eliminativist’ account of belief.5 
                                                          
4 In sum, the suggestion here is that we can have two possible kinds of revisions to our folk-
psychological view: (i) additions of new states, (ii) more substantial changes to the characterizations of 
familiar folk-psychological states (i.e. changes that do not have to do just with the added relationships to 
the new states). These two kinds of revisions are not alternative to each other. An example of revision of 
the first kind (i) is Tamar Gendler’s recent suggestion that we need to recognize the existence of aliefs 
(see Gendler 2008, 2008a, 2010; I shall discuss this suggestion in Chapter 4: §4). An example of revision 
of the second kind (ii) may be, arguably, the account of belief defended by Eric Schwitzgebel (see 
Schwitzgebel 2000, 2002, 2009, 2013; I shall say something more on this in Chapter 4: § 2).  
5 Note that this would be a much less radical form of eliminativism than the one famously defended 
(among others) by Paul Churchland (Churchland 1981). In the scenario I described, the basic conceptual 
framework of  folk psychology would be retained: the category of belief would disappear, but its 
explanatory job would be done by another mental state of a similar kind – an intentional state with 
causal powers, semantically evaluable. In Churchland’s view, instead, all folk-psychological notions 
would be eliminated and “our mutual understanding and even our introspection may then be 
20 
 
These are, in short, the ways in which our account of a given mental state M will end 
up being more conservative, more revisionist, or utterly eliminativist, depending on our 
view about the explanatory power of M. 
2.3. ASSESSING EXPLANATORY POWER: MORE (OR LESS) CONTROVERSIAL CASES 
In order to best assess  folk psychology’s explanatory power, we should not consider 
only the uncontroversial, paradigmatic cases of mental state ascriptions discussed 
above. There are a variety of more controversial cases which also deserve our 
attention. These include cases where we struggle to understand other people or our 
own experiences/behaviours, and cases where we do think we have some 
understanding of other people or our own experiences/behaviours, but it is not a fully 
clear understanding (and, notably, it is not based on folk-psychological assumptions 
that are commonly shared in the way specified above). 
Take, for example, phenomena such as mental illness, creativity, or dreams. How 
do we explain the behaviour and experience of a deluded subject who claims with 
conviction that she is dead, while acting and reacting in a number of ways obviously 
inconsistent with that claim? What mental states drive the creative actions of an artist 
when she paints her canvasses? Can we predict when and how such creative actions 
will occur? What mental states are we in when we dream? Many ordinary folks 
probably do not have a clear answer to such questions; and when answers are given, 
they are generally not universally accepted.6 Something similar happens with familiar 
phenomena such as self-deception – e.g. a husband who obstinately denies that his 
wife is cheating on him though seemingly ‘knowing’ that she does, and indeed being 
very jealous; or absent-minded behaviours – e.g. an Italian tourist in Great Britain who 
seems to know (and indeed claims with conviction) that there is left-hand drive there, 
yet keeps looking in the wrong direction before crossing the roads. Here we do not 
find the subjects’ actions and reactions so puzzling, and indeed we often expect them 
to occur precisely as they do; yet, we might struggle to tell a fully coherent story about 
them (notably, a story that explains both what subjects do and what they say). 
                                                                                                                                                                  
reconstituted within the conceptual framework of completed neuroscience” (Churchland 1981: 67). My 
hope is that good ‘accounts of folk-psychological notions’ of the sort I am describing, differently from 
simple ‘folk-psychological accounts’, can stand up to Churchland’s radical eliminative challenge. In this 
respect, my project here is very much in line with the view defended by Fodor 1987 (see in particular 
Ch. 1). 
6 So for example both delusions and dreams are taken by some to be beliefs, and by others to be kinds 
of imaginings. The fact that  folk psychology doesn’t provide clear explanations for phenomena like 
dreams and creativity is one of the reasons that Churchland gives to reject  folk psychology altogether 
(see again Churchland 1981). 
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Moreover, our explanations and the assumptions that underlie these phenomena tend 
to vary across individuals. In the Italian tourist case, for example, some of us might 
think that she behaves like that because she keeps forgetting British traffic rules and 
mistakenly believing that in Britain there is right-hand drive like in the rest of Europe 
(on the tacit assumption that behaviour always reveals beliefs); while others might 
think that she behaves like that just out of habit, while obviously believing that in 
Britain there is left-hand drive (on the tacit assumption that not all behaviour reveals 
belief).  
Cases like the ones just considered, where our folk-psychological explanations 
are confused, discordant with each other, or altogether lacking, occur relatively often in 
our experience (absent-mindedness or self-deceived behaviours happen all the time; 
many of us dream every night…). In assessing the explanatory power of our folk-
psychological view we cannot treat them as rare exceptions. Of course, it might well 
turn out that such cases cannot be convincingly explained by appealing to folk-
psychological states, and require us to postulate new mental states instead. Or it might be 
that they cannot be explained at all – in the sense that there isn’t really a way to rationalize 
similar behaviours and experiences. Although we cannot rule out in principle either of 
these conclusions, there are reasons to be hesitant about embracing them. As for the 
irrationality conclusion, in many cases it doesn’t sound right: many of the cases in 
question, even if somehow puzzling, do not look just absurd and unintelligible – we 
seem to understand and predict them pretty well (think again of the absent-minded 
tourist example). And before concluding that such understanding presupposes the 
existence of downright new mental states, we should – even only for reasons of 
economy and simplicity – consider carefully whether the states we are already familiar 
with can do the job; and – if so – how we should characterize them so that they can do that at 
best.  
Indeed, the consideration of problematic cases like those exemplified above 
might influence our account of folk-psychological states. We might realize that some 
properties that we are used to attribute to one of these states – say, to belief – make it 
particularly suited to explain some otherwise problematic cases, while other properties 
commonly associated to it do not help or, worse, make such cases even more 
mysterious: this would give us reasons to think that some of our common assumptions 
about belief are more crucial to characterizing it properly; while others are 
inessential/mistaken – and therefore can/should be abandoned. The analysis of 
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controversial cases like those just mentioned might then lead us to adopt a revisionist 
account of (at least some) folk-psychological states.  
Here we come back to our earlier question: how much can an account of a given 
mental state M depart from our folk-psychological assumptions about M, for it to still 
make sense to consider it as a revisionist account of M, rather than as an eliminativist 
account according to which nothing like M actually exists (but something else does)? 
This is a difficult question. It is not clear whether there is any principled criterion by 
means of which to answer it. According to Ramsey, Stich, and Garon (1990), there 
isn’t any such criterion – and that this is a general problem which affects any 
theoretical inquiry when it comes to distinguish between ‘ontologically conservative 
changes’ (i.e. changes where the entities posited by a theory to explain a given 
phenomenon are ‘conserved’, though with differences in their characterization, into a 
new theory about the same phenomenon) and ‘ontologically radical changes’ (i.e. 
changes where the posits of an old theory cannot be similarly conserved in a new one). 
How to distinguish ontologically conservative from ontologically radical theory 
changes, Ramsey, Stich, and Garon suggest, 
is a question that is easier to ask than to answer. There is, in the philosophy-of-science 
literature, nothing that even comes close to a plausible and fully general account of when 
theory change sustains an eliminativist conclusion and when it does not. In the absence of 
a principled way of deciding when ontological elimination is in order, the best we can do 
is to look at the posits of the old theory – the ones that are at risk of elimination – and 
ask whether there is anything in the new theory that they might be identified with or 
reduced to. If the posits of the new theory strike us as deeply and fundamentally different 
from those of the old theory (...) then it will be plausible to conclude that the theory 
change has been a radical one and that an eliminativist conclusion is in order. But since 
there is not easy measure of how ‘deeply and fundamentally different’ a pair of posits are, the conclusion we 
reach is bound to be a judgement call. (Ramsey, Stich, and Garon 1990: 502-503, emphasis 
mine)7 
I agree on the intrinsic difficulty – perhaps even impossibility – of answering the 
ontological question about theory changes that these authors raise. This shouldn’t be 
too much of a worry for my discussion here, though. After all, my ultimate interest is 
advancing our understanding of how the mind works, of the mental capacities that are 
responsible for our actions, reactions, and behaviours. I think that our folk-
psychological view is a good starting point to address these problems (even if we 
                                                          
7 For similar considerations concerning the problems that arise with intertheoretic identifications, see 
also Stich (1991); and Stich (1996): Ch.1.  
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should then be ready to depart from it in many ways); and this is why my discussion 
stems from the question of what is a good account of folk-psychological mental states. I 
also think that what I am going to say will do enough justice to our folk-psychological 
intuitions, and especially to those concerning imagination and belief, to justify 
continuing talking in those terms; even if it will turn out that our commonsensical 
views about such things as imagination and belief are in some respects imprecise and 
incomplete.  
So, I take the account of imagination I’m going to defend to be in some respects 
revisionist, but only mildly revisionist – definitely closer to the conservative rather than 
to the eliminativist end of the spectrum I sketched above. I see that this is debatable, 
though. Ultimately, I will have to leave the question open. What matters more to me 
here is to demonstrate that we need to recognize the existence of a mental state with 
the features that I ascribe to imagination; the decision whether such state does indeed 
deserve to be called ‘imagination’ is bound to be, as Ramsey, Stich, and Garon suggest, 
a judgement call: I shall then leave it up to the reader. 
3. FOLK PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC PSYCHOLOGY (AND OTHER COGNITIVE 
SCIENCES) 
At this point it seems natural to observe that, if what I am interested in is the best 
possible account of how our mind works, then the place to look is scientific 
psychology, which addresses this question on the basis of rigorous empirical methods, 
rather than  folk psychology, which is indeed nothing more than commonsensical. I do 
agree with that; though I don’t think there is really an alternative here. Scientific 
psychologists in the last century have worked a lot with folk-psychological categories, 
making a variety of empirical discoveries/claims about the mental states originally 
featuring in our folk-psychological picture of the mind. The account I wish to offer, as 
I said, is not a folk-psychological account, but a scientifically informed account of folk-
psychological notions: an account which considers seriously the entities posited by our 
folk-psychological view of the mind and try to see whether anything like them is likely 
to exist, also (and importantly) on the basis of what the best scientific theories of the 
mind can tell us about them. Such an account would fit in the category that 
Ravenscroft calls ‘scientific folk psychology’: 
 folk psychology quantifies over a range of mental states including perceptions, 
sensations, emotions, and – importantly – propositional attitudes like beliefs and desires. 
(...) Many theories in scientific psychology quantify over a similar range of states. (...) It 
will be helpful to have a label for those scientific psychological theories which quantify 
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over states originally posited by  folk psychology. For want of a better term (...) I will use 
the term ‘scientific folk psychology’ for any such theory. (Ravenscroft 2005: 69; see also 
Fodor 1987) 
Here note that scientific psychology, as any proper science (and probably more than 
others, since it is fairly young and still in a phase of methodological consolidation), is in 
continuous change, and few, if any, of its theories/principles are universally accepted; 
therefore, reflecting scientific psychological assumptions is likely to be at least as 
complicated as we have seen matching folk-psychological assumptions is. Yet, a good 
account of folk-psychological states will have to reflect claims of scientific psychology 
as much as possible.  
More in general, I would say that a good account should aim to be in line with 
the best available theories in different cognitive sciences – from neurology and 
psychiatry to anthropology; from genetics to linguistics, and so on. This means that it 
should aim to be well integrated in a network of connections with those theories – 
gaining support from them (and supporting them) to the extents and in the ways in 
which that is possible. What these connections precisely amount to, how rich they can 
be, and how they can be tested, of course will vary a lot depending on the different 
disciplines. In some cases it may also be quite difficult to establish and we might even 
not be in the position to do that (yet); but this does not undermine the claim that some 
degree of theoretical integration with theories in different cognitive sciences is 
something a good account should aim at.8 
CONCLUSION 
In this chapter I have described the sort of account of the imagination that I will offer. 
I have identified some important dimensions along which we can measure the success 
of such an account: (1) closeness to folk-psychological assumptions, (2) explanatory 
power concerning various aspects of our experience/behaviour, and (3) integration 
with the best scientific cognitive theories. Requirements concerning (1) should be met 
in order for my account to be considered an account of the imagination – rather than 
of something else. Requirements concerning (2) and (3) should be met in order for my 
account to provide a plausible representation of how the mind actually works – or, at 
least, a representation which approximates to that. Since understanding how the mind 
actually works is my ultimate interest here, (2) and (3) are more important for me than 
(1). I think, however, that the account I am going to offer meets also (1). Insofar as my 
                                                          
8 I will address this problem more in detail in the next chapters when it will come out in particular cases. 
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arguments in the next chapters will be successful, they will provide us with a better 
understanding of what imagination is, of how it works, and of what roles it plays in our 
lives. 
  
26 
 
Chapter 2 
IMAGINATION AND BELIEF: SIMILARITIES 
 
 
 
 
Up to this point I have been taking a holistic approach to the analysis of mental states, 
talking most of the time of a general account of belief, desire, perception, imagination 
etc..., rather than of specific accounts of these different states. In a sense, such a 
holistic approach is unavoidable: even if we didn’t subscribe unconditionally to the 
functionalist view that mental states are essentially constituted by their causal relations 
to one another (and to external inputs/outputs), it seems reasonable to hold that a 
good account of a mental state M should at least clarify what is distinctive about M 
that sets it apart from other mental states, and how, if at all, M interacts with such 
states to produce behaviour. Therefore, while my focus here is on imagination, what I 
am going to say will involve a number of assumptions about other mental states, and 
will have implications for our accounts of them, too. The most interesting and 
controversial implications, arguably, will be those concerning the account of belief. 
This is not surprising. The kind of imagination that I am going to be mostly concerned 
with is propositional imagination, which is similar to belief in several respects. One of 
the main challenges that an account of this kind of imagination faces is to clarify what 
precisely such similarities amount to and, perhaps most importantly, in what respects 
they break down – i.e. in what respects propositional imagination differs from belief. 
This challenge was originally raised by David Hume – and it is often referred to as 
‘Hume’s Problem’ (see e.g. Armstrong 1973: 70; Price 1969: 160; Van Leeuwen 2009: 
223): 
The imagination (...) can feign a train of events, with all the appearance of reality, ascribe 
to them a particular time and place, conceive them as existent, and paint them out to itself 
with every circumstance, that belongs to any historical fact, which it believes with the 
greatest certainty. Wherein, therefore, consists the difference between such a fiction and belief? (Hume 
1777: Part II, Section V)9 
                                                          
9 Another passage in the Treatise on Human Nature raises the related problem of how to distinguish 
believing a proposition from ‘merely entertaining’ it (see Hume 1739: Book I, Part III, Section 7). 
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Hume’s problem, which is still very much debated, will be one of my central concerns 
in this thesis.10 In order to address it properly, in this chapter I seek clarify how the 
problem arises in the first place. I shall introduce paradigmatic cases of imaginings and 
beliefs (§1), and point out some striking similarities between them, both at the level of 
the content (§2) and of the attitude (§§3-5) – which explain the difficulty to distinguish 
the ones from the others.  
Before getting to the heart of these matters, a brief conceptual and 
terminological clarification. Imagination does not only come in propositional forms, 
but can also come in perceptual forms. And propositional forms themselves might be 
of different kinds: as we shall see, according to some there are ‘desire-like’ as well as 
‘belief-like’ kinds of propositional imaginings. Unless otherwise specified, in this thesis 
with ‘imagination’ I will refer to propositional imaginings that are belief-like. I will at times 
also call them ‘make-believe’, or ‘belief-like imaginings’, especially when I will need to 
differentiate them from other kinds of propositional imaginings (such as ‘make-
desires’, or ‘desire-like imaginings’).11 
 
1. PARADIGMATIC EXAMPLES  
In line with the methodology suggested in Chapter 1, let’s start by considering some 
paradigmatic cases that we are all happy to explain in terms of imagination (or, vice 
versa, of belief). Here is a classic case of daydreaming. I am sitting at my desk, writing 
on my computer, and it occurs to me that it would be good to read a recent paper in 
the Journal of Philosophy. I go on the Internet to download it, but in so doing I start 
hanging around on on-line newspapers. Today, they are all for the Royal Wedding. 
Some photos of Kate Middleton make me figuring myself dressed in white like her: for 
a moment ‘I become the Duchess of Cambridge’. Wow, tonight I’m going to leave for a 
honeymoon in tropical islands, I should pack my stuff! Or actually no, I shouldn’t: someone will 
certainly do that for me while I enjoy the wedding party! Yes, I enjoy that, but: what a nightmare to be 
followed by thousands of eyes wherever I go... These are some of my thoughts when I get 
carried away representing myself as the Duchess of Cambridge. These thoughts are 
soon interrupted by the clock that strikes 7pm, reminding me that it’s late and I must 
                                                          
10 Indeed, this thesis as a whole may be seen as an attempt to provide a satisfactory solution to Hume’s 
Problem. 
11 As far as I know, the term ‘make-believe’ to indicate belief-like forms of imagination was first used by 
Walton (1990) and Currie (1990). Also the term ‘make-desire’ is originally due Currie (1990). Later on, 
Currie will use the terms ‘belief-like imaginings’ and ‘desire-like imaginings’ (see e.g. Currie 2002, Currie 
and Ravenscroft 2002). Doggett and Egan(2007) and Van Leeuwen (2011) talk of ‘i-beliefs’ and ‘i-
desires’. 
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go back to work: I’m not the Duchess of Cambridge, but a PhD student – and one who is very 
behind with her thesis – so I should stop wasting my time in silly ways!  
I assume that everyone who knows me would be happy, in this circumstance, to 
describe my ‘PhD thoughts’ as beliefs, and my ‘Royal Wedding thoughts’ as 
imaginings: I believe that I am a PhD student, sat in front of my computer, writing my 
thesis; while I just imagine, for a moment, that I am the Duchess of Cambridge, on the 
day of my wedding, almost leaving to honeymoon.  
Other paradigmatic cases where the belief/imagination distinction looks so clear 
are our engagement with fictions and with pretence games.12 I take it that most of us 
would agree that readers of Harry Potter’s stories imagine many things about the 
adventures of an eleven-year-old child who discovers to be a wizard, without actually 
believing them. And that children playing a Wild West game do not actually believe 
themselves to be Indians and cowboys fighting in a real war, but simply imagine this; 
they never stop believing to be children living at home with mum and dad but – as 
long as the game goes on – they imagine themselves to be Indians and cowboys 
instead.  
Appeals to imagination are not limited to playful cases like the ones just seen. 
Imagination is often appealed to also to explain ‘more serious’ things, such as our 
capacity to create and understand thought experiments, to form counterfactual 
thoughts about what might have happened, to hypothesise about what might happen 
in the future. So for example we say that we imagine the existence of Twin Earth – a 
planet where the liquid that people drink and call ‘water’ is not H2O; that we imagine 
how our life would have been if we had met a different partner; that we imagine 
getting a new job and moving to a different country. We sometimes also say that we 
imagine ‘putting ourselves in someone else’s shoes’, to indicate that we see the world 
from the perspective of someone else. 
                                                          
12 Derek Matravers (2010) has questioned that imagination plays the central role in our engagement with 
fiction that most authors take it to play. He argues that readers/film viewers do not need to – nor 
typically do – imagine the contents of the fictions they engage with. According to Matravers readers/film 
viewers do just ‘understand’ (or ‘engage with’) such contents; and this is something they do both with 
fictions and with non-fictions. In fact, I wonder whether what Matravers calls ‘understanding’ or 
‘engagement’ is not, in the end, a very basic form of imagining. At least, Matravers does not clearly spell 
out what the critical difference between understanding and imagining is supposed to be. And my impression 
is that it is not really a substantial difference. If ask you to understand a proposition p, and then I ask 
you to imagine that p, am I asking you to do two essentially different things? Here I haven’t space for 
discussing Matravers’ argument at length, though. I will just assume the otherwise widely accepted view 
that our engagement with fiction is a paradigmatic example of imagination’s exercise. 
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I take all these to be rather uncontroversial examples of imagination’s exercise. 
Less uncontroversial and less obvious is the question of what are the essential features 
by virtue of which they classify as such; and, notably, by virtue of which they differ 
from cases that we explain in terms of belief. 
2. SAME CONTENTS, REGARDED IN THE SAME WAY 
One thing we can notice immediately is that in none of the previous examples the 
crucial differences between imagination and belief seem to concern their contents. 
Take the daydream case. My imagining and my belief here have two different contents 
– I imagine THAT I AM A DUCHESS, while I believe THAT I AM A STUDENT; 
but this is not what makes the critical difference between them. It is not the case that 
being a Duchess is a kind of thing that can only be imagined, while being a student is a 
kind of thing that can only be believed. I can imagine that I am student, as well as 
believing it; and I can do both things at the same time. I do this now: I imagine that I 
am a PhD student who is writing her thesis with LaTex. Part of the content of this 
imagining – the bit THAT I AM A PHD STUDENT WHO IS WRITING – is also 
something that I believe. This is possible insofar as imagination and belief’s contents 
are isomorphic: they are both propositional contents, and the same propositions that 
can be believed can also, in principle, be imagined.13  
Belief and imagination do not only have the same kind of contents; they also 
seem to ‘look’ at their contents in rather similar ways. They are both cognitive 
attitudes, which ‘regard’ their contents as true, differently from conative attitudes – such 
as desires or intentions – which regard their contents as to-be-made-true, or from aversive 
attitudes – such as (some) negative emotions – which regard their contents as to-be-
prevented-from-becoming-true.14 Whether we believe or imagine something, we represent it 
as being the case; we represent the world in a certain way – e.g., as a world where (it is 
                                                          
13 The reverse might not always be true; maybe I can imagine, but not believe, that I do not exist, or that 
5 + 7 does not equal 12. But these are quite exceptional cases; and anyway they do not undermine the 
claim that in most cases imaginings and beliefs cannot be distinguished just on the basis of their 
contents.  
The view that imaginings and beliefs do not (intrinsically) differ at the level of the content – but are 
rather distinguished by their functional roles – is accepted by most cognitive accounts of imagination in 
the contemporary debate (see e.g. Nichols and Stich 2000, Currie and Ravenscroft 2002, Schroeder and 
Matheson 2006, Weinberg and Meskin 2006, Doggett and Egan 2007, Van Leeuwen 2013, Liao and 
Doggett 2014 – and indeed many others). Two interesting exceptions to this wide consensus are Leslie 
(1987, 1994, 2002) and Langland-Hassan (2012), which however I will not discuss here. 
14 I take this taxonomy and terminology from Velleman and Shah (2005); see also Velleman (2000) and 
Van Leeuwen (2009) for analogous distinctions/terminologies. A distinction similar (if not right 
coincident) with the distinction I am drawing here between cognitive and conative attitudes has been 
captured by some philosophers in terms of different directions of fit – mind-to-world vs. world-to-mind 
(see Anscombe 1957, Searle 1983, Humberstone 1992).  
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true that) I am a PhD student working on her thesis, or as a world where (it is true 
that) I am the Duchess of Cambridge on the day of her wedding. This seems to be 
what Hume was hinting at in the passage quoted above, observing that “imagination 
can feign a train of events with all the appearance of reality, ascribe to them a particular 
time and place, conceive them as existent”.  
What precisely does such ‘conceiving-as-existent’ or – as contemporary 
philosophers more often say – ‘regarding-as-true’ characteristic of both belief and in 
imagination amount to? I take it to involve at least two aspects. First, a phenomenal 
aspect: there is something that it is like to regard p as true (which is, arguably, what 
makes us intuitively grasp the similarity in this respect between beliefs and imaginings, 
as opposed to desires and intentions). Second, a cognitive aspect: insofar as a 
proposition is regarded as true, it is available to play some specific roles in our 
cognitive economy – notably in our theoretical reasoning – in ways that I am going to 
clarify. Let’s then say something more on these two aspects of regarding-as-true, and 
see how imagination and belief are alike in both of them.15 I will discuss the 
phenomenal aspects in §§ 3 and 4; § 5 will be devoted to the cognitive aspect. 
3. REGARDING-AS-TRUE: PHENOMENAL ASPECT (I) 
A first, phenomenal, aspect of regarding-as-true can be characterized in terms of a 
disposition to undergo certain kinds of conscious experiences in response to the 
relevant proposition which is regarded as true. Notably, a disposition to feel emotions 
that would be appropriate if the proposition in question were true (e.g. grief in the case 
of propositions describing a loss, fear in the case propositions describing a danger, joy 
in the case of propositions describing positive things, and so on). Imagination and 
belief are widely recognized to be alike in this respect. Imagining that my PhD viva will 
                                                          
15 Here it is worth noticing that my characterization of regarding-as-true is (partially) different from 
others that has been suggested. The notion of regarding-as-true is often associated to that of acceptance, 
which in turn has been characterized in somewhat different ways by different philosophers (see e.g. 
Stalnaker 1984, Cohen 1989, Bratman 1992, Velleman 2000). Velleman himself, to whom much of my 
views here are inspired, uses ‘regarding a proposition as true’ and ‘accepting a proposition’ 
interchangeably, analysing them in terms of a disposition to act in ways that would promote the 
satisfaction of one’s desires if the proposition in question were true: “Regarding a proposition as true – 
or, to introduce a term, accepting a proposition (…) involves a disposition to behave as would be 
desirable if the proposition were true, by doing things that would promote the satisfaction of one’s 
desires in that case. We can thus interpret the locution ‘regarding as...’ to mean ‘representing in a way 
that disposes one to behave as would be desirable if...’ – or just ‘...as if...’ for short”. (Velleman 2000: 250, 
255) I agree that regarding as true disposes us to act in the ways Velleman describes: this is indeed what 
I am going to argue in the next chapters. But here I won’t commit myself with the view that such 
behavioural dispositions are constitutive of regarding-as-true in the way Velleman suggests. At least for 
present purposes, I take the phenomenal and cognitive dispositions that I will describe to be sufficient 
for regarding a proposition as true. 
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be terribly hard can produce unpleasant feelings very similar to those generated by 
believing that it will be terribly hard; imagining that Harry Potter eventually manages to 
save his friend Ginny can make me sigh of relief as I would if I believed a young life to 
be saved. Apparently, the same proposition can elicit similar – if not identical – 
emotional responses whether it is believed or imagined. This is something we are all 
familiar with. It is also attested in a number of psychological studies, showing, among 
other things, that that the same physiological arousal underlies our emotional 
responses to beliefs and to imaginings.16 And the assumption of a close similarity – if 
not identity – between such responses informs common experimental practices: 
psychologists in their trials do often rely on (acknowledgedly) fictional scenarios in 
order to elicit emotions that subjects would be expected to have if they believed such 
scenarios to really obtain (see Izard 1991; Harris 2000: Ch.4). Importantly, imaginings 
and beliefs are not alike just in that they can elicit emotional responses, but also in that 
they can justify, or rationalize, them. Such responses will be more or less appropriate 
depending on how well they can be understood in the light of what the subject 
believes/imagines. So, for example, fear can be quite an appropriate response to my 
belief that there is a psychopath killer at large, but not to the belief that today is a 
sunny day. It can also be appropriate to my imagining – in watching Psycho – that 
Norman Bates is approaching Marion’s shower; but it does not seem appropriate to 
my imagining that Winnie the Pooh happily flies in a balloon.  
Note that here I have been oversimplifying things a bit: I have been ignoring 
some complexities concerning, respectively, the status of our affective responses to 
imaginings, and the role that other mental states – notably other conative states – play 
in generating such responses. In §§ 3.1 and 3.2 I shall briefly address these 
complexities. 
 
 
                                                          
16 Lang (1984) and Vrana and Lang (1990), for example found same reactions in terms of heart-rate, 
skin-conductance and startle responses. For a review and discussion of various classic studies on 
emotional reactions to imagined scenarios, see Harris (2000): Ch. 4. Damasio (1994) provides 
compelling evidence of how imaginative engagement with hypothetical scenarios/courses of action can 
produce emotional responses which match very closely those that would be produced by actual 
engagement with such scenarios/actions; Damasio also stresses the great adaptive value of our 
emotional sensitivity to imaginary stimuli (for further philosophical discussion of Damasio’s findings, 
see Gendler and Kovakovich 2006; Currie and Ravenscroft 2002: Ch. 9). Matheson and Schroeder 
(2006) discuss some evidence of the fact that emotional responses to acknowledgedly fictional stimuli 
and emotional responses to acknowledgedly non-fictional stimuli have the same or very similar neural 
correlates. 
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3.1. REAL EMOTIONS OR QUASI-EMOTIONS?  
I said that fear can be an appropriate emotional response to my imaginative 
engagement with Psycho’s shower scene. But it is a controversial question whether I can 
literally fear for Marion as I fear for the intended victims of a killer I believe to be 
around. According to some authors, the answer to this question is no, because genuine 
emotions require beliefs in the existence of their objects. So, as I do not believe, but 
merely imagine, that Marion exists, I cannot really fear for her: what I experience, 
though phenomenologically (and physiologically) alike to fear, is a different kind of 
state – call it ‘quasi-fear’, in Kendall Walton’s famous terminology (Walton 1978 and 
1990: Part II; for a more recent defence of this ‘quasi-emotions view’, see Friend 
2003). Other authors reject the idea that genuine emotions require beliefs in the 
existence of their objects. As Richard Moran pointed out, emotions are a broad and 
heterogeneous category. Some emotions might not require any belief at all: think of 
disgust at the perception of something rotten, surprise for something unexpected, or 
the discomfort most of us feel in witnessing surgery, though not believing that the 
patient is suffering. Other emotions – such as remorse, regret, or nostalgia – seem to 
involve beliefs about things that might have existed/happened but ultimately didn’t, or 
about things that existed in the past but do not exist anymore. Given the breadth of 
states that we are happy to count as genuinely emotional, Moran argues, it is unclear 
why affective responses to imaginings should be denied that status (Moran 1994: 76-
79; for other more recent defences of this sort of ‘genuine fictional emotions view’ see 
Currie and Ravenscroft 2002; Gendler and Kovakovich 2006). 
Perhaps the disagreement here is less radical than it may prima facie seem to be. 
After all, most parties in the debate agree that beliefs and imaginings can produce the 
same sort of phenomenological and physiological responses: we have seen that this is indeed 
something that also advocates of quasi-emotions concede (see in particular Walton 
1978: 6; Friend 2006: 35). And of course, on the other hand, advocates of genuine 
emotions must concede that such phenomenological and physiological responses are 
functionally distinct at least in this respect: they are generated by different (i.e. believed 
vs. imagined) stimuli. As I see it, the critical question here is then the question whether 
this is the only difference between such responses: i.e. the question whether what we have 
are phenomenological and physiological responses which only differ in that some of 
them are generated by beliefs while others are generated by imaginings.  
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If this is indeed the only difference, then we could arguably conclude that beliefs 
and imaginings have the same emotional effects after all. The reason why advocates of 
quasi-emotions reject this conclusion is that in their view the difference between the 
two classes of emotional responses here in question has not to do just with their 
(imagined vs. believed) inputs, but has also to do with their action outputs. When I 
‘fear’ for Marion I do not call the police as I would do (plausibly) if I feared for a real 
intended victim. As Walton puts it: “Fear is motivating in distinctive ways. (…) It puts 
pressure on one’s behaviour (even if one resists). To deny this would be radically to 
reconceive the notion of fear. Fear emasculated by subtracting its distinctive 
motivational force is not fear at all” (Walton 1990: 201-202).  
But is it actually true that emotional responses to beliefs systematically differ 
from emotional responses to imaginings in motivational force? I do not think so. 
Arguably, the distress that I feel when I imagine that my viva will be terribly hard can 
motivate me to frantically prepare my defence precisely as it would do the distress 
caused by the belief that my viva will be terribly hard.17 Admittedly, though, a proper 
defence of this claim is not straightforward, and requires a more careful general 
discussion of the relations between belief, imagination, and action. Indeed, here it 
should be noted that what motivates us act, strictly speaking, are not just (nor indeed 
directly) our emotions, but are rather the patterns of cognitive and conative attitudes in 
the context of which our emotions arise. Distress at the idea of a hard viva would not 
in itself motivate me to prepare, unless I also desired to pass my viva; if I just desired to 
forget my PhD and start a new different life, my distress might go with the decision to 
give up any preparation and fail to attend the viva. And my desire to pass the viva, in 
turn, would not be enough to motivate me, unless I could represent ways to fulfil it 
                                                          
17 Here one could also observe that the Psycho example I gave does not really show the difference 
between ‘fictional’ and ‘genuine’ emotions that it is supposed to show. Indeed, what I imagine in 
watching Psycho might not (and indeed, ought not to) be that there is a killer in action right now, 
approaching his victim in the shower. Perhaps what I imagine is rather that a real killer did such things 
in the past, and the film reports them (or something like this). If this is the case, then the fact that I do 
not call the police does not in itself reveal a difference between the motivating force of emotions elicited 
by imagination and the motivating force of emotions elicited by belief: arguably, I would not call the 
police even if I believed that I am watching a documentary film reporting a frightening crime that really 
happened in the past (for considerations along these lines, see Matravers 1997). Now, I grant to Walton 
and friends that it is not hard to find better examples of cases where imagining and believing the very same 
thing produce the very same emotion (or emotion-like) experience, yet lead to different action outputs 
(e.g.: now I hear a footfall in the basement, I imagine that there is burglar there, and I feel scared; but this 
may not motivate me to call the police as it would do the scary belief that there is a burglar in the 
basement). However, as I shall argue in Chapter 5, I think that also in cases like this the fact that 
imaginings and beliefs do not motivate the same actions is not due to their having intrinsically different 
motivating and emotional powers, but it is rather due to contingent differences in the sets of the other 
mental states to which the imaginings and beliefs in question belong (on this, see Ch. 5: §2).  
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(e.g. unless I assumed that better preparation increases chances of better performance). The question 
of imagination and belief’s emotional powers, then, turns out to be strictly related to – 
and in various ways dependent on – the question of their motivational powers upon 
action. 
This latter question will be the focus of my discussion in Chapters 3, 4 and 5, 
where I shall argue that imagination and belief’s motivating powers are identical. Insofar 
as my arguments there will be successful, they will support a similar conclusion with 
respect to imagination and belief’s emotional powers.18 For the moment, I shall leave this 
question open. And I shall go on briefly discussing another related question, which has 
just emerged, concerning the relationships between belief, imagination and desire.  
3.2. REAL DESIRES OR ‘MAKE-DESIRES’?   
As my action of preparing for the viva depends on my desire to pass it, so does my 
feeling of distress. Indeed, when I said that such a feeling can be explained by the belief 
that the viva will be terribly hard, I told just part of the story. Such a belief disposes me 
to feel distressed only in conjunction with a desire to have a smooth and successful 
viva; if, for some twisted reason, I desired to go through a terribly hard viva, the belief 
that it will indeed be terribly hard would probably not distress me.19 Something similar 
will be true for the distress generated by my imagining a hard viva: whether it is believed 
or imagined, that scenario seems to be distress-generating only insofar as I desire a 
smooth, successful viva (or something like that). In the case of imaginings, however, 
things gets more complicated, because it is not always clear what desires could play the 
relevant explanatory role. The problem is most evident with imaginings concerning 
fictional entities. My relief when Harry Potter saves Ginny’s life seems to be naturally 
explained by saying that I desire Ginny to be saved; and indeed we do commonly give 
explanations of this sort. But postulating a desire like the one just mentioned raises 
perplexities somewhat similar to those just discussed in relation to emotions: can I 
really desire that Ginny is saved, while not believing that she exists?20 This looks 
                                                          
18 This is true insofar as the basic difference to which advocates of quasi-emotions appeal is a 
behavioural difference: if I will show that in fact there isn’t any behavioural difference between 
imagination and belief, this will undermine their argument for the emotional difference. Though 
admittedly there may be different sorts of arguments to differentiate our affective responses to 
imagination from our affective responses to belief, which may not be undermined by my arguments. 
19 Note that I am not arguing that all emotions depend on beliefs and desires. I am just suggesting that, 
when emotions depend on beliefs, they typically depend on desires as well. In the next section I will 
discuss a kind of emotional response to belief (and to imaginings) that does not seem to depend much 
on desires: i.e. an emotional experience of conviction (see § 4 below). 
20 The problem here is not so much with having desires involving things that we know to be non-
existent. At least some kinds of desires concerning non-existent things are quite common and 
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problematic. And it is not obvious how a real desire about a ‘non-existent entity’ could 
be satisfied – as indeed it seems to be – by what I make-believe (or by what the story 
makes true) about such entity, thereby generating my relief. That is why various 
authors have argued that it is not by appealing to desires like this that we can explain 
what goes on here. Currie (2002) and Doggett & Egan (2007) suggested that in order 
to account for emotional responses like my relief for Ginny’s final rescue we should 
recognize the existence of a mental state which is to desire as make-believe is to belief: 
call it ‘make-desire’.21 On this view what happens is that I make-believe that Ginny is in 
danger and make-desire that she be saved. Therefore, when eventually I make-believe 
that she is indeed saved, I have a reaction of relief (whether real-relief or quasi-relief).  
Many authors are sceptical about the existence of make-desires, though. Nichols 
(2004), for example, argues that make-desires are unnecessary to explain reactions like 
my relief for Ginny’s rescue, which can been more economically explained by real 
desires such as the desire that in Harry Potter’s story Ginny is saved (‘more economically’ 
insofar as we do not add a new category to our ontology of the mind). Sceptics like 
Nichols suggest that make-desires are also unnecessary to explain other phenomena for 
which they are postulated by their advocates, and point out a number of problems that 
emerge when we try to characterize them properly.22  
Like the debate on real emotions vs. quasi-emotions, that on real desires vs. 
make-desires has been very live in recent years, with a number of different arguments 
provided from both parties.23 I will discuss some of such arguments later on (see 
                                                                                                                                                                  
unproblematic. Take, for example, my desire to have a baby and call him Fred: I do not believe that a 
baby called Fred exists – what I desire is that such a currently non-existent thing as ‘my baby’ comes into 
existence and has the property of being called Fred. But in cases like Harry Potter and Ginny I do not 
seem to desire that such person as Ginny exists and that she has the property of being in danger and 
then being saved. Apparently, I simply desire that Ginny – whom I do not believe exists – is saved. This 
looks more problematic. 
21 As I noted above (footnote 11), this term is due Currie (1990), who will then shift (in Currie 2002) to 
talk in terms of ‘desire-like imaginings’ (see also Currie and Ravenscroft 2002). Doggett and Egan (2007) 
talk of ‘i-desires’. Here I take all these terms to refer to one and the same thing: an imaginative 
counterpart of real desires (analogous to the imaginative counterpart of real belief that I am discussing). 
Since I am calling the imaginative counterpart of belief ‘make-believe’, for uniformity I will use the term 
‘make-desire’ for the imaginative counterparts of desires. Later on I will sometimes talk in terms of 
belief-like and desire-like imaginings, adopting the terminology used by the authors I will be discussing.  
22 Other phenomena that make-desires are supposed to explain include our capacity to understand other 
people’s practical reasoning, and – as we shall see in Chapter 3 – pretence behaviours.  
23 The controversy on real vs. quasi-emotions can be dated back at least to Colin Radford’s seminal 
paper “How can we be moved by the fate of Anna Karenina?” (1975); and was very live in the Eighties 
and Nineties. The controversy on real vs. make-desires is a bit more recent. The existence of make-
desires was first defended by simulations theorists (such as Gordon 1986, Goldman 1989, Currie 1995, 
2002, as necessary to explain our capacity to predict and explain other people’s behaviour. As it has been 
observed, this controversy marks “one of the most important fault lines” between different theories of 
36 
 
Chapter 3, §4.4). For the moment, though, without taking a definite side in either of 
those two debates, I will ignore the complications that they raise, and simply assume 
the following, on which I think all parties agree: belief and imagination are alike in that 
they both can, generally in conjunction with desires (or desire-like states), explain – i.e. 
cause and rationalize – certain kinds of emotions (or emotion-like states). Both 
believing and imagining that p dispose me to undergo emotional experiences that 
would be appropriate if p were true, given my p-related desires (roughly, they dispose 
me to undergo positive reactions in cases where I take the truth of p to fulfil my 
desires, negative reactions otherwise). Such emotional experiences are a first important 
aspect of my regarding-as-true that p. 
4. REGARDING-AS-TRUE: PHENOMENAL ASPECT (II) 
Among all the emotional experiences appropriate to the truth of p that we are disposed 
to undergo when we regard p as true, there is one that is sometimes described in terms 
of ‘feeling it true’ that p (Cohen 1989; see also Ramsey 1926, Schwitzgebel 2002, Bayne 
and Pacherie 2005). This particular kind of phenomenal disposition deserves special 
attention in my discussion here, for at least two reasons. On the one hand, this 
disposition to feel-it-true plays an especially important role in the phenomenology of 
regarding-as-true. On the other hand – differently from other phenomenal dispositions 
such as those discussed so far, which are widely recognized to be associated both with 
belief and with imagination – the disposition to feel-it-true has often been taken to be 
an exclusive prerogative of belief, if not even the mark of belief, necessary and 
sufficient to distinguish it from imagination and other mental states.24 In order to argue 
that belief and imagination are alike in that they both regard their contents as true, I 
shall argue that a disposition to feel-its-content-true characterizes also our imaginings.  
4.1. FEELING IT TRUE 
To begin, we need to be clear on what such ‘feeling that a proposition is true’ consists 
in. Describing it in relation to belief, Jonathan Cohen says: 
                                                                                                                                                                  
imagination: “one of the main parameters on which different accounts of imagination differ” (Nichols 
2006: 9; Schellenberg 2013: 500).  
24 This is for example Cohen (1989)’s view. Other authors who take the disposition to feel-its-content 
true to be a key feature of belief are Schwitzgebel (2002) and Bayne and Pacherie (2005); see also 
Ramsey (1926), who talks of a “belief-feeling, or feeling of conviction”. Schwitzgebel takes this 
disposition to feel-true to be one of the most central dispositions belonging to what he calls beliefs’ 
“dispositional stereotypes” (though he grants that it is not strictly speaking sufficient for belief; as indeed 
in his view no behavioural or phenomenal disposition in itself is: see Schwitzgebel 2002: 252-253).  
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Feeling it true that p (...) takes different forms. One may feel convinced by the 
evidence of its being true that p, one may feel surprised to learn of an event that 
is evidence against its being true that p, one may feel pleased at its being true that 
p, and so on... (Cohen 1989: 368) 
Admittedly, from this description it is not obvious that a disposition to feel it true that 
p is anything over and above the general disposition to undergo any emotional 
experiences appropriate to the truth of p (such as, to continue Cohen’s list, 
disappointment if p is undesired, fear if p describes a danger, admiration if p describes 
something remarkable, and so on...). However, I think that we can, among all the 
emotional experiences appropriate to the truth of a given proposition p, identify one 
which is most peculiarly characterized by the feeling that p is true – one, we could say, 
which has as formal object the persuasiveness of p:25 that is what Cohen calls a feeling 
of conviction concerning p. We can also describe it as a feeling of assent to an ‘internal 
utterance’ of p: something like what one experiences in telling silently to herself “Yes: 
p!” (see Schwitzgebel 2002: 252).26 It is this peculiar kind of experience that I will refer 
to here with the expression ‘feeling it true that p’.27 Of course, there is likely to be a 
strict relation between such a feeling and all other emotional reactions to p that one 
might have: plausibly, the more one feels confident that p is true, the more intensely 
she will respond emotionally to it in a number of different ways. It might even be the 
case that a minimal degree of feeling-p-true is necessary in order to undergo any other 
possible emotional experience directed towards p (so that, e.g., I can’t really fear the 
dog snarling at me if I don’t feel at all true that a dog is snarling at me28). Yet, none of 
this means that one’s feeling true that p can simply be factorized into her other p-
related feelings/emotions.  
4.2. CONDITIONS OF MANIFESTATION: THE ‘OCCURRENCE CONDITION’.  
A feeling of confidence/truth like that just described can be observed clearly in some 
newly acquired beliefs. While waiting for a response about a paper I submitted to a 
                                                          
25 Formal object of an emotion is the evaluative category under which all the particular objects that are 
appropriate for that emotion fall (see Lyon 1980). So, if the formal object of fear is ‘the dangerous’, and 
the formal object of love is ‘the appealing’, the formal object of conviction/feeling of truth will be 
something like ‘the persuasive’. That is: particular objects are feared insofar as they are experienced as 
dangerous, they are loved insofar as they are perceived as appealing, and they are felt-true insofar as they 
are perceived as persuasive.  
26 Note that this feeling of conviction that makes me tell silently to myself p, in turn, is likely to dispose 
me to openly assert it: we are generally disposed to sincerely assert what we feel convinced about (in 
appropriate circumstances). 
27 Here I will use such expressions as ‘feeling it true that...’, ‘feeling of truth about...’, ‘feeling convinced 
about...’, ‘feeling confident that...’ interchangeably. 
28 This is indeed why I said that feeling it true plays an especially important role in the phenomenology 
of regarding as true. 
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conference, I might wonder whether it has been accepted and hope that it has; but I 
don’t feel assent to the proposition that MY PAPER HAS BEEN ACCEPTED. Then, 
when eventually, reading an email, I come to believe that it has been accepted, I am 
likely to think silently to myself: “Yes: it has been accepted!”, feeling a kind of internal 
assent to this. Of course, I won’t actually feel like that for all the time that I hold such 
belief. When I make holiday plans with my friends at dinner, I don’t think about the 
conference and I don’t have any feeling about it. I still believe that my paper has been 
accepted, but the disposition to ‘feel it true’ is not expected to be manifest now, unless 
the relevant proposition comes to mind (e.g., in case a friend at some point asks me 
whether I’ve got any news about the paper I submitted). Indeed, it is important to 
specify that believing that p disposes me to feel it true that p on the condition that I pay 
some attention to p, that p is occurrently present ‘before my mind’. Call this the ‘occurrence 
condition’. If this occurrence condition is not met, a lack of manifestation of the 
disposition to feel it true can be ‘excused’, without thereby compromising the holding 
of the disposition itself.29  
Note that this ‘occurrence condition’ holds also for the manifestation of 
‘standard’ emotions such as those discussed in the previous section: fear, distress, 
happiness, etc.. In relation to such emotions, I only mentioned a ‘desire condition’ – 
observing that the belief that my viva will be hard makes me feeling anxious if I desire to 
pass my viva. But another relevant condition is that the idea of a hard viva is occurrently 
before my mind: when I am not thinking about it, I might well not feel anxious at all – 
and this would not mean that I’m not disposed to feel anxious in response to the hard 
viva idea.30  
Also the other conditions of manifestation that I am going to discuss in relation 
to the disposition to feel it true apply to ‘standard’ emotional dispositions as well. In 
my view, indeed, the disposition to feel it true is not substantially different from all 
                                                          
29 I am not arguing that the satisfaction of such ‘occurrence condition’ is in itself sufficient to guarantee 
that the disposition to feel it true is manifested (for, as we shall see, there are also other relevant 
conditions). Nor am I arguing that the satisfaction of such ‘occurrence condition’ is necessary for the 
manifestation of that disposition to be possible. (My guess is that it wouldn’t be possible to feel it true 
that p without having p before your mind; but if it were possible, that wouldn’t be a problem for my 
view.) Probably the best way to understand the condition in question is in terms of the ‘excusing 
condition’ to which it gives raise if it is not met: if the ‘occurrence condition’ is not met, this constitutes an excusing 
condition for the non-manifestation of the disposition to feel it true. The same holds for the other conditions that I 
am going to discuss. 
30 Note also that if on the one hand the occurrence condition holds for any kind of emotions, on the 
other hand the ‘desire condition’ does not seem to hold for the disposition to feel it true: it seems that if 
I believe that my paper has been accepted and this proposition is occurrently before my mind, I will feel 
it true anyway, irrespective of what I desire (see footnote 19 above). 
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other emotional dispositions. Most importantly, like all other emotional dispositions, it 
is associated both with belief and imagination. Here is where my view differs from 
most others: while (almost) everyone would agree that both believing and imagining 
that my paper has been accepted dispose me to experience some pleasant feelings 
(whether feelings of satisfaction or of ‘quasi-satisfaction’), no one I know would agree 
with me that both believing and imagining that my paper has been accepted dispose 
me to feel it true that it has been accepted. It is commonly assumed that only believing, 
but not imagining, that it has been accepted would dispose me to feel that true. Against 
this common assumption, I shall argue that imagination disposes us to feel its contents true 
basically as belief does. 
Note that of course this feeling-true – as any other emotional experience – 
comes in degrees. But, for the sake of simplicity, I am now going to treat it as an ‘all-
or-nothing’ matter (as I have done with all emotional experiences so far). My point is 
that belief and imagination do not differ in disposing us to feel their contents true, nor 
do they differ in the intensity of the feeling-true they dispose us to undergo: it is not 
the case that believing p disposes us to feel more convinced about p than imagining p 
does. This feeling of truth/conviction and the different degrees in which it comes 
depend on factors/conditions that are the same for belief and for imagination. 
4.3. IMAGININGS WHICH FEEL TRUE… 
The fact that we can feel what we imagine to be true is, I take it, a common experience. 
Consider again a classic case of daydreaming. Maria is falling in love with John, and 
thinks of him all the time. Now she attends a lecture, but doesn’t follow a word of it. 
Instead, she fantasizes that John surprizes her, calling for her at the University, and 
taking her out for dinner. Actually, she knows that John is not even in town today, but 
this doesn’t affect her daydream, where she vividly represents him waiting for her at 
the end of the lecture. She imagines their meeting in great detail – how John is dressed, 
what he tells her, her first reaction in seeing him, and so on. The more details she adds, 
the more she gets carried away by the daydream, which feels so true. Indeed, it feels so 
true that she winces with surprize when all her mates in the classroom get up as the 
lecture is finished, reminding her that nothing of what is going on in her mind is really 
true. Though some of us may be ‘more daydreamers’ than others, experiences like the 
one just described – of becoming absorbed in something you imagine, feeling it more 
and more true – are not uncommon. They might be even more common in cases of 
engagement with fictions and with pretence games. Works of fiction can make us feel 
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that the stories they tell are true; and enjoying them is often also a matter of leaving 
such feeling to become phenomenologically predominant. Watching Psycho, it is hard 
not to feel the story of Marion, Norman and all the others to be true: especially in 
some engrossing passages we might feel really convinced that it is. While Norman 
Bates is approaching the shower, don’t we typically think silently to ourselves (and 
sometimes also aloud) such things as: “Oh, he is approaching the shower! Marion 
doesn’t realizes this! Something awful is going to happen!” – feeling internal assent to 
these propositions? (And, remember, such a ‘feeling of internal assent’ is precisely what 
the ‘feeling of truth’ amounts to.) This of course does not mean that we don’t know, at 
some level, that such propositions are false – and not even that we temporarily 
suspend our disbelief in them; but just that in that moment we are so immersed in the 
story that we feel it true.31 Similarly, a child fully immersed in a pretence game may feel 
it really true that she is a prisoner in her enemy’s hands, waiting for her fellows pirates 
to free her; or that she is a mother, lulling her new-born baby to sleep; and such things 
as toy swords and dolls help to enhance that feeling. These are all paradigmatic cases of 
imagination’s exercise where what is imagined is felt true.  
4.4. ...AND IMAGININGS WHICH FEEL FALSE 
Admittedly, there are also many similarly paradigmatic cases where we imagine 
something without feeling it to be true; if not even feeling it to be false, made up, merely 
fictional. That is often the case with counterfactual imaginings, such as those we 
deploy in thought experiments or hypothetical reasoning. While reading “The Meaning 
of Meaning”, trying to assess Putnam’s argument for semantic externalism, we do not 
typically feel it true that there is a planet like Twin Earth, silently thinking to ourselves 
such things as: “Oh, yes: I have doppelganger who drinks twin-water!”. And, actually, 
also daydreams, fictions and pretence games are not always felt true as in the examples 
just discussed. When, cycling in a rainy winter day in Nottingham, I daydream about 
my summer bike rides in Tuscany, what I imagine might well feel sadly far from truth. 
When I play with my little nephew his favourite game – ‘the underground’ (consisting 
of opening and closing the kitchen sliding door, simulating the loudspeaker 
announcements of the stops) – I might well imagine to be in the underground without 
                                                          
31 And indeed we would react with surprize if, in the thick of it, the video suddenly blacked-out and the 
lights in the cinema were turned on, reminding us that the story on the screen is not actually true. If this 
happened, by the way, we would also be annoyed. The capacity fictional works have to (re)create 
alternative realities, making us feeling them true, is generally something we value and search in them: 
that is indeed one reason why many of us enjoy highly realistic representational media, such as 
stereoscopic 3D – which enhance such feelings of truth.  
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feeling this true; differently from him, who apparently is completely identified with the 
stationmaster.  
The fact that in many cases we imagine without feeling what we imagine to be 
true does not itself undermine the claim that imagination disposes us to feel-true as 
belief does. After all, as we have seen, everyone agrees that belief disposes us to feel its 
contents true even if many – indeed most – of the things that we believe at a given 
time are not things that we actually feel true at that time. We do not feel our non-
occurrent beliefs to be true; but in these cases a lack of manifestation of the disposition 
to feel-true does not undermine the holding of the disposition itself, because the 
‘occurrence condition’ – i.e. the condition that p is occurrently present before our 
mind – is not met. The point, however, is that in the cases just considered of imagining 
p without feeling it true that p the occurrence condition seems to be always met. If 
what I imagine about cycling in Tuscany, or about being in the underground, doesn’t 
feel true, this is not because the relevant propositions – such as I AM CYCLING IN 
TUSCANY; I AM IN THE UNDERGROUND – aren’t occurrently present before 
my mind. Indeed, according to some, if these propositions weren’t occurrently present 
before my mind it wouldn’t be possible to imagine them at all, for there are no such 
things as non-occurrent imaginings comparable (somehow) to non-occurrent beliefs 
(see Currie 1995a: 160-161). Actually, I don’t think this is quite right.32 But anyway, 
whether imagining something non-occurrently is possible or not, we can agree that this 
is not what happens in the cases we are considering, which are certainly cases where I 
occurrently imagine something and yet I do not feel it true – therefore, cases where the 
lack of manifestation of the disposition to feel-true is not ‘excused’ by the fact that the 
occurrence condition is not met. Shall we then conclude that such cases reveal that 
imagination does not dispose us to feel its contents true as belief does? No. Let’s see 
why not. 
4.5. CONDITIONS OF MANIFESTATION: THE ‘OCCURRENT META-BELIEF CONDITION’ 
Arguably, the reason why my daydream about Tuscany doesn’t feel true as Maria’s 
daydream about John, or why my pretence that I’m in the underground doesn’t feel 
true as my nephew’s pretence that he is, is that in both cases there is something that 
prevents me from being fully immersed in what I imagine in the same way in which 
                                                          
32 I am with Walton on this. Walton (1990) convincingly argues that we can have non-occurrent 
imaginings as well as non-occurrent beliefs (Walton 1990: 16-17). Nichols (2004) also argues along these 
lines, criticizing Currie (1995). 
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Maria and my nephew are: something that keeps reminding me that I am, after all, just 
imagining. Maria, sitting comfortably in the classroom, is not interested in the lecture. 
In this period she has just one thing in mind: John. This makes it easy for her to pay 
no attention to what she believes about her actual situation and to get completely 
absorbed in her daydream; something that is harder for me, when I cycle with the rain 
pouring in my face clearly reminding me that I am in England and not in Tuscany. 
Similarly, for my nephew – who is mad about trains and, as all children, keen to 
pretence play – it is quite easy to get absorbed in his game without thinking that it is 
just a game, therefore feeling it true. Again, this is much easier for him than it is for me, 
as I do not find the game so exciting and I am not really absorbed in it. The reason 
why deeper absorption into one’s imaginings is associated with a stronger feeling that 
they are true should be clear: insofar as one is immersed in what is imagined, one 
assumes a perspective internal to it, focussing all the attention on it, rather than (also) 
on the fact of being imagining. From this internal perspective, what is imagined is just 
true: if from an external perspective it is true in the game (i.e. fictionally true) that the 
kitchen is a coach, from a perspective internal to the game itself it is simply true that the 
kitchen is a coach – and so it is felt. Of course, this is not to say that the imaginer who 
takes such internal perspective does not believe any more that she is imagining (rather 
than believing) to be in a coach; she simply does not occurrently believe that.  
What the previous examples suggest, then, is that imagining that p disposes us to 
feel it true that p on the condition that we do not occurrently think about the fact that 
we are just imagining p – or, more precisely, that we do not have the occurrent (meta-) 
belief that we do not really believe that p. Call this the ‘occurrent meta-belief condition’.  
What I argue is that the same condition just described holds also in cases where 
it is a belief that p which disposes us to feel it true that p. If I believe that p and p is 
occurrently present before my mind, but for some reason I also occurrently believe that 
I do not believe that p (e.g. if for some reason I mistake my belief that p for an 
imagining that p), then I might well not feel it true that p. And, I take it, this lack of 
manifestation of the disposition to feel it true would be excused, since the occurrent 
meta-belief condition is not met.  
4.5.1. BELIEF AND SELF-KNOWLEDGE. I can concede that cases in which the occurrent 
meta-belief condition is not satisfied are less frequent with belief than with imaginings. 
With belief, a non-satisfaction of such condition means that the subject is wrong about 
what she believes: she actually believes that p, but also believes that she doesn’t believe 
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that p. This something that common opinion takes to be very rare, if possible at all: 
“Of course I know what I believe!”, we are generally keen to think, crediting ourselves 
with a privileged introspective access to our own minds, and to our beliefs in 
particular. In fact, the question whether we really have such a privileged introspective 
access to our own beliefs and deliberations is controversial. Some deny that we do, 
insisting that we know them by interpreting our behavior in much the same way we 
come to know of other people’s beliefs and deliberations (see Carruthers 2010). And 
anyway, even granting some form of privileged introspective access, this does not 
mean that mistakes are impossible, or even very rare: privileged is not the same as 
infallible. Both common experience and empirical research suggest that a number of 
factors can blur our view of our own mind, and make us believe – maybe just 
temporarily – that we do not believe something that in fact we do. When this happens, 
it seems likely that we won’t feel what we believe to be true.  
Consider for example the following case, from a famous psychological 
experiment. Subjects were asked to write an essay in defence of a thesis they initially 
firmly disagreed with. A first group was asked to do that for a paltry sum of money; a 
second group for a more substantial sum of money. After having written the essay, 
they were re-asked again for their opinion about the thesis they defended. The result 
was that subjects in the first group expressed much more agreement with such thesis 
than they previously did, while subjects in the second group expressed the same 
disagreement as before. So apparently subjects in the first group lose their initial 
conviction that the thesis was wrong (i.e.: they didn’t feel their initial belief to be true 
anymore); while subjects in the second group remained just as convinced as they 
previously were (Cohen 1962; see also Linder et al. 1965 for a replication of these 
results).33 How can this difference be explained? The suggestion that subjects in the 
first group changed their beliefs about the thesis in question, while subjects in the 
second group didn’t, is not really explanatory – it simply shifts the question: why does 
defending a thesis for inadequate pay make you changing your mind more than 
defending it for adequate pay? If what happened is that writing the essay influenced 
subjects’ beliefs by making them realizing previously ignored good reasons in favour of 
the thesis in question, it would still remain mysterious why receiving a little pay should 
make them seeing better reasons than receiving a higher pay. A more plausible and 
powerful explanation, suggested by Peter Carruthers, is that subjects in the first group 
                                                          
33 See footnote 26 above on the relation between feeling-true that p and asserting that p. 
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didn’t change their beliefs, but formed a wrong meta-belief about what they really 
believed, on the basis of reasoning like this: “Since I spent all that time writing the 
essay for a small sum of money, and since it was my choice to do so, it must be the 
case that I thought it worthwhile to defend the position in question. So I must believe 
it” (Carruthers 2010: 95). While subjects in the second group didn’t form any such 
belief, as they could easily see a reason for what they did: they were well-paid. This 
would explain the asymmetry in the answers of the two groups when asked again about 
their position on the thesis defended. 
Now, admittedly there might be other explanations here. I am not claiming to 
have established that Carruthers’ explanation is the best possible one (although I think 
that it is). But little in my argument depends on this. All that matters for my argument 
is that if Carruthers’ suggested explanation is correct, we have a clear case where 
subjects (those in the first group) believe that p (THIS THESIS IS WRONG), but 
believe they believe not p (SINCE I WROTE THE ESSAY, I MUST BELIEVE THIS 
THESIS IS NOT WRONG); and this seems to justify the fact that – at least for the 
time in which the mistaken meta-belief is occurrently present in their mind – they do 
not feel it true that p. If you are not persuaded that this was what actually happened to 
subjects in the experiment, you might probably think of different cases where someone 
is mistaken about her own beliefs; and even if you had it such mistakes about your 
own beliefs are psychologically impossible, or almost never happen, what is important 
for my argument is that you agree with me that in the hypothetical case where such 
mistakes happened, they would justify a lack of feeling it true that p. Which looks, I 
take it, very plausible. 
The suggestion so far is then the following: both believing and imagining that p 
dispose a subject S to feel it true that p insofar as: 
(i) S has p occurrently present before her mind (occurrence condition); and, 
(ii) S does not have an occurrent belief that she doesn’t really believe that p 
(occurrent meta-belief condition).34 
In cases of belief, condition (ii) is often met, since we generally know what we believe 
(though mistakes here might be more frequent than we tend to assume). While 
condition (i) very often is not met, since – due to the limits of our attention – most of 
the propositions we believe at a time t are not occurrently present in our mind at t (and 
indeed many of them might almost never be occurrently present). With imagination, 
                                                          
34 For a clarification about how to understand these two conditions, see footnote 29 above.  
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the opposite seems to be the case. Condition (i) is often met, at least by the imaginings 
that we commonly ascribe to each other, which are generally occurrent (even without 
assuming that imaginings are by necessity occurrent). While condition (ii) sometimes is 
met (when we are immersed in our imaginings), and sometimes is not (in cases where 
we consciously think of our imaginings as imaginings). These differences, anyway, do 
not indicate that imagining p doesn’t dispose us to feel p true as believing p does. 
Imagining and believing dispose us to feel p true on the same conditions; the 
differences between them are in the satisfaction of such conditions.35 
4.6. OTHER RELEVANT CONDITIONS OF MANIFESTATION 
 Note that (i) and (ii) are not the only relevant conditions of manifestation for the 
disposition to feel true associated to belief and to imagination. A number of cases 
where we do not feel what we believe/imagine to be true suggest that there are various 
other conditions which, if not met, might excuse a lack of manifestation of such 
disposition.  
Take for example cases where we say things like: “I can’t believe that p!”. What 
we mean in such cases is not literally that we cannot (or do not) believe that p, but 
rather that, though we have come, on the basis of relevant evidence, to believe that p, 
we still struggle to feel it true that p. So, for example, if I believe with conviction that 
my paper is going to be rejected, when I am notified that it has been accepted I might 
come to believe that it has been accepted, but for a while I might still be unable to feel 
that true: ‘it has not sunk in yet’. Believing that p, we can then say, disposes us to feel it 
true that p insofar as we have enough time to become acquainted with the idea that p 
is the case. Call this the ‘sinking in time condition’. If this condition is not met, we 
might believe that p without feeling p to be true.36 
Or take another case, widely discussed in the recent philosophical literature: the 
Grand Canyon Skywalk.37 People who visit the Skywalk arguably believe it to be safe, 
                                                          
35 In Chapter 5 I shall argue that the same is true for imagination and belief’s dispositional connection to 
action: imagining and believing dispose us act in the same ways and under the same conditions; the 
differences between their behavioural manifestations are due to differences in the satisfaction of such 
conditions. This is a line of argument originally defended by J. David Velleman (Velleman 2000). 
36 Admittedly this is a rough and just approximate formulation of the condition in question (and the 
same holds for the other condition I’m going to introduce in this section). I am just trying to give an 
idea of a few further conditions that might be relevant for feeling our beliefs/imaginings to be true. 
37 That is a popular attraction in the Grand Canyon: a mile-high glass-bottom walkway extending 70 feet 
from the Canyon’s rim, overlooking the Colorado River, seemingly unsupported. The example has been 
brought to contemporary philosophers’ attention by Tamar Gendler, who introduced it among her 
paradigmatic examples of “alief”-driven behaviours; though as she notes, ‘precipice-cases’ like this were 
discussed by philosophers (e.g. Hume) since early-modern period (see Gendler 2008a: 561-562). 
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but while walking on it they might well struggle to feel it true that it really is. They 
might repeat to themselves that it is perfectly safe without feeling internal assent to this 
proposition. The lack of feeling of conviction in such a case seems to be due to a 
conflict between beliefs and perceptions: people believe that the Skywalk is safe, but 
they see a precipice which they perceive as dangerous, and such perception has a 
stronger power on their feelings than their belief has. This suggests that believing that 
p disposes us to feel it true that p insofar as we don’t have perceptions which conflict 
with such belief in the way just seen. Call this the ‘no rival perceptions condition’. If 
this condition is not met, we might believe that p without feeling it true that p.38  
Both the ‘no rival perception condition’ and the ‘sinking in time condition’ seem 
to hold also in cases of imaginings. Watching a fictional movie where characters walk 
on the Skywalk glass, I might imagine that they are safe – taking it to be true in the 
story that they are; yet, seeing them suspended in the void might prevent me to feel 
fully convinced that they are. When, at the end of Hitchcock’s Stage Fright, Jonathan 
Cooper turns out to be the murder, contrary to what we had been led to think up to 
that point, we might have a moment where we struggle to feel it true that he is the 
murder, even if we imagine this to be true in the story.39 
It is worth noticing, again, that in all these examples the relevant feeling of 
truth/conviction is not really an all-or-nothing matter as I have treated it for the sake 
of simplicity, but actually comes in degrees. Although I might feel somehow 
unconvinced that Skywalk is safe, or that my paper has been accepted, this doesn’t 
mean that I don’t feel it to be true at all. But what matters to my point is that these 
different degrees of conviction do not depend on whether the proposition is believed 
or imagined; they depend on a number of conditions which are the same for belief and 
for imagination. Belief and imagination, dispose us to feel their contents true in much 
                                                          
38 Note that cases like this need not be perception-dependent: someone who fears flying might well 
believe that the aircraft is safe, and repeat this to herself during the flight, without feeling this to be true. 
Probably in such a case the lack of feeling of truth might be explained by a rival imagining concerning 
dangers of flying. We might then hypothesize a ‘no rival imagining condition’ analogous to the ‘no rival 
perception condition’ just discussed. This would explain why an actor who believes that he is not 
Ulysses may not feel this belief true when, while performing Ulysses’ role on the stage, he tells to the 
Cyclops Polyphemus “I’m not Ulysses”.  
39 In fact, the question whether it is really true in Hitchcock’s story that he is the murder may be 
controversial (Hitchcock’s use of flash-back here makes it hard to settle the issue). Here I am just 
assuming that some viewers (like me) imagine it to be true in the story that he is the murder, yet (for a 
while at least) they struggle to feel it true. 
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the same ways – i.e. on the same conditions – differing only with respect to the 
satisfaction of such conditions.40 
4.7. SUMMING UP 
So where are we? I started from the observation that in paradigmatic cases belief and 
imagination are alike in that they have the same kind of contents and they both ‘regard 
such contents as true’; and I am trying to spell out what, plainly speaking, such 
regarding-as-true amounts to. So far I have considered a first important dimension of 
it: a phenomenal dimension. In §§ 3 and 4 have argued that both belief and imagination 
regard their contents as true in the sense that they dispose us to undergo certain kinds 
of conscious experiences in response to such contents: experiences that include various 
kinds of emotions and a peculiar sense of conviction/feeling of truth. In § 5 I am 
going to consider another important dimension of regarding-as-true: a cognitive 
dimension.  
5. REGARDING AS TRUE: COGNITIVE ASPECT 
Regarding a proposition as true does not involve only being disposed to respond 
emotionally to it in ways that would be appropriate if it were true, but it also involves 
being disposed to treat it as true in one’s reasoning: to ignore, at least temporarily, the 
possibility that it is false, in order to explore the consequences that would follow from 
its being true.41  
This is another respect in which belief and imagination are widely recognized to 
be alike. If I come to believe that black truffles are cheap, I shall conclude that most 
people can afford black truffles every day. If I read a fictional story which says that 
black truffles are cheap, I may well draw the same conclusion: most people can afford 
black truffles every day. Of course, in this latter case I don’t come to believe this 
conclusion as I did in the first case: now I just imagine it to be true in the story.42 But I 
draw the same inference in both cases. While I wouldn’t draw that inference if I desired 
black truffles to be cheap. That is because in desiring black truffles to be cheap I 
wouldn’t regard it as true that they are; and the conclusion that most people can afford 
                                                          
40 Here I have discussed just some of the relevant conditions. I take the burden of the proof to find 
conditions that make a difference between belief and imagination to be on my opponent. 
41 This is how Stalnaker characterizes the notion of acceptance: “To accept a proposition is to treat it as 
a true proposition in one way or another – to ignore, for the moment at least, the possibility that it is 
false” (Stalnaker 1984: 79).  
42 More precisely, I imagine it to be true (true tout court) – and I believe it to be true in the story (see Currie 
1990: Ch.2). 
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truffles every day only follows if I consider the consequences of it being true that 
truffles are cheap.43  
Here it is worth noticing that when, reading the fictional story where truffles are 
cheap, I conclude that most people can afford them, a tacit premise of my inference is 
something I believe about cheap things – namely, that they are things which most people 
can afford. Inferences of this kind play a crucial role in our engagement with fictional 
stories. Authors do not have to (nor indeed reasonably could) tell us everything they 
want us to imagine; they rely on us using our general knowledge to fill out their stories 
with relevant information that is not explicit in the text (for discussions about the 
principles that guide such a ‘filling out’, see Lewis 1978; Currie 1990: Ch. 2; Walton 
1990: Ch.4).44 If Holmes is said to receive a bullet wound in his chest, competent 
readers will infer that he won’t recover in hours or days, importing their beliefs about 
bullets’ effects and human physiology into Holmes’ story – more or less in the 
following way: 
P1) Holmes has received a bullet wound in his chest. (Something readers imagine) 
P2) No one who receives a bullet wound in his chest recovers in hours or days. 
(Something readers believe, therefore also imagine) 
.·. Holmes won’t recover in hours/days. (Something readers imagine)45  
Inferences like this are possible insofar as belief and imagination have isomorphic 
contents; and inferential mechanisms process propositions only on the basis of their 
contents, irrespective of whether they are believed or imagined. Though this doesn’t 
mean that such mechanisms are completely blind to the belief/imagination distinction: 
when they work properly, they operate in such a way as to ensure that when the 
premises of an inference are imagined and not believed, the conclusion of the 
inference, too, will be an imagining and not a belief – as in the example just seen.46  
                                                          
43 Desires qua desires do not function as premises in theoretical reasoning: even though, of course, I can 
draw consequences from a proposition that I desire, in order to do that I need – if only for a moment – 
to regard this proposition as true in a way in which only belief or imagination do. Something like this 
seems indeed what happens in cases of ‘wishful thinking’, where a proposition that is desired (for the 
mere fact of being desired) starts being regarded as true. 
44 As Tamar Gendler notes: “The narrator needs to assume that the listener shares a wide range of back-
ground beliefs about the world, and the listener needs to assume that the narrator assumes this, and so 
on, in a familiar Gricean fashion” (Gendler 2000: 76).  
45 See Currie (2002): 206-207. 
46 Though note that things can go wrong, and we sometimes end up believing conclusions drawn from 
imagined premises (for a discussion of cases like this occurring in our engagement with fictions, see 
Currie and Ichino 2015). Note also that it is not clear that all inferences which have an imagining among 
their premises should end up with an imagined conclusion. If it is true that imaginability entails 
conceptual possibility, then there would be modal inferences where from imagined premises (I imagine 
q) we come to believe some conclusions (I believe q to be possible).  
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Research in developmental psychology shows that children engaged in pretence 
make similar inferences from a remarkably young age, importing into their games many 
things they believe to be true in the real world.47 If (in the game) Sam takes a shot at 
Rob, they will both spontaneously infer that Rob is now wounded, drawing on their 
beliefs about the effects of shooting (unless, of course, special assumptions were made 
in the game, such as the assumption that Rob is invulnerable). Will they also infer that 
Rob won’t recover in hours or days? Perhaps; but not necessarily. Maybe for the sake 
of the game it is rather better to ‘allow’ Rob being back in full form within seconds, 
ignoring that a consequence of being shot is to be out of action for a long time. Here it 
is worth noting that a decision of this sort would not be possible if they believed, rather 
than merely imagined, that Sam has been shot. Indeed, when we believe something it 
does not seem to be up to us to decide what consequences we draw from it. Although 
factors such as interest and attention do arguably play a role in determining what 
inferences (among the myriad possible ones) are deployed in different cases, ignoring 
the obvious consequences of something we believe cannot just be a matter of conscious 
deliberation. An important difference between imagination and belief seems finally to 
be coming out, then. I will return to this in the next chapter. For the moment, though, 
I would rather conclude by emphasizing the striking similarity that has emerged so far, 
which I have described as a cognitive dimension of ‘regarding as true’: both when we 
imagine and when we believe that p we can – and are somehow disposed to – draw 
theoretical inferences from p.48  
The parallel between belief and imagination in this respect seems to be even 
closer – and, indeed, more uncontroversially recognized – than the parallel in the 
emotional respect considered above (§ 2). If, as we have seen, some deny that a 
proposition can have the same emotional effects whether it is believed or imagined, no 
one really questions that a proposition can make the same contribution to our 
theoretical reasoning whether it is believed or imagined: no one would argue that 
inferences drawn from imagined propositions are not real inferences but quasi-
                                                          
47 The classic reference here are Alan Leslie’s seminal studies (Leslie 1987, 1994). See also Harris (2000): 
notably Chapter 2. The literature on these topics is really vast; for some further references see my 
discussion of pretence in Chapter 3, §4. 
48 The specification ‘theoretical’ here is necessary because propositions that are not regarded as true – 
but, for example, as to be made true – play crucial roles in practical reasoning; while only propositions 
regarded as true enter in theoretical reasoning.  
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inferences. It is sometimes said that imagination ‘preserves’ (or ‘mirror’) 49 the 
inferential role of belief; but this should not – nor, I take it, is meant to – suggest that 
our inferential mechanisms are primarily suited to process beliefs, while imaginings 
exploit such mechanisms in a kind of parasitic, subaltern way. Indeed, inferences from 
imagined premises do not occur just in the context of engagement with fiction and 
pretence games, but are pervasive in our thinking: they are what make all our 
counterfactual or hypothetical thinking possible. So imagination and belief regard their 
contents as true also in this ‘cognitive’ sense: we can include both imagined and 
believed propositions into bits of our theoretical reasoning, drawing inferences from 
them. 
CONCLUSION  
In this Chapter I have introduced Hume’s Problem (so-called), which will be a central 
thread of this thesis: how does imagination differ from belief? I have sought to explain 
how the problem arises, considering some striking similarities between imagination and 
belief that make it hard to set the one apart from the other. I have argued that 
imaginings and beliefs have the same sort of contents: they both have propositional 
contents. And that they ‘regard’ such contents in the same way: they both regard such 
contents as true. Talking in terms of ‘regarding as true’ is, of course, metaphorical. As 
David Velleman once observed, surely this locution shouldn’t be understood as 
positing “an inner eye that squints at propositions or raises its eyebrow at them so as to 
regard them in different ways” (Velleman 2000: 182). Most of my discussion in this 
chapter has then been devoted to clarifying this metaphor.  
I have suggested that regarding a proposition p as true involves at least two 
aspects. First, a phenomenal aspect: insofar as I regard p as true, I am disposed to 
undergo emotions that would be appropriate if p were true (emotions which include 
also a peculiar feeling of conviction about p). Second, a cognitive aspect: insofar as I 
regard p as true, I am disposed to treat p as true in my reasoning, drawing theoretical 
inferences from it. I take these two aspects to be both necessary and jointly sufficient 
for regarding a proposition as true. I do also take it that (leaving aside the disposition 
to feel convinced about p –which is often taken to be an exclusive prerogative of 
belief) most parties in the debate agree that imagination and belief are alike in the 
                                                          
49 See e.g. Currie (2002); Gendler (2003); Currie & Ichino (2013): strictly speaking, both preservation and 
mirroring are asymmetric processes (imagination preserves/mirrors something that is originally a feature 
of belief). 
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phenomenal and cognitive respects here in question: i.e. most parties in the debate 
agree that imagination and belief regard their contents as true in at least these two 
senses.50  
But how do imagination and belief differ, then? Why in spite of the striking 
similarities just discussed, do we say without hesitation that I believe that I am a 
student, while I just imagine that I am a Duchess?51 Now that we have clarified how 
the Hume’s problem arise, we should find a way to solve it. This will be the business of 
the next three chapters. 
                                                          
50 While, on the other hand, not everyone agrees that both imagination and belief regard their contents 
as true in the sense of disposing us to act as if their contents where true, as Velleman (2000) argues. Here 
I meant to offer a characterization of ‘regarding as true’ which remains neutral on the controversial 
question of imagination’s motivating power. Although I agree with Velleman that a disposition to 
motivate relevant actions is indeed characteristic of states – like beliefs and imaginings – which regard 
their contents as true, I do not take this to be necessarily part of what regarding as true amounts to. 
Therefore, even if eventually you were not fully persuaded by my arguments for the motivating power of 
imagination, you could still agree with me that imagination regards its contents as true as belief does. 
51 Again, note that the question here is why, not how we distinguish imagination from belief in that way: it 
is a question about the reasons that justify/explain our ascriptions, not about the mechanisms that are causally 
responsible for them. And my answer to the ‘why’ question is neutral with respect to the ‘how’ question. 
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Chapter 3 
IMAGINATION AND BELIEF:  
WHERE IS THE DIFFERENCE? 
 
 
 
 
We all agree that subjects imagine rather than believing, the relevant contents of the 
daydreams, fictions, pretences, and thoughts experiments they engage with. So far, 
however, I have observed only respects in which, in all such cases, imagination and 
belief are alike. That still leaves us without an answer to Hume’s problem: what is that 
makes the critical difference between them?  
In this chapter I shall consider two sorts of differences that might look as good 
candidates to answer this question. On the one hand, differences in cognitive inputs – 
concerning the ways in which imagination and belief are formed (and maintained). On 
the other hand, differences in behavioural outputs – concerning the ways in which 
imagination and belief influence our actions. My aim is to show that, in spite of 
appearances, output differences do not actually hold, and the critical difference 
between imaginings and beliefs lies at the inputs level. Though my main argument for 
this view will come in the next two chapters, here I will bring some initial support in its 
favour on the basis of the analysis of pretence actions – notably of children’s games of 
pretence. After having clarified what the (supposed) inputs and outputs differences 
between imagination and belief amount to (§§ 1-2), I will argue that the best possible 
explanation of pretenders’ behaviours requires us to recognize the autonomous 
motivating power of imagination, thereby challenging the idea that the production of 
action outputs is an exclusive prerogative of belief (§3).  
Along my discussion I shall examine in detail the dynamics of motivation by 
imagining – considering the role that desires and ‘desire-like imaginings’ play in it. This 
will pave the way for next chapters’ more general argument in favour of the identity of 
imagination and belief motivating powers. 
 
1. INPUT DIFFERENCES: SENSITIVITY TO EVIDENCE 
Let’s go back to my daydream that I am the Duchess of Cambridge. Why do we say 
without hesitation that I just imagine that I am a Duchess, while I believe that I am a 
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student? Two orders of considerations seem to be most relevant here – which I will 
discuss, respectively, in this section (§1) and the next (§2). 
A first sort of relevant considerations concerns the ways in which my two 
representations (I AM A DUCHESS; I AM A STUDENT) are formed/maintained, and 
the normative constraints to which they are subjected. All the evidence available to me 
strongly suggests that I am a PhD student and not a Duchess, and my representation 
of myself as a PhD student seems to be formed and maintained in response to such 
evidence. I first formed that representation when I was notified that my PhD 
application was successful, and I now maintain it insofar as I have some relevant 
evidence (my supervisions go on as usual, I am in the PhDs mailing-list, etc…), or at 
least insofar as I don’t get relevant counter-evidence: if I were notified that I failed my 
annual review and I have been suspended from the PhD program, for example, I 
would not represent myself as a PhD student any more. Or, better: I might continue 
representing myself as a PhD student, but my attitude towards this representation 
could not be belief anymore. I might imagine that I (still) am a PhD student, or wish 
that I (still) were a PhD student, but how could I still believe that – after having read and 
understood the notification of suspension I received? It seems that I simply couldn’t: 
the very belief status of my attitude crucially depends on its being sensitive to the 
evidence available to me – and that notification is an obvious piece of counter-
evidence. 
 In fact, things here are a bit more complex than that. To say that after having 
read and understood the University notification I could not believe that I am a PhD 
student anymore is not strictly speaking true. What is true is that I could not just decide 
to maintain my belief in the same way in which I can just decide, say, to raise my arm. 
As Bernard Williams famously observed: “belief cannot be like that; (…) I cannot 
bring it about, just like that, that I believe something” (Williams 1970: 148). But while 
it seems undeniable that I could not consciously decide to ignore contrary evidence and 
keep believing that I am a PhD student, it is not hard to think of cases where some 
evidence insensitive factors not (fully) consciously recognized as such cause me to maintain 
such belief. Think for example of a case where my strong desire to complete the PhD 
and my consequent disappointment at the idea of not completing it lead me to 
discount – more or less consciously – the evidence provided by the notification I 
receive; but then, when more compelling evidence becomes available to me – e.g. 
when I receive a second more official notification from University – I do eventually 
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respond to it, changing my attitude accordingly.52 In a case like this, my initial 
resistance to abandon my ‘PhD student representation’ in the face of contrary evidence 
– though admittedly far from perfectly rational – would not in itself compromise the very 
belief status of my attitude towards that representation. And indeed, looking at the 
thing retrospectively, I may well feel embarrassed for having unreasonably continued to 
believe that I was a PhD student. Cases like this, where the formation and maintenance 
of our beliefs is influenced also by motivational (i.e. evidence insensitive) factors like 
desires or emotions, seem to be quite common: think for example of what 
psychologists call ‘self-serving beliefs’, or of many other familiar instances of wishful 
thinking.53 It doesn’t sound right to say that any supposed belief that is affected by 
such motivational factors is, in fact, not a belief at all. What we shall say is rather that, 
insofar as they are affected by such motivational, evidence insensitive factors, the 
beliefs in question are somehow epistemically defective: they are, to some extent, 
irrational – as I observed my belief that I am a PhD student would be, if I maintained it 
in spite of the evidence (i.e. the notification) I received. 
All this suggests that we should distinguish two senses in which the sensitivity to 
evidence of a representation is relevant for its belief status. The first is a constitutive 
sense: some degree of sensitivity to evidence seems to be a constitutive, necessary 
feature of belief, so that an attitude which doesn’t display any degree of such sensitivity 
cannot thereby count as belief. The claim that after having read and understood the 
notification of suspension I cannot believe that I am a PhD student anymore appeals to 
this constitutive role of sensitivity to evidence. But it overlooks the important 
specification that what is constitutively necessary for belief is not perfect sensitivity to 
evidence; it is just some degree of it. The fact that an attitude does not change in response 
to one relevant piece of evidence does not, in itself, necessarily mean that it is 
completely insensitive to evidence; so it is not enough to conclude that such attitude is 
not a belief. On the other hand, as we have seen, insofar as an attitude classifies as 
                                                          
52 I might for example ignore it, reading the email very quickly and immediately forgetting it (perhaps 
like in Freudian cases of repression); or I might read it carefully and tell myself that it must be a mistake, 
that surely the notification doesn’t really mean what it seems to mean, hence put it in a corner and, 
again, forget about it for a while… Till when I receive the new notification. 
53 What psychologists call ‘self-serving beliefs’ are, roughly, beliefs about ourselves which are formed on 
the basis of a biased consideration of the available evidence, due to a need/desire to enhance self-esteem 
and preserve a positive self-image (see e.g. Taylor and Brown 1988). So for example it seems that 
healthy, non-depressed subjects tend to form beliefs of this sort about their own past, concentrating on 
evidence of good performances, and neglecting evidence of poor ones. I think that in various cases there 
may be room to question whether so-called ‘self-serving beliefs’ are actually best described as belief; but 
at least some instances of them surely are. For a review and discussion of the literature on self-serving 
bias, see Bortolotti (2010): 143-148.  
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belief, the fact that it does not change in response to one relevant piece of evidence 
makes it somehow defective. This has to do with the second, normative sense in which 
sensitivity to evidence is relevant to belief. If perfect sensitivity evidence is not a 
constitutive requirement for belief, it seems to be at least a normative one: a normative 
ideal to which rational beliefs should conform. Ideally, a rational subject ought to form 
her beliefs just on the basis of an objective assessment of the evidence available to her, 
not influenced by what she desires, or fears, nor by any other non-evidential factors. 
Why ought she to do that? This can be understood in relation to another key norm 
that governs belief – a ‘norm of truth’. When we classify a state as belief, we apply to it 
a standard of correctness which is satisfied if and only if its propositional content is 
true. A reason why beliefs ought to be perfectly sensitive to evidence can be seen in the 
fact that responding to the available evidence is the best way for them to track truth. 
My attitude towards the representation of myself as a PhD student seems to be 
normatively governed by these sorts of rationality and truth standards: which is why, if 
I maintain such an attitude in spite of the notification of suspension, I can be criticized 
in the ways we have seen – I can be criticized for holding an irrational and false belief.54 
My attitude towards the representation of myself as a Duchess is not similarly 
constrained – either constitutively or normatively – by evidence and truth. That 
representation is not formed in response to the evidence available to me; it just 
depends on how I decide, for a while, to represent the world, or perhaps simply on what 
happens to ‘come to my mind’ at a given time. Indeed, I obviously don’t take 
newspapers’ articles about the Royal Wedding as a source of evidence about myself; 
what happens is just that such news somehow prompt me to form a representation – 
the representation of myself as a Duchess – which I then, more or less deliberately, 
enjoy entertaining for a while. And, importantly, there is nothing wrong with that: 
there is nothing irrational in my imagining, for a bit, that I am a Duchess; and the fact 
that this proposition is false does not put me in a defective epistemic condition.  
So this seems to be a first important difference between my two representations, 
which might explain why one of them is classified as imagining, and the other is 
classified as belief: my representation of myself as a Duchess is not, nor ought to be, 
                                                          
54 To say it, again, with Williams: “Truth and falsehood are dimensions of an assessment of belief as 
opposed to many other psychological states” (Williams: 1970: 136). I will discuss more in detail these 
norms and the relation between the constitutive and the normative dimensions of belief’s sensitivity to 
evidence in Chapter 4: §2.3. 
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sensitive to real-world evidence as my representation of myself as a PhD student is, 
and ought to be.  
1.1. INFERENTIAL INTEGRATION AND HOLISTIC COHERENCE 
There are different kinds of evidence to which beliefs can be sensitive. One is 
perceptual evidence. My belief that I’m sat in front of this computer, for example, is 
formed in response to my visual perception of the computer, together with my 
proprioception of myself in front of it – in a rather unreflective process, which doesn’t 
seem to involve any conscious inference (if any inference at all). My belief that I am a 
PhD student, on the other hand, is the result of a more reflective response to a 
different kind of evidence, which does not amount to perceptions, but to reasons: let’s 
call it ‘inferential evidence’. That belief seems to follow as a consequence from various 
other beliefs I have – such as the belief that my PhD application was successful, the 
belief that if one’s PhD application is successful, then one becomes a PhD student, the 
belief that generally the status of PhD student lasts until one passes, etc… All these 
beliefs constitute reasons for me to form the belief that I am a PhD student; which in 
turn constitutes a reason to form other beliefs (e.g. the beliefs that I should write a 
thesis, that I should attend the PG seminars, that I am eligible for a Student Railcard, 
and so on), as well as a reason to abandon any other belief that is in tension with it (e.g. 
the belief that I can enjoy long week-ends and holidays without worrying about work 
all the time).  
As it turns out, a direct consequence of belief’s sensitivity to inferential evidence 
is that our beliefs tend to be integrated into a holistically coherent system. This system, of 
course, also includes perceptual beliefs: though perceptual beliefs might not be formed 
on the basis of inferential reasoning, once they are formed they become sensitive to it, 
being integrated with other pre-existing beliefs. This is how (e.g.) the false belief that I 
might form the first time I look at the Müller-Lyer arrows is revised when I learn that 
it is an optical illusion.55 And the same is true of beliefs formed in response to other 
kinds of evidence, like what we can call testimonial or introspective evidence – intended 
quite loosely to indicate such stimuli as ‘other people’s words’, or ‘the inner perception 
of one’s own feelings’. These sorts of stimuli may – rightly or wrongly, and more or 
less consciously – be taken as an evidential basis for one’s beliefs (as with the belief 
that my application was successful, formed in response to the Postgraduate Office 
                                                          
55 While, on the other hand, the lower-level perceptual representation of the two arrows remains the 
same, due to cognitive encapsulation. 
57 
 
Administrator’s email; or the belief that I feel happy for that success, formed by 
introspecting my own emotions/feelings). Whether forming beliefs on the basis of 
testimony, or of introspection, does in itself involve inferential processes of some sort 
are controversial questions which I won’t tackle here. But it seems uncontroversial 
that, once testimonial and introspective beliefs are formed, they become sensitive to 
inferential reasoning, integrating with the rest of our beliefs (as we have seen with the 
testimonial belief that the application was successful, which – together with my pre-
existing beliefs on the consequences of successful applications – becomes a premise 
for further inferences about my student status). 
Apparently, then, among the different kinds of evidence to which beliefs can be 
sensitive, what I have called ‘inferential evidence’ has an especially important status.56 It 
is a kind of evidence to which all beliefs, from the moment in which they are formed, 
become sensitive; while the other sorts of evidence just considered (higher-level 
testimonial evidence, or lower-level perceptual/introspective evidence) do not play a 
relevant role in all cases. So, for example, general abstract beliefs (e.g. the belief that 2 
+ 2 = 4) may not be sensitive to perceptual evidence; introspective beliefs (and maybe 
some evaluative beliefs, like moral or aesthetic ones) may not be sensitive to 
testimonial evidence; but all such beliefs, no matters how they are initially formed, will 
be to some extent sensitive to the inferential evidence constituted by the holistic 
system of a subject’s pre-existing beliefs.  
All this, again, should be understood in a normative as well as in a constitutive sense. 
Being inferentially integrated into and holistic coherent system is a norm to which the 
beliefs of a rational subject should conform, and some degree of inferential integration 
and holistic coherence seems to be necessary for a state to classify as belief. Local 
inconsistencies are possible and, indeed, happen rather often.57 But they put the subject 
in a defective epistemic condition: a rational subject who recognizes them should feel a 
pressure to solve them. And, beyond a certain limit, inconsistencies and lack of 
inferential integration cast serious doubts on the very belief status of the states that are 
involved. Indeed, one reason why my representation of myself as the Duchess of 
                                                          
56 I am not claiming to have provided an exhaustive taxonomy of all the possible kinds of evidence to 
which beliefs can be sensitive (nor indeed a taxonomy that carves the nature of such kinds of evidence at 
its joints). Another relevant kind of evidence, arguably, comes from memory. 
57 The extensive psychological literature on human reasoning shows that we are all subject to rather 
systematic mistakes in deductive as well as probabilistic reasoning, which often lead to the formation of 
inconsistent beliefs (for an extensive discussion of psychological studies in this area, see Kahneman 
2011). 
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Cambridge does not classify as belief is that it is at odds with many other important 
beliefs I have (about myself, my life, UK’s Royal family, etc…).  
2. OUTPUT DIFFERENCES: DISPOSITIONS TO ACTION  
Another respect in which my representation of myself as the Duchess of Cambridge 
seems to differ from my representation of myself as a PhD student has to do with the 
effects that such two representations have upon my actions. This morning I did not 
wear an elegant white dress and look for my chauffeur in order to be taken to 
Westminster Abbey; I wore my usual attire, and cycled to University, where I spent all 
day at my desk, doing such things as writing my thesis and updating my academic CV – 
a CV where, of course, I declare that I am a PhD student in Nottingham, not the 
Duchess of Cambridge. My representation of myself as a PhD student apparently 
motivates me to act in certain ways; ways in which my representation of myself as a 
Duchess does not. This seems to be, prima facie at least, a reason why we classify the 
one as belief and the other as imagining.58  
Here it is worth noting that the belief that I am a PhD student will motivate my 
action to work on a thesis chapter only in conjunction with other representational 
states: including other beliefs – e.g. the belief that PhD students are tasked to write a 
thesis – and, notably, some relevant desires – e.g. the desire to complete my task. If I 
desired to avoid my task, instead – or if I believed that PhD students’ task is not 
writing a thesis, but farming the land – then the belief that I am a PhD student would 
not motivate me to write a thesis chapter. Nor would it motivate me to write on my 
CV that I am a PhD student, unless I also desired to have a truthful CV; if I desired to 
fake my CV, I may well write on my CV that I am an Emeritus Professor. A good way 
to describe the motivational power characteristic of belief might then be in terms of a 
dispositional connection via desire to action: believing that p disposes one to act in ways 
that, if p were true, would promote the satisfaction of one’s desires (see Stalnaker 1984: 
82; Velleman 2000: 255; Van Leeuwen 2009: 219). Indeed, if it is true that I am a PhD 
student, writing a thesis chapter will (help to) satisfy my desire to complete my task. 
                                                          
58 Note that when I talk about motivation here I refer to the actual role that a given cognition has in 
bringing about action: imaginings in cases of daydream like this do not motivate in the sense that, as it 
happens, they do not bring about any action. But – as I shall argue in Chapter 5 – that does not mean 
that imaginings lack motivating force – i.e. that they do not dispose to act in the relevant ways. In §3.1 
below I shall better clarify what precisely the motivation here in question amount to, introducing the so-
called Humean Theory of Motivation. 
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And writing on my CV that I am a PhD student will (help to) satisfy my desire to have 
a truthful CV.59  
Importantly, belief’s dispositions to action may fail to be manifested even in the 
presence of the relevant desires. So, for example, I might well believe that I am a PhD 
student whose job is to write a thesis, and desire to do my job, yet fail to perform the 
action of writing my thesis because my computer is broken and I spend the day trying 
to repair it. For the same reason, being unable to access the file of my CV, I might not 
write in it that I am a PhD student, even if I desire to have a truthful CV. In cases like 
this, the lack of manifestation of the disposition to act upon my belief might be 
excused by the physical impediment to perform the relevant actions, and wouldn’t 
indicate that I am not disposed to perform such actions.60 But the holding of such 
disposition, even though not manifested, seems to be necessary to ascribe to me the 
belief that I am a PhD student. If I never even thought to work on a thesis chapter and 
I never said that I am a PhD student nor wrote it into my CV, this would probably 
mean that I am not disposed to perform such actions; hence, that I do not believe that 
I am a PhD student, after all. This, we have seen, may indeed be a reason why my 
representation of myself as a Duchess does not qualify as belief: this representation 
does not motivate any action, hence the natural thing to say seems to be that it does 
not dispose me to act in the relevant ways (the natural thing to say, I shall argue, is 
wrong; but for the moment let’s grant its prima facie plausibility).61 
2.1. SOME DOUBTS ABOUT OUTPUT DIFFERENCES 
So, in a paradigmatic case of daydreaming like the one I have been discussing my 
imaginings seem to differ from my beliefs in two notable respects. On one hand, they 
seem to differ with respect to their cognitive inputs (and the normative constraints 
which govern them): my imaginings are not (nor ought to be) formed and maintained 
in response to real-world evidence as my beliefs are (and ought to be). On the other 
hand, they seem to differ with respect to their behavioural outputs: my imaginings do 
not motivate me to act as my beliefs (jointly with my desires) do.  
                                                          
59 This latter action, by the way, is of a kind that plays a key role in our practices of belief ascription: 
indeed, as I noted in Chapter 2 (§4), we tend to credit people with a reliable knowledge of their own 
beliefs (and inner lives more in general), therefore we take sincere assertions as a reliable guide to 
people’s beliefs. 
60 There is a large (arguably, indefinitely large) number of ‘excusing conditions’ of this sort, which may 
justify lacks of belief’s behavioural manifestations. I will discuss this point at length in Chapter 5. 
61 Indeed, in Chapter 5 I shall argue that this is just a case where the relevant disposition fails to manifest 
itself.  
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Similar considerations on inputs and outputs might be taken to explain also 
other paradigmatic cases where the belief/imagination distinction looks 
straightforward. Readers’ imaginings of Harry Potter’s story, for example, are obviously 
unresponsive to real-world evidence (they are indeed formed in response to the fiction) 
and disconnected from action. Readers typically enjoy the story for the sake of fun and 
recreation: their engagement with it is not contingent on their taking it to be true (and 
there is nothing irrational with that: that’s precisely what competent fiction’s readers 
should do). Nor does readers’ engagement with the story motivate them to act upon it: 
they do not take precautions against Lord Vordemort’s evil curses, or ever consider 
applying for a job at Hogwarts School of Witchcraft and Wizardry. And, of course, 
they would not sincerely assent to most of the propositions that are part of the story: if 
invited to speak truthfully, they would not say that somewhere in the UK, near to a 
black forest, there is a famous school of witchcraft and wizardry. And so it goes with 
the more ‘serious’ instances of imagination’s exercise introduced above – such as 
thoughts experiments and other forms of counterfactual thinking. My imagining that 
Berlusconi does not own most Italian TV channels is surely not formed in response to 
the evidence available to me (which unambiguously suggest the opposite to be true); 
and it does not influence my actions (indeed, I don’t turn on the TV expecting to find 
Berlusconi-free information; if I want Berlusconi-free information I avoid turning the 
TV on and I read some independent newspapers, instead).  
The view that imaginings and beliefs critically differ both with respect to the 
ways in which they are formed and with respect to their behavioural outputs is almost 
universally accepted. So much that Shaun Nichols (2006) describes these two 
differences between imaginings and beliefs as one of the “central facts about the 
propositional imagination that have shaped almost all theorizing in the recent 
literature” (Nichols 2006: 6).62 This almost universal agreement notwithstanding, 
however, I wish to distance myself from the view in question. As already hinted, I 
                                                          
62 Introducing a collection of key contributions to the ongoing debate on propositional imagination, 
Nichols (2006) observes: “Most people working in this area agree on several substantive claims about 
the nature of imagination. (…) Imaginational representations are distinguished from belief 
representations by their functional roles. (…) Further, the central facts reviewed in Section 3 provide us 
with some of the critical functional differences between believing and imaging. The inputs to the imagination 
are at the whim of the intention, but this is not the case for belief, and the imagination and belief make different 
contributions to action tendencies. These are major differences in the causal roles of imaginational representations and belief 
representations…” (Nichols 2006: 8-9). For more recent endorsements of this ‘Standard View of 
Imagination’ (as I shall call it in Chapter 5), see e.g. Schellenberg (2013), Liao and Doggett (2014). 
Basically, as I shall say, I know just one author who does not conform to this view: J. David Velleman 
(2000). 
 
61 
 
think that motivational differences between imagination and belief, far from being ‘a 
fact’, are actually merely apparent. Even if in the paradigmatic cases just considered 
imaginings do not motivate any action, there are many other cases where they do 
motivate, suggesting that imagination has the same motivating power as belief, though 
this power is not always exerted. But remember that it is not always exerted in cases of 
belief, either – since belief’s connection to action outputs is a dispositional one: I 
characterized it as a disposition to act in ways that would promote the satisfaction of 
our desires if what we believe is true, noting that in many cases such disposition holds 
without being actually manifested. Imagination – I shall argue – disposes us to act in 
the same ways.  
Some initial evidence and intuitive plausibility for my view comes from the 
consideration of another paradigmatic case of imagination’s exercise I introduced in 
Chapter 2: the case of pretence.  
3. PRETENCE  
Children playing the Wild West game seem to act upon their imaginings: cowboys twirl 
round their jests, Indians throw their darts, they chase each other... That’s indeed what 
the game crucially consists in. So, one may argue, the fact that children imagine, rather 
than believe, that they are cowboys/Indians, cannot be explained by the fact that their 
representations of themselves as cowboys/Indians do not motivate them to act in the 
relevant ways: it can only be explained by the fact that such representations are formed 
as a result of what children decide to enact in their games, rather than in response to 
real-world evidence (and there is nothing irrational in that). If this is right, then, the 
case of pretence may be taken to support my view that considerations about 
behavioural outputs are not sufficient to distinguish imagination from belief, while only 
considerations about epistemic inputs are sufficient.  
We should be careful in drawing such a conclusion, though. One thing is to say 
that a child imagines, rather than believes, that he is a cowboy. Quite another thing is 
to say that this very imagining is what motivates him to act in cowboy-like ways. While 
the former thing is rather uncontroversial, the latter is not: many deny it, arguing that 
the only mental states that can motivate action are beliefs in conjunction with desires. 
In §§ 3.1 and 3.2 I will critically discuss these arguments and explain why I take them 
to be, ultimately, unconvincing.63  
                                                          
63 In what follows I will focus mostly on children pretence. However, I take what I am going to say to 
hold more in general, also for adult’s pretence (more precisely, for many paradigmatic instances of it). 
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3.1. THE ‘HUMEAN THEORY OF MOTIVATION’ 
The idea that the only mental states with motivational power upon action are beliefs 
and desires is at the basis of a very influential view of psychological motivation, known 
as ‘Humean theory of motivation’ (see Davidson 1963; Smith 1987, 1994). This view 
looks very plausible, prima facie, at least if we start from the assumption that actions 
are by definition intentional doings. Indeed, it seems that, insofar as an action is 
something that an agent does intentionally, it must involve some desire of the agent 
towards an intended end; and this desire, in turn, will only motivate the relevant doing 
if such doing is seen as a way to fulfil the desire – which is why a belief seems to be also 
necessary.64 Therefore, on this view, any action A must be motivated – i.e. caused and 
rationalized – by a desire-belief pair: more precisely, by a desire to ϕ and a belief that ϕ 
can be obtained by performing the action A. So, for example, if my cycling to the 
swimming pool is an action, rather than something that merely happens to me (like an 
autonomic behaviour), this is because it is motivated by a desire-belief pair of the kind 
just seen: e.g. by my desire to swim and my belief that if I cycle to the swimming pool, 
then I can swim.  
The specification that such a motivation amounts both to a cause and a reason for 
my action is important. This is a point famously defended by Donald Davidson (1963). 
My desire to swim, together with my belief that I can swim if I cycle to the pool, 
certainly constitutes a reason for that action – call it reason R. But I might well have also 
a number of other reasons S, T, W… to act in that way: I might well have a number of 
other belief-desire pairs that would rationalize my action – e.g. the desire to try my new 
bike and the belief that I can try my new bike by cycling to the swimming pool. Yet, on 
this occasion the actual reason for my action is R, and nothing else: I cycle to the pool 
because I want to swim, and not because I want to try my new bike (and not for any 
other reason either). The only way to account for this – Davidson suggests – is to 
recognize that R is not just a reason, but is also what actually causes my action. 
                                                          
64 Belief-desire pairs like this are what Davidson calls “primary reasons” of an action (Davidson 1963: 
686). It is controversial whether such primary reasons are enough to motivate actions, or whether it is 
also necessary to form, on the basis of such primary reasons, an intention to act. In contrast with 
Elizabeth Anscombe (1957), Davidson argues for a reduction of intentions to primary reasons: on this 
view, acting with intention is just acting on the basis of a belief-desire pair; there isn’t any distinctive 
state of intending over and above beliefs and desires (later on, Davidson will change his mind; see 
Davidson 1980, Essay 5). It is worth noticing that also the definition of action is controversial: some 
question the idea that actions are necessarily intentional (see e.g. Romdenh-Romluc 2013). However, 
here I sidestep this debate. What I am interested to is the ‘Humean’ claim that only belief-desire pairs 
can motivate intentional doings; and I call all intentional doings ‘actions’.  
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Motivating reasons are not just reasons that justify actions, but also causal factors that 
produce them. 
It is also worth noticing that on this view not all beliefs have a direct motivational 
power upon action. Strictly speaking, only beliefs of the form “ϕ can be obtained by 
performing action A” can – in conjunction with the relevant desires (desires to ϕ) – 
motivate actions. This however doesn’t mean that we should revise the general claim 
that beliefs dispose us to act in ways that would promote the satisfaction of our desires 
if the believed contents were true, claiming instead that only beliefs of that particular 
form dispose us to act in such ways. Indeed, as we have seen, a crucial feature of 
beliefs is their holistic (coherent) inferential integration. Our beliefs about how to 
satisfy our desires (i.e. beliefs of the form “ϕ can be obtained by performing action A”) 
will be connected with – and, in many cases, derived from – the other beliefs we have 
about the real world (notably, beliefs about the nature of ϕ, about the effects of action 
A, about ourselves and our own capacities, and other similar matters). All these other 
beliefs can then be taken to play a role, more or less direct, in disposing us to act in 
particular ways – since they are (or at least are available to be) taken into account into 
our practical reasoning. Take the case where I desire to eat some pie, I walk to the 
kitchen, take a piece of pie, and put it in my mouth. Presumably, what happens in this 
case is that my desire to eat pie makes occurrently present before my mind some beliefs 
relevant to the satisfaction of that desire, e.g. the belief that there is some pie left over 
from yesterday, the belief that the pie is in the kitchen, the belief that if something is in 
the kitchen I can get it by walking to the kitchen, and so on. From these beliefs, I come 
to form the further belief that I can eat some pie by going to the kitchen, taking a piece of pie and 
putting it in my mouth. This latter belief is surely the one that makes maximally close 
contact with my action; but all the other beliefs from which it is derived are also 
responsible for my action (in a causal as well as in a rational sense). All these beliefs are 
part of a system which, as a whole, is dispositionally connected to action.  
So, far from contradicting the view that dispositional connection via desire to 
action is a necessary feature of beliefs, the Humean theory of motivation pushes that 
view even further, suggesting that dispositional connection via desire to action is also 
sufficient to set belief apart from the other cognitive attitudes, since that disposition to 
action is an exclusive prerogative of belief. Anything that counts as an action is 
motivated by a belief-desire pair of the kind just seen.  
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3.2. A HUMEAN ACCOUNT OF PRETENCE? 
If anything that counts as an action is motivated by a suitable belief-desire pair, this 
must be the case also with pretence actions. This doesn’t commit Humean theorists to 
denying that imagination plays any role in explaining pretence. But it does commit 
them to denying that imagination plays a straightforwardly motivational role. An 
influential account of this Humean kind has been defended by Nichols and Stich 
(2000) (henceforth, “N&S”). While granting that a child who chases his friend, 
shooting (toy) arrows at him and shouting: “Give yourself up!” imagines – and does 
not believe – that he is an Indian fighting with a cowboy, N&S argue that it cannot be 
that imagining by itself which motivates him to act in such a way. Indeed – they notice – 
there may be plenty of cases where the child has precisely that same imagining without 
acting it out at all. If in this particular case he does perform the relevant actions, that 
must be due to the fact that now he desires to act in accordance with what he imagines, 
and believes that he can do that by chasing his friend, shooting toy arrows at him, and 
shouting at him “Give yourself up!”. More precisely, what happens according to N&S 
is that when the child imagines that he is an Indian fighting with cowboys, he comes to 
form various beliefs about how he would behave if he really were an Indian fighting 
with cowboys; and, desiring to behave in a way similar to the way in which he would 
behave if he really were an Indian fighting with cowboys, he ends up performing the 
relevant pretence actions. On this view, then, imagination drives pretence actions just 
indirectly – via beliefs and desires: what directly motivates pretence actions are beliefs 
and desires about what is imagined and pretended.  
3.2.1 SOME PROBLEMS FOR THE HUMEAN VIEW. Such a Humean picture of pretence 
faces various objections. A common objection is that it credits pretenders with very 
implausible – if not even impossible – beliefs and desires. Some authors have pointed 
out that crediting children with desires and beliefs about pretence is highly implausible, 
because children start engaging in pretence games at a remarkably young age (normally 
at about fifteen-months-old), when they still haven’t mastered the concept of 
pretence.65 As Currie and Ravenscroft observe: “if young children lack the concept of 
                                                          
65 There is evidence that children by the age of fifteen month are able to engage in primitive games of 
pretence (cf. Friedman and Leslie 2007; for a great overview of the research on children and pretence, 
cf. Lillard 2002).  
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pretence, they can hardly be credited with the desire to pretend” (Currie and 
Ravenscroft 2002: 127).66  
Admittedly, to this N&S can reply that crediting children with a desire to pretend 
does not necessarily mean requiring them to possess the concept of pretence. To 
understand this point we should distinguish between two different senses in which 
“pretence” is used within this debate: (1) a behavioural sense – for which ‘pretence’ is 
used to refer to the action of pretending, and (2) a mentalistic sense – for which ‘pretence’ 
is used to indicate the mental states that underlie pretence actions (‘pretence’ in this 
mentalistic sense is generally used as a synonym of ‘imagination’). Arguably, these two 
senses of pretence are strictly related at the conceptual level: a proper conceptual 
understanding of pretence actions seems to require an understanding of the mental 
states that underlie them (i.e. it seems to require understanding them as actions 
performed with an intention to pretend, or anyway as involving a pretence/imaginative 
representation in the agent’s mind). But it is not obvious that performing pretence 
actions (and recognizing them when performed by others) requires the possession of 
the concept of pretence. N&S endorse a ‘behavioural account of pretence’ – which is 
opposed to ‘mentalistic accounts’ precisely in that it maintains that engaging with 
pretence doesn’t require to recognize it as driven by mental states of a certain kind, or 
by intentions to pretend, but only requires an ability to behave as if the pretended 
contents were true (and recognizing pretence actions when performed by others only 
requires an ability to recognize them as actions that would be appropriate if the 
pretended content were true).67 On this view, the desires and beliefs about pretence 
that we should ascribe to pretenders are nothing but desires to behave as if something were 
the case and beliefs about how to behave in that way. A child who pretends that P will do 
that simply insofar as:  
(i) (having imagined that P) she forms a conditional belief with a content of the 
form: If it really were the case that P, then it would be the case that Q, R, S… And I 
would behave in ways v, w, z…;  
(ii)  she has a desire to behave in ways similar to v, w, z;  
                                                          
66 In a similar vein, Velleman (2000) argues that a Humean explanation like the one here at stake “is 
wrong developmentally, in that it credits the child with a precocious mastery of the distinction between 
fact and fiction” (Velleman 2000: 257). 
67 The question of what mental capacities underlie children’s (and adult’s) pretence is a rather 
controversial one, which has been extensively discussed in the recent psychological and philosophical 
literature. Here I am particularly interested in the following aspect of that general question: does a good 
account – whatever it is – of the mental capacities underlying pretence require us to recognize the 
autonomous motivating power of imagination?  
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(iii) she has a belief like: I can behave in ways similar to v, w, z… by performing 
actions v1, w1, z1…
68  
Desires and beliefs like these are ‘about pretence’ de re – they concern something that, 
as a matter of fact, counts as pretence; but not de dicto – they do not require children to 
have the concept of pretence explicitly deployed in their mind.69 So they do not involve 
any sophisticated mentalistic concept. They simply involve the concept of behaving as if, 
which even young children do plausibly possess.70 
However, even if desires and beliefs like (i), (ii) and (iii) are not developmentally 
implausible, there are other reasons why they do not seem to be good candidates to 
explain what motivates children’s (or also adults’) pretence. Such desires and beliefs do 
not seem to be neither necessary nor sufficient to motivate pretence. As various 
authors have observed, we can – and often do – pretend that P without having the 
relevant conditional beliefs about how we would behave if P were actually the case; or 
maybe having beliefs about how we would behave if P were the case, but not desiring 
to act in ways similar to such ways, and indeed acting in very different ways. So, for 
example, it seems that I can pretend to be a dinosaur even if I don’t have any precise 
belief about how dinosaurs behave; or, having just a few boring beliefs about possible 
dinosaurs behaviours (e.g. just the belief that dinosaurs are very heavy and static 
creatures) I might not want to base my pretence upon them, and pretend to behave in 
ways dissimilar from those in which I believe dinosaurs would do. The view that 
pretending that P is motivated by desires to act similarly to how one would act if P were 
true (and beliefs about how to do that) cannot explain all the kind of creative, bizarre 
behaviours that pretenders engage in, which can be very different from (and even 
incompatible with) what they believe to be true in the real world.71  
                                                          
68 See Nichols and Stich (2000): 128. Note that N&S only indicate (i) and (ii). However, strictly speaking 
a belief-desire pair like (i) and (ii) is not of the right ‘Humean’ form to motivate action. In order to work, 
N&S’s account also needs (iii). 
69 See Nichols and Stich (2000): 129, footnote 8. For similar behavioural accounts, see also Perner (1991) 
and Harris (2000).  
70 Schellenberg (2013) has a different strategy to reply this objection, based on the idea that there can be 
‘non-conceptual states with conceptual content’: i.e. states that have a conceptual content but are such 
that a subject can be in those states also without having the conceptual tools necessary to articulate that 
content (Schellenberg 2013: 516-517). This sounds interesting. However, from Schellenberg’s brief 
discussion of this point I can’t clearly understand how mental states of this sort are possible.  
71 For criticisms along these lines, see Velleman (2000); Doggett & Egan (2007); Van Leeuwen (2011). 
Van Leeuwen gives a nice example of pretending to do things that we don’t believe to be similar to 
anything that we would ever do: “A student who gets a bad grade on her test may, in private, pretend 
she is shooting the professor with a gun: ‘Bang, take that!’. What would her conditional belief be? 
Presumably: if I had a gun, I would shoot my professor. But surely it is not a requirement that she believe this 
in order to engage in such pretending. In fact it is perfectly common for people to pretend to do things 
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Moreover, even if beliefs and desires like (i), (ii) and (iii) above do not require the 
child to conceptualize what she is doing as pretence, they still require her to have 
occurrently present in her mind the idea that what she is doing is not an authentic and 
effective action, but is just similar to what could be an authentic and effective one. This 
makes it hard to see how pretenders can become fully immersed in their pretences: i.e. 
how children can ‘lose themselves in their games’ as they typically do. It seems that a 
child who acts on the belief that what he is doing is similar to what he would do if he 
were an Indian cannot be fully immersed into the Wild West fictional world, since 
within that world he is not just similar to an Indian and doesn’t just perform actions 
similar to those that would be appropriate if he were an Indian: within the game he 
rather is an Indian and performs authentic Indian actions. This is why Velleman argues 
that Humean accounts (like the one we are discussing) give a picture of pretence which 
is ‘depressingly unchildlike’: 
As I see it, the desire-belief explanation of pretending makes the child out to be 
depressingly unchildlike. According to this explanation, the child keeps a firm grip on 
reality while mounting an appearance conceived as such. He puts on an act conceived by 
him as a means of impersonating something that he is not. (…) I call this explanation 
depressing because it denies that the child ever enters into the fiction of being something 
other than it is.  
A child who was motivated by such a desire would remain securely outside the fiction, 
thinking about it as such. (Velleman 2000: 257)72 
Finally, then, beliefs and desires like those that N&S ascribe to pretenders are not only 
unnecessary and insufficient to motivate pretence; they even seem to make it hard to 
understand some important characteristics of pretence – such as the creativity of 
pretenders and the possibility for pretenders to become fully immersed into their 
games.  
Now, all these criticisms admittedly only show that the beliefs and desires that 
N&S attribute to pretenders are implausible; they do not establish that pretenders are 
not motivated by beliefs and desires. However, it’s not easy to see what other beliefs 
and desires we could postulate to explain pretenders’ behaviours, if we exclude – as I 
am assuming everyone would – that pretenders literally believe the contents of their 
                                                                                                                                                                  
that they do not believe they would do under any circumstances. Sometimes, that is the point.” (Van 
Leeuwen 2011: 59).  
72 To this, Currie & Ravenscroft reply that children do not necessarily have to consciously and 
reflectively attend the beliefs and desires (of kind i-iii above) that drive their pretence actions (Currie and 
Ravenscroft 2002: 124). However, I think that if such beliefs and desires play the relevant motivational 
role, causing and rationalizing the pretence actions here in question, they must have an impact on the 
ways in which children see those actions, hence on the experience they have in performing them. 
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pretences and have genuine desires about them (e.g. that children really believe they are 
Indians and cowboys, and desire to kill each other, etc.). All the attempts to provide 
Humean explanations of pretence that I am aware of end up ascribing to pretenders 
beliefs and desires with implausibly complicated and conceptually sophisticated 
contents.73 This makes it tempting to conclude that a better explanation of pretence is 
rather in terms of what pretenders imagine – with no mediation of beliefs and desires. 
It is this view which I explore in the remainder of this chapter, as a first step on the 
way to my eventual conclusion, in subsequent chapters, that belief and imagination are 
not distinguished at the level of output. 
3.3. THE IMAGINATION-AS-MOTIVATION VIEW OF PRETENCE 
On this view, the child who chases his friend, shooting toy arrows at him is not 
motivated by beliefs and desires, but by imaginings. What happens is simply that he 
imagines that he is an Indian, and he acts this imagining out. Following Currie and 
Ravenscroft (2002), let’s call this “the imagination-as-motivation view” of pretence. I 
think that some version of this view is likely to provide the best possible explanation 
for many central cases of pretence. Here I shall present and defend the version of this 
view proposed by Currie and Ravenscroft (2002; henceforth, “C&R”); though what I 
am going to say also draws on discussions from Velleman (2000) and Egan and 
Doggett (2007).74  
                                                          
73 Funkhouser and Spaulding (2009), for example, suggest that: “the children’s pretense is often 
accounted for by a desire to pretend (e.g. for its own sake, as a way to socialize with others, etc.), the 
imagination that guides it, and a belief that following the imagination is a good means of achieving the 
end specified as the content of the desire” (Funkhouser and Spaulding 2009: 309-310). This seems to 
require pretenders to possess (at least) the concepts of pretence and imagination – and to have such 
concepts deployed in the contents of their beliefs and desires when they pretend. Schellenberg (2013) 
argues that pretenders are typically motivated by “desires to make fictional” and beliefs about how to 
satisfy them (Schelleneberg 2013: 515). It is not hard to see how (at least some of) the problems I have 
raised in relation to N&S’s account can affect also these other Humean accounts. Though admittedly a 
fair assessment of such accounts would require a more extensive discussion. 
74 In fact, note that Currie and Ravenscroft (2002) do not claim to have conclusive arguments for this 
imagination-as-motivation view. They provide various reasons to endorse it, but they eventually leave 
the question open: “Further arguments might decide the matter, but for now making a choice seems 
more a rhetorical move than a rationally dictated one. Nor we do have to make a choice. (…) We can 
base our claims on a disjunction: either imagination motivates pretence, or the beliefs and desires that 
motivate pretence are guided by imaginings” (Currie and Ravenscroft 2002: 130-131). For the sake of 
simplicity, here I shall treat Currie and Ravenscroft as fully committed with the first disjunct (this is 
indeed how they are generally treated by their opponents: in the debate on pretence, they are always 
considered as convinced advocated of the imagination-as-motivation view). Note that also my final 
position on these matters will remain to some extents open. As I shall say, I don’t take my arguments in 
favour of the imagination-as-motivation view of pretence to be conclusive. Nor I need them to be 
conclusive, since my main argument in favour of the motivating power of imagination is based on the 
consideration of a different sort of actions, which I will introduce in Chapter 4. 
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What exactly does “acting out of imagination” mean? Advocates of the 
imagination-as-motivation view must clarify that, explaining how imaginings can 
motivate us to act in consequent ways. As we have seen, beliefs do not motivate alone, 
but only in conjunction with relevant desires. My belief that I can kill you by hitting 
you with this paperweight does not motivate me to hit you with this paperweight. 
Fortunately, it would motivate me to do that only if I wanted to kill you. It is my 
wanting that outcome, in a sense, which constitutes the real motor of motivation. If there 
are cases where imagination motivates, then, we should expect a similar motor to be at 
work there, too. Take again the child’s imagining that he can kill his ‘cowboy enemy’ by 
shooting arrows at him. If it is this imagining that motivates his pretence action of 
shooting arrows, then we should expect it to do that in conjunction with some relevant 
desire – a desire that the content of such an imagining somehow indicates how to 
satisfy (as the content of the belief that I can kill you by hitting you with this paperweight 
indicates a way to satisfy a desire to kill you). But what plays the relevant desire role in 
this case? According to C&R, it is not a real desire to kill his ‘cowboy enemy’. Indeed, 
it seems perfectly possible (indeed plausible) that the child performs that action 
without having any real desire to kill: you don’t need to be an aspirant killer in order to 
engage in a pretence of killing. Most importantly, C&R notice, a real desire to kill 
“would not normally explain an action of pretending [to kill]”; it would rather explain an 
action of really trying to kill. Therefore, the motivating force of the child’s imagining 
must depend on something other than a real desire; which is why C&R appeal to an 
imaginative counterpart of desire: a kind of ‘make-desire’ like those I introduced in 
Chapter 2 (which they now call “desire-like imagining”):75  
A motivating reason to pretend to Ψ might be that the agent has the desire-like imagining 
to φ and the belief-like imagining that he can φ by Ψ-ing. (Currie and Ravenscroft 2002: 
116)76 
So on this view the child who makes-believe (i.e., in the new terminology, has a belief-
like imagining) that he is an Indian armed with arrows to kill his cowboy enemy does 
                                                          
75 Remember that in Chapter 2 the introduction of make-desires was suggested to explain how 
imagination disposes us to react emotionally in various ways.  
76 Note that in C&R’s text this sentence appears as a question: “We can ask whether a motivating reason 
to pretend to Ψ might be that…”. C&R do then defend a positive answer to this question, even if in a 
cautious and admittedly tentative way (as I noted before, in footnote 73). More convinced advocates of 
the imagination-as-motivation view of pretence are Doggett & Egan (2007) and, even more, Velleman 
(2000). 
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also make-desire (i.e. have a desire-like imagining) to kill his cowboy enemy; and this 
imaginary belief/desire pair motivates his action of pretending to shoot arrows.77 
Here it is important to notice that actually C&R do not seem to exclude 
categorically that a real desire might play the relevant role in explaining pretence 
actions. Indeed, what they say is that “a real desire [to φ] would not normally explain 
pretending to [to φ]” (C&R 2002: 116, my emphasis); thereby suggesting – I take it – 
that a real desire could in principle, jointly with a belief-like imagining, motivate 
pretence, though this is not what happens most of the time, in normal cases.78 This 
sounds very right to me. If Sam is annoyed with Tom, his real desire to hurt Tom 
might well explain his pretence action to shoot a (toy) arrow at him: that is, it seems 
plausible that Sam’s desire to hurt Tom, together with his (belief-like) imagining that he 
can do that by shooting a (toy) arrow at him, is what actually motivates his pretence 
(while, presumably he doesn’t try to really hurt Tom with a real arrow because he has 
higher-order desires to control himself, to obey the social rules he has been taught, to 
avoid being punished… And perhaps partly also because a real arrow is not so readily 
available to him!). Indeed, as children’s genuine desires obviously play an important 
role in determining what games they engage with, it would be surprizing if such desires 
did not – at least sometimes – also played a role in determining their actions within the 
games.  
Pushing this line of thinking, Velleman (2000) has suggested that some species of 
real desires – what he calls ‘wishes’ – are always what plays the relevant motivating role 
in pretence. Still, I agree with C&R that real desires are not likely to be what normally 
motivates pretenders’ actions. Indeed, the conative states that typically motivate 
pretence seem to differ from real desires in two important respects – which have 
emerged in the discussion so far. First, pretenders’ ‘desires’ and real desires seem to 
differ in the ways in which they are formed and controlled. Pretenders seem to have a 
deliberate control upon the ‘desires’ that they endorse in their games, which they do 
not typically have upon their real desires. It seems at least possible for a child engaged 
in a pretence fight to bring about (more or less consciously and deliberately) a ‘desire’ 
                                                          
77 From now on I will use the terms “belief-like imagining” and “desire-like imagining” to indicate the 
imaginative counterparts of belief and desires. I will keep using the terms “make-believe” and “make-
desire” (introduced in Chapter 2) to indicate the corresponding verbs. So, just to be clear: a subject who 
makes-believe that p and makes-desire that q has a belief-like imagining that p and a desire-like 
imagining that q. I will sometimes talk also of “imaginary beliefs” and “imaginary desires”, as N&S do. 
78 C&R make this point using the example of a pretence to eat a (mud) pie: “There may be no real desire 
for the belief-like imagining to combine with so as to motivate: the child who pretends to eat may not 
really want to eat anything. Anyway, wanting to eat would not normally explain pretending to eat.” (C&R 
2002: 116). I will come back to the mud-pie example shortly, in §3.4. 
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to kill that is at odds with her own inclinations and natural feelings towards her friend; 
while a real desire to kill cannot be elicited in this way. Moreover, pretenders’ ‘desires’ 
and real desires seem to differ with respect to their satisfaction conditions (see Currie 
2010). In most cases, the ‘desires’ that motivate pretence seem to be fully satisfied by 
what turns out to be fictionally true within the pretence itself. Again, this wouldn’t be 
possible if they were real desires. A ‘desire’ to kill a cowboy, which motivates the 
pretence of shooting a toy arrow at him, will generally be totally satisfied by the 
cowboy’s pretence of falling down dead, which makes it true in the game the he has died. 
A real desire to kill a cowboy would not be satisfied by it merely being true in the game 
that the cowboy has died. These differences with respect to formation and satisfaction 
conditions suggest that, if we want to argue that children’s pretence actions are 
motivated by their (belief-like) imaginings, we must appeal to desire-like imaginings as 
well.79  
I will have more to say on the relation between desire-like imaginings and real 
desires shortly (§3.4). For the moment, let’s conclude the presentation of the 
imagination-as-motivation view of pretence by emphasizing once again that such pairs 
of belief-like and desire-like imaginings constitute proper motivations – i.e. both causes 
and reasons – for actions, as we have seen that genuine belief-desire pairs do. This 
suggestion, by the way, does not seem to involve any particularly new or implausible 
revisions of our concept of imagination. After all, as C&R observe, it is already widely 
accepted that imaginings can cause various sorts of behaviours. This is for example how 
the so-called phenomenon of ‘motor mimicry’ is explained: the fact that we tend to 
conform our facial expressions and postures to those of people around us is typically 
explained (roughly) by saying that we imagine ourselves to be in other peoples’ 
situation, and this move us to behave accordingly (think e.g. of when we move so as to 
defend our own body at the sight of a blow aimed at another; see Goldman 2006: Ch. 
11). Moreover – as we have seen in Chapter 2 – it is also widely accepted that 
imaginings can rationalize emotional responses (as with Psycho shower scene 
rationalizing a fearful response, rather than an envious one). But then, if we are ready 
                                                          
79 Here I must notice that the origin of real desires is a difficult and much debated question (notably for 
what concerns intrinsic, non-instrumental desires; see Schroeder 2015 for an introduction to this topic). 
My suggestion that pretenders’ desires differ from real desires with respect to the ways in which they are 
formed, then, is not based on a clear positive view about how real desires are formed. It is based on the 
more modest consideration that, however they are formed, real desires are not (straightforwardly) 
sensitive to our will and conscious deliberations in the ways in which pretenders’ desires seem to be. 
However, I see that more work would be needed to properly support this claim: both the extents to 
which pretenders’ desires are, and the extents to which real desires are not, subject to the will, would 
require further discussion.  
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to credit imaginings with such causal and rational powers, why deny that they can exert 
the two powers together in motivating proper actions? 
Cowering from a blow aimed at another suggests that imaginings have the capacity to 
generate behaviour, if not to rationalize it, and the emotions case suggests that 
imagination has the capacity to rationalize if not to generate behaviour. Put the two 
together, and you have imagination as motivation. (Currie and Ravenscroft 2002: 130) 
3.4. PROBLEMS (AND SOLUTIONS) FOR THE IMAGINATION-AS-MOTIVATION VIEW 
Criticisms of the imagination-as-motivation account of pretence have focused mostly 
on the notion of desire-like imaginings – which we have already seen to be a rather 
controversial one (see above Ch.2, §3.2). Here I will discuss some problems raised by 
Nichols and Stich (2000) (as before, ‘N&S’ for short), which will allow me to clarify 
some important points on the nature of desire-like imaginings and, more generally, on 
how imagination motivates.  
3.4.1. DESIRES AND DESIRE-LIKE IMAGININGS: SAME MOTIVATING POWERS? The first 
objection raised by N&S is that if desire-like imaginings and real desires with the same 
contents have the same motivating powers, then we should expect them to produce 
the same behaviours, and this would obviously be a wrong prediction. Considering the 
case of a child who pretends that a gob of mud is a pie, N&S note: 
An (imaginary) desire to eat some pie, along with an (imaginary) belief that the gob of 
mud is a pie would presumably lead the pretender to actually eat the mud pies. But 
pretense behaviour of this sort is rarely seen in children and almost never seen in adults 
(Nichols and Stich 2000: 134) 
So, N&S conclude, the imagination-as-motivation account of pretence makes the 
wrong predictions about the behaviour of pretenders. 
C&R have a reply to this. They concede to N&S that if desire-like imaginings and 
real desires with the same contents had the same motivating powers, then we should 
expect them to produce the same behaviours and this would be a wrong prediction about 
pretenders’ behaviours. But they reject the antecedent of the conditional, arguing that we 
need not assume that desire-like imaginings and real desires have the same motivating 
powers: 
Why should we assume that the motivating powers of desire-like imaginings and of 
desires with the same contents are the same? (…) Imaginings might be type-individuated 
partly by their distinctive motivating powers. In particular, where the desire to P is apt to 
motivate one to ϕ, the imaginary desire to P may motivate one to pretend to ϕ. (Currie 
and Ravenscroft 2002: 116) 
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I find this reply unconvincing. But a better one is available to C&R. In my view, C&R 
should reject N&S’s conditional altogether: for it is not true that if we assume that real 
desires and desire-like imaginings have the same powers we make the wrong 
predictions about pretenders’ behaviours. What is wrong, rather, is the story N&S’s tell 
us about the ‘mud-pie pretence game’. They say that if the motivating power of real 
desires and desire-like imaginings is the same, then a child who make-believes that the 
gob is a pie and make-desires to eat a pie would actually eat the mud. But this doesn’t 
sound right. A child who make-desires to eat a pie and make-believes that the gob is a 
pie will presumably also make-believe that she can eat that ‘pie’ by putting it close to 
her cheek and saying “yum-yum” (or something like that). Strictly speaking, it is this 
belief-like imagining that, together with the desire-like imagining to eat the pie, 
motivates her pretence action. And if we assume that this belief-like/desire-like 
imagining pair has the same motivating power of a belief/desire pair with the same 
contents we make precisely the right prediction about the child’s behaviour. If the 
child desired to eat that pie and believed that she can eat it by putting it close to her 
cheek and saying “yum-yum”, she would behave precisely in the same way: she would 
put the mud-pie close to her cheek and say “yum-yum”.  
Of course, in this latter case the child would not be pretending to eat a pie; she 
would rather be trying (unsuccessfully) to eat one. These seem indeed to be two rather 
different actions (though based on the same observable behaviour). But the difference 
between them does not depend on the fact that one is motivated by a real desire and 
the other by a desire-like imagining; it seems rather to depend on the fact that in one 
case the child believes (falsely) that the action she performs will allow her to eat, while 
in the other case she just make-believes that it will.80 The pretence status of her action 
depends on how the child ‘sees’ the action itself, not on the imaginative nature of the 
desire that such action is supposed to satisfy. And indeed, as I have argued in §4.3, it 
seems that also real desires can motivate pretence actions, if they operate in 
conjunction with belief-like imaginings. Remember the example of Sam who is (really) 
annoyed with Tom and pretends to shoot a toy arrow at him. Or – to take a case which 
parallels the mud-pie pretence – think of a situation where, waiting for pizza at the 
restaurant and being very hungry, I grab the (empty) plate in front of me and pretend 
to bite it, saying “Mmm, this pizza is good!”. What makes this a pretence action, rather 
                                                          
80 Note that I am not suggesting that the fact that she make-believes that is sufficient to make her action a 
pretence; I am suggesting that it is necessary. 
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than a genuine unsuccessful attempt to eat, is clearly the fact that I don’t believe but 
just make-believe that I can eat the ‘pizza-plate’, even if my desire to eat is a real one.  
How can we tell that my desire here is a real one, while children’s ‘desires’ to eat 
(mud) pies are imaginary? As I suggested before, one clear criterion here has to do with 
their different satisfaction conditions. My desire to eat at the restaurant is not satisfied 
by the fact that in my mini-pretence it becomes true that I have had a bite of pizza; 
while (in many cases) children pretending to eat mud-pies can thereby satisfy their 
‘desires’ for pies. Moreover, such ‘desires’ for pies seem sensitive to children’s will and 
control in a way in which my desire for pizza isn’t. Children engaged in a mud-pie 
pretence seem able to bring about ‘desires’ for pies irrespectively of whether they feel 
hungry, and even of whether they actually like pies; something that arguably I couldn’t 
do with my real desire for pizza.81  
All this might suggest that desire-like imaginings are always easily and 
straightforwardly satisfied: you never have to wait for a pretend-pizza; all you need to 
do is to pretend to eat it. But things are obviously not that simple. At least in the 
context of pretence games, desire-like imaginings are satisfied by what is fictionally true 
in the games, and what is fictionally true in a game does not always depend on what a 
pretender spontaneously make-believes to be true. Generally, it also depends on what 
other players make-believe, as well as on a number of somewhat ‘objective’ rules: such 
as rules that children agreed, more or less explicitly, in advance – e.g. “Sam is the chef, 
Jules is the diner” – or more conventional rules typically holding for given kinds of 
games – like the rule I have been assuming to hold in my examples, according to which 
putting something close to your mouth and saying “yum-yum” is eating. So, if Sam is 
slow in preparing pizza, Jules’s will have to wait in order to satisfy her imaginative 
desire for pizza, as I have to wait to satisfy my real desire at the restaurant. And note 
also that if Jules didn’t realize that the game she is playing is one where people are used 
to eat from their feet, her pretence to put food close to her mouth wouldn’t make it 
fictionally true that she is eating: in the game, she would be unsuccessfully try to eat. 
As Currie (2004) notices, like ‘competent believers’ whose beliefs correspond to what 
                                                          
81 In relation to this, note that while my pretence of eating at the restaurant is likely to start precisely 
because no pizza is available to me, children might very well play mud-pie games also in cases in which 
real pies would be easily accessible to them. Indeed, children who are fussy eaters and never finish their 
meals may well engage in cooking/eating pretences. Of course, one might argue that such pretences 
reveal a suppressed real desire to eat; but this doesn’t look plausible to me as a standard explanation. All 
that said, though, here note again the doubts and complexities that I pointed out before concerning the 
differences between real-desires and pretence-desires’ formation (see footnote 78 above).  
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is true in the real world, ‘competent pretenders’ are those whose make-believe 
corresponds to what is true in the game they are playing (Currie 2004: 205).  
Now we are also in the position to better understand the intuitive plausibility of 
N&S’s objection. Their example of the mud-pie pretence is plausibly referred to 
cognitively normal children, who are competent believers (in particular, who correctly 
believe that to eat you should put food into your mouth), and competent pretenders (in 
particular, who correctly make-believe that to eat you should put food close to your 
mouth). For such competent children (and, note, here I am not questioning that even 
very young children are normally that competent), a desire to eat a pie and a belief that 
something is a pie will indeed motivate an action of putting that thing into their mouth, 
while a desire-like imagining to eat a pie and a belief-like imagining that something is a 
pie will motivate an action of putting that thing close to their mouth. So N&S are right 
that desire/belief pairs and imaginary desire/belief pairs will normally motivate 
different actions. But now we can appreciate that these differences are not due to the 
intrinsically different motivating powers of those two pairs, but rather to contingent 
differences in the sets of representational states to which those two pairs normally 
belong. (Incidentally, note that paying attention to the whole set of mental states in the 
context of which imaginary belief/desires pairs motivate is crucial for dealing with 
another important question that advocates of the imagination-as-motivation view must 
be able to answer: namely, the question of why imagination motivates actions in cases 
of pretence, but not in many other cases. I will come back to this important point in 
Chapter 5: §3.) 
3.4.2. DEAD CATS (AND SOME TENTATIVE CONCLUSIONS). A second problem that N&S 
raise for the imagination-as-motivation view is that there are cases of pretence for 
which an appeal to desire-like imaginings is utterly implausible – such as the case of 
someone pretending to be a dead cat. Even if we grant that a child pretending to be an 
Indian who shoots arrows at his cowboy enemy is motivated by Indian-like imaginary 
desires and beliefs, a similar explanation is not available for a child pretending to be a 
dead cat. Dead cats have no desires – nor, of course, beliefs about how to satisfy them; 
so whatever the child does in such a case (presumably something like lying on the 
floor, muttering “I am dead”) cannot be explained by his taking on, in imagination, the 
desires and beliefs of a dead cat and acting out of them. It should instead be explained 
– according to N&S – in terms of a real desire to behave as you would if you were a 
dead cat, and real beliefs about how to do that.  
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C&R have a reply also to this objection. And, this time, it’s a persuasive one.  
They grant that cases like the dead cat pretence are not plausibly explained in terms of 
motivating imaginings and seem to require belief-desire explanations. But this, they 
argue, is not in itself a problem for the imagination-as-motivation view, since this view 
was explicitly offered to explain one particular kind of pretence: namely, pretence that 
involves role taking – pretence that involves acting out the part of an intentional agent. 
And this, C&R suggest, is a sufficiently distinctive kind of pretence for it plausibly be 
thought of as having a distinctive kind of explanation” (Currie and Ravenscroft 2002: 
117). Indeed, it is not obvious that all cases of pretence must have the same kind of 
mental causes. And surely defending the imagination-as-motivation view does not 
amount to deny that there are cases of pretence motivated by beliefs and desires.  
Nor, importantly, does it amount to denying that beliefs and desires can 
influence pretence in a number of ways. As Humeans can allow that imaginings play a 
role – even an important one – in explaining pretence, so advocates of the 
imagination-as-motivation view can allow for beliefs and desires. We can probably all 
agree that beliefs about Indians and cowboys’ behaviours are likely to influence what 
children imagine when they pretend to be Indians and cowboys. And we may also 
agree that such imaginings do – at least sometimes – bring about further beliefs like 
those postulated by N&S (If I were a cowboy, I would behave like that…). All these beliefs 
and imaginings will play a role in explaining children pretence. The point is to 
understand which, among these representational states, make maximally close contact 
with behaviour. And what I have argued so far suggests that imaginings are more likely 
to be the ones.  
Have I established that pretence is, in some cases at least, motivated by pretenders’ 
imaginings? Admittedly not. The debate on the cognitive motivation underlying 
pretence is very extensive and live, and my defence of the imagination-as-motivation 
view hasn’t dealt with all the objections that have been raised against it, nor with all the 
available alternative views which have been proposed.82 However, I hope to have at 
least provided good reasons to think that an explanation of pretence in terms of what 
                                                          
82 A really interesting account of pretence is the account recently defended by Van Leeuwen (2011), 
according to which imaginings do influence pretence behaviour without the mediation of beliefs, but the 
imaginings that do that are sensory/perceptual imaginings, rather than propositional imaginings. Van 
Leeuwen also raises various criticisms against the notion of desires-like imaginings, arguing that they 
cannot explain the two phenomena that he calls “semi-pretence” and “pretence-layering” (Van Leeuwen 
2011: 55-56). This view, as most of Van Leeuwen’s greatly interesting work, would definitely deserve a 
serious consideration and discussion, which I hope to develop in my future research. Unfortunately, I 
became aware of Van Leeuwen’s work and of its relevance to my interests too late to discuss it properly 
in this thesis. 
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pretenders imagine can avoid some serious problems that affect most Humean 
explanations in terms of belief-desire pairs, without involving theoretically expensive 
moves (i.e. without requiring any dramatic change in our view of imagination’s 
powers), since both the causal and the rationalizing powers of imagination are already 
widely accepted. For the moment, I would be happy to have persuaded you of this, and 
I won’t go further into the debate on pretence. As I said, indeed, I take the case of 
pretence actions to provide some initial evidence and intuitive plausibility for my view 
that imagination and belief do not critically differ in action outputs; but my main 
argument for such view is not based primarily on pretence. Vice versa, if I will be able 
to persuade you, on a somewhat independent basis, that imagination has the same 
motivating powers of belief, this might provide further reasons to accept that such 
powers are exerted also in cases of pretence.  
CONCLUSION 
In this Chapter I have started addressing the Hume Problem of how to distinguish 
imagination from belief. I have discussed two orders of considerations that look 
relevant to solve this problem: (i) considerations concerning the cognitive inputs that 
are responsible for imagination and belief’s formation, and (ii) considerations 
concerning imagination and belief’s behavioural outputs. I have first clarified what 
reasons we might have to think that in paradigmatic cases of daydream, engagement 
with fictions, and counterfactual/modal reasoning imaginings differ from beliefs in 
both these respects. Then I have focussed on cases of pretence, asking whether they 
challenge the idea that imaginings and beliefs can be distinguished on the basis of 
behavioural outputs and whether they might be taken to support my view that 
imaginings and beliefs differ just with respects to cognitive inputs. I have argued that 
such cases do indeed provide some initial evidence (and some intuitive plausibility) in 
favour of my view, because the best available explanation of pretence requires us to 
recognize that imagination is not motivationally inert, but can cause and rationalize 
actions in ways very similar to the ways in which belief does – thereby revealing that 
the differences between imagination and belief with respect to action outputs are much 
smaller than they might prima facie seem (and have traditionally been taken) to be. 
This initial evidence is not conclusive, though: it does not  prove that 
imagination and belief are totally alike with respect to action outputs. According to the 
version of the imagination-as-motivation view of pretence that I defended, when 
imaginings (belief-like ones) motivate pretence they generally do so in conjunction with 
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desire-like imaginings; while beliefs – we have seen – typically motivate in conjunction 
with real desires. So, cases of pretence do not reveal that imagination and belief 
motivate action in the same ways. Actually, I did also argue that 
imagination can sometimes motivate pretence in conjunction with real desires (and I 
mentioned reasons why, according to some, this is what happens all the time). But this 
still does not prove that there are no motivational differences between imagination and 
belief. Indeed, beliefs’ dispositional connection (via desire) to action holds across 
contexts: as various authors pointed out, “beliefs can enter into action choice in any 
sort of context whatsoever” (Van Leeuwen 2009: 224; see also Bratman 1992). If 
imagination motivated actions only in cases of pretence, its motivating power would be 
much more limited than that of belief. In order to show that imagination’s motivating 
power is really the same of belief, then, I need to consider whether and how 
imagination’s power is exerted across different contexts also outside the domain of 
pretence – as belief’s power is. This is what I am going to do in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 4 
WISE PENS, EVIL CARDIGANS, THOUGHTFUL DOORS  
AND OTHER STRANGE THINGS 
 
 
 
 
So far I have defended a view according to which imagination and belief are alike in 
important respects. They have the same kinds of contents: i.e. propositions.83 And they 
both ‘regard such contents as true’ – in the phenomenological as well as in the 
cognitive sense I specified: both imagining that p and believing that p dispose us to 
undergo emotional experiences that would be appropriate if p were true, and they both 
dispose us to ‘treat p as true’ in our reasoning, drawing theoretical inferences from it. I 
have also argued that imaginings and beliefs have similar motivating powers: cases of 
pretence reveal that imaginings can motivate us to act in ways very similar to the ways 
in which beliefs, jointly with desires, do (even though I granted that in pretence cases 
imaginings are more likely to motivate in conjunction with desire-like imaginings, 
rather than with real desires). Thus, on this view imagination and belief turn out to 
have very similar emotional and behavioural outputs. The most critical difference 
between them has to do with the cognitive inputs in response to which they are 
formed and the related normative constraints that govern them: imaginings are not 
(nor ought to be) formed and maintained in response to real-world evidence as beliefs 
are (and ought to be).  
In fact, as I anticipated already, I think that output similarities between 
imagination and belief can be pushed even farther. They can be pushed so far that, 
rather than talking in term of ‘similarities’, it may become more appropriate to talk in 
terms of ‘sameness’: imagination and belief have basically the same 
behavioural/emotional outputs and can only be distinguished with respect to cognitive 
inputs (and related normative constraints). In this chapter I will introduce my main 
argument for this view, based on the consideration of a number of cases different from 
the paradigmatic ones on which I have been focussing in the last two chapters. As I 
have it, the same imaginative state that we invoke to explain cases of daydreams, 
engagement with fictions, pretence and modal reasoning, plays the relevant explanatory 
                                                          
83 Here remember that with ‘imagination’ without further qualifications I refer to propositional 
imagination which is belief-like. As I said, I recognize also forms of propositional imaginings that are 
desire-like (as well as forms of non-propositional imaginings). But when I want to talk about these latter 
forms of imaginings I shall always make this explicit. 
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role also in a number of other cases (/activities/experiences) that are not at all 
marginal in our lives. The analysis of such cases reveals something important about the 
nature and powers of imagination. 
Here is the plan. In § 1 I will introduce the relevant cases and overview a number 
of possible explanations for them. In §§ 2 and 3 I will focus on explanations in terms 
of belief, arguing that they don’t work. In § 4 I will argue for my own explanation in 
terms of imaginings and raise some general questions about the motivating force of 
imagination as compared to that of belief, which I will answer in the next chapter. 
Before moving on to this, though, in § 5, I will address a radical challenge to my view 
raised by Tamar Gendler’s arguments for the existence of aliefs. 
 
1. SUPERSTITION AND MAGIC 
When I was in High School, I used the same pen for written tests as I took notes with 
in my classes, since ‘it already knew the right answers’. During my BA at university, I 
used to wear the same red T-shirt on the days of exams. I also have a T-shirt (a 
different one, of course) that I use when I go on difficult climbing expeditions in the 
mountains. At the supermarket, I always take the second item in the row on a shelf. 
And I read Rob Brezsny’s horoscope on International every Thursday. I feel slightly 
ashamed in reporting these small rituals and superstitious actions that punctuate my 
everyday life; but, at least, I know that I am in good company. Barack Obama is 
famous for his ritual of playing basketball on the morning of every election; David 
Beckham for wearing a brand new football outfit at each match.84 And apparently 
Beckham’s fans are ready to pay significant amounts of money to possess his ‘old’ 
outfits – as indeed people are ready to do for such things as Princess Diana’s wedding 
dress or John Lennon’s hand-written lyrics. As these particular objects seem to mean a 
lot to us, by the way, so we tend to charge with special meanings some particular 
events in the lives of their owners: think of the many conspiracy theories circulating 
about Princess Diana’s car crash (which ‘couldn’t be just an accident’).85 We are also all 
                                                          
84 Along with students, politicians, athletes, musicians, financial investors, and fishermen are all 
categories of people well-known for the propitiatory rites and lucky charms they perform before and 
during their performances (see Vyse 2000: Ch.2; a nice, detailed discussion of athletes’ superstitions is 
provided by the anthropologist and former baseball player George Gmelch in his popular essay 
“Baseball Magic”: “As I listened to my professor describe the magical rituals of the Trobriand Islanders 
it occurred to me that what these so-called primitives people did wasn’t all that different from what my 
teammates and I did for luck and confidence at the ballpark…”. Gmelch 1978: 33). 
85 This, by the way, is something we do with our own lives as well: like when we say that such things as 
running into a long-lost friend in a so unlikely place, or miraculously escaping an accident, ‘can’t be sheer 
coincidences’. 
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familiar with a number of traditional superstitious actions, like touching wood, crossing 
your fingers, throwing a coin into a fountain before leaving a nice place you visited, 
avoiding travel on Friday the 13th, and so on. 
Psychological research over the last decades has provided more systematic 
evidence of how widespread among educated Western adults is the tendency to behave 
in superstitious ways more or less similar to those just described. In a series of seminal 
experiments Paul Rozin and colleagues found most subjects to be reluctant to throw 
darts at the photograph of a loved one (though explicitly recognizing that action to be 
harmless); unwilling to drink from a bottle labelled “Poison” (though knowing that it 
actually contains just sugared water); or unwilling to wear an acknowledgedly fully 
sterilized sweater that they were told previously belonged to Adolf Hitler (see e.g. 
Rozin, Millman, and Nemeroff 1986, Nemeroff and Rozin 2002).86 
Some sorts of superstitious behaviours have also been pointed out to be 
characteristic of some forms of obsessive-compulsive disorder (a pathological 
condition which affects about 2% of European and U.S. populations), involving such 
rituals as turning the light on and off a certain number of times before exiting a room 
‘to prevent something bad from happening’, or compulsive hand-washing ‘to kill all 
bacteria that assault your skin every time you touch something’.87  
What all these otherwise disparate actions, which I have gathered under the 
broad label of superstitious actions,88 have in common, is the peculiar kind of ‘magical’ 
thinking that they all seem to presuppose. A kind of thinking, that is, which departs in 
various ways from the natural view of the world supported by contemporary science, 
ascribing supernatural properties to things and agents: taking, for instance, action at 
distance to be possible, or treating inanimate things as sentient objects and brute 
                                                          
86 Similar findings are informally replicated by the psychologist Bruce Hood during his talks, which he 
uses to open by offering his audience to wear, for a substantial reward, a cardigan that has belonged to 
the serial killer Fred West, unvaryingly obtaining a vast majority of refusals (See Hood 2012: Ch.2). See 
also Haidt (2012) for other evidence of this sort. 
87 I will say something more on the relation between superstition and obsessive-compulsive disorders in 
§3.2. below. 
88 Here the question arises whether all these cases are properly characterized as ‘actions’. Aren’t at least 
some of them just cases of unintentional reactions/behaviours? This doubt may be plausible for some 
‘Rozin cases’: e.g. cases of subjects being hesitant to eat faeces-shaped fudges. But I think that overall 
most of the cases I described count as intentional actions: in most cases we can identify a deliberate 
doing on the part of the subject – something she intended to do and for which, indeed, she can be taken 
responsible for. Surely, some subjects in Rozin’s experiment might have displayed just a quick-and-dirty 
reaction on which they then didn’t act (e.g. turning their nose up at a faeces-shaped fudge, hesitating a 
bit, but then ending up eating it). These cases of course don’t count as actions. But many participants in 
the experiment definitely refused to eat the faeces-shaped fudge, and ate instead the other one: what I 
am concerned with are the behaviours of those subjects, which I think would count as actions on any 
account of this notion. If you don’t think that refusing is an action, you will nonetheless agree that choosing 
the other one is. 
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physical processes as teleological ones; most generally, seeing meaning, reasons and 
intentionality where in fact there seem to be none, and more of them where there seem 
to be less.89 
1.1. OTHER ‘MAGICAL’ ACTIONS  
At least some aspects of the kind of thinking just described seem to be very pervasive 
in our cognitive life, underlying also many actions and behaviours that would not 
typically classify – if not very loosely – as superstitious. Consider for example all those 
cases where we happen to talk to (or talk about) inanimate things as if they had a mind 
and could understand us – like when we insult the printer for ‘not understanding that 
we want an A6 format’, or ask the door to ‘please remain shut’.90 Or consider other 
similar cases that Velleman calls “expressive behaviours” – i.e. behaviours expressive 
of an emotion – like: tearing up your boyfriend's letter when you are angry with him, 
yelling at the driver in another car who obviously can’t hear you, loudly encouraging 
the players of your favourite team while watching a match in TV…91  
Admittedly, describing all of these cases as manifestations of magical thinking 
might sound a bit odd: where is the magic in the screams of an enthusiastic sport fan? 
But I think the apparent oddity eases off if we take, as I shall do here, the term 
“magical” as a sort of term of art: a term indicating something that might involve 
typical magical constructs/properties – such as ghosts, spirits, supernatural gifts of 
second sight – but might also just amount to exaggerating the degree to which some 
properties that are not themselves magical – such as consciousness, understanding, 
rationality – are manifested in the world around us, whether it is a door or the image of 
a soccer player on a TV screen.  
1.2. MAGICAL THINKING: GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND PARTICULAR CONTENTS 
Lots of interesting work has been devoted to spelling out what precisely this sort of 
‘magical thinking’ amounts to – i.e. which categories and principles underlie it. 
Anthropologists from Levi-Strauss have emphasized its fundamentally anthropomorphic 
nature (see e.g. Guthrie 1993). Currie and Jureidini (2004) introduced the category of 
over-coherence to describe its characteristic tendency to overestimate the world’s coherent 
design and rationality. Lindeman and Aarnio (2007) identified its most distinctive 
                                                          
89 This characterization of our magical thinking draws significantly on the one suggested by Currie and 
Jureidini (2004), to which I will return to shortly.  
90 As we ascribe consciousness and mindedness to inanimate things, we also exaggerate the degrees to 
which such properties are possessed by sentient beings, at various levels.  
91 Some of the examples here are due to Rosalind Hursthouse (1991), who calls these “arational actions”. 
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feature as a systematic tendency to category mistakes where the core attributes of mental 
and physical a processes are conflated. Rozin and Nemeroff famously argued that 
much of this thinking conforms to what he calls “laws of sympathetic magic”: notably, 
a “law of contagion” – according to which things that once have been in contact may 
influence each other permanently through transfer of a non-physical essences from 
each other (as with the cardigan permeated by Hitler’s wicked essence); and a “law of 
similarity” – according to which objects that are superficially similar in some respect 
share also a deeper essence, so the action taken on one can affect the other (as with a 
photograph sharing the essence of the person it portrays; or with a name sharing the 
essence of its referent92). Various authors have recently suggested more detailed 
articulations of these two laws into a number of more specific principles.93  
Which, if any, of these principles and categories are better suited to describe the 
logic and contents of our magical thinking, is a fascinating question; but not one that I 
am going to discuss any further here.94 Arguably, to say that our thinking in this 
domain presupposes some or some other principles/categories does not necessarily 
mean that such principles/categories are internally represented by us in the abstract 
form we have just seen – let alone that abstract representations of such 
principles/categories are what directly motivates our ‘superstitious actions’. On the 
contrary, as Currie and Jureidini have persuasively argued, our magical, over-coherent 
thoughts typically take the form of unsystematic little narratives concerning the 
interactions between particular individuals/objects/events (generally represented as 
intentional agents – or, at least as goal-directed entities), whose behaviours are 
coherently and somehow teleologically related to one another. And indeed, whatever 
our views of the general underlying principles are, I think we can all agree in ascribing 
                                                          
92 Following Piaget, Nemeroff and Rozin describe this as a case of ‘nominal realism’ (Nemeroff and 
Rozin 2000: 6). 
93 Such as Huston (2012)’s seven principles of magical thinking: objects carry essences; symbols have 
powers; actions have distant consequences; the mind knows no bounds; the soul lives on; the world is 
alive; everything happens for a reason. See also Rozin and Nemeroff’s re-elaboration of their original 
theory (Nemeroff and Rozin 2002). 
94 Though note that such principles/categories are not necessarily alternative to each other. Moreover, it 
is worth noticing, beyond the disagreements, also some important points on which most parties in the 
debate seem to agree: (1) the superstitious/magical thoughts here in question are extremely pervasive in 
our thinking; (2) in spite of their falsity and irrationality, holding such thoughts and acting upon them 
can yield a number of pragmatic benefits. Psychological benefits (e.g. it has been argued that personal 
superstitious rituals may generate a sense of control which has positive effects: wearing his ‘lucky new 
outfit’ may make David Beckham actually feel better and play better in the match). Social benefits (when 
the rituals are collective, they can constitute a “useful glue that binds us together as a society” Hood 
2012; see also Vyse 1999). I will say something more on the benefits of superstitious thinking at the end 
of Section 2. As we shall see shortly, another widely shared assumption – which I will question – is that 
superstitious thoughts are beliefs. 
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to the agents in the cases I have described particular magical thoughts more or less like 
these: 
- This pen – who attended all the lessons – will help me to write down the correct answers 
(my thought when I take that particular pen out of my writing case for the 
exam); 
- Throwing this coin here will make sure that I return to Rome (the thought of the 
tourist who throws one euro into the Trevi Fountain); 
- This door can understand what I say: if I talk to her gently I might persuade her (my 
thought when, trying to close the door for the third time, I ask her to ‘please 
remain shut eventually’).  
1.3. THE EXPLANATORY OPTIONS 
The plausibility of the thought-ascriptions just suggested, of course, depends on the 
fact that it seems to be in the light of thoughts like these that subjects’ actions make 
sense. No doubt, there might be a number of different explanations for such actions, 
some of which might have nothing whatsoever to do with those thoughts. One might 
have never heard about the legend that throwing coins into the Trevi Fountain is a way 
to make sure that one returns to Rome, and might well throw a coin there just because 
she sees all the other tourists doing that, or perhaps in order to test whether coins can 
float into water. But this is not what happens most of the time. Generally, people are 
aware of the fountain legend, and the reason why they throw their coins there has 
something to do with that very legend. Similarly, the reason why people avoid 
travelling on Friday the 13th generally has something to do with the idea that it is a day 
of bad luck; the reason why people touch wood has generally something to do with the 
idea that this brings good luck; and so on.95 After all, we call all these actions 
‘superstitious’ precisely insofar as they involve that sort of superstitious thoughts. 
Though something similar holds also for those other actions I mentioned which do 
not classify straightforwardly as ‘superstitious’. When I ask the door to please remain 
                                                          
95 Subjects themselves do sometimes mention such ideas in explaining their actions (as I’ve done in 
telling you that I insisted in using that particular pen in my exams because it was the same ‘who had 
previously heard the lessons’). And even if – as we shall see often happens – subjects are reluctant to 
avow such ideas explicitly, we appeal to them in order to make sense of what they do: I take it that most 
of us would agree that the thought that the pullover has been touched by Hitler and is somehow 
contaminated generally plays some role in determining people’s refusal to wear it, whether they explicitly 
recognize this or not. After all, the same people plausible would accept to keep in their hands books 
describing Hitler’s atrocities in details and featuring pictures of him. Their problem with the pullover  
seem to be related to the idea that it has been touched, hence contaminated by such an evil person as 
Hitler. 
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shut, I obviously somehow think of it as able to understand me: this thought obviously has 
some role in explaining my action of talking ‘to her’.  
What role precisely? Well, this is much less obvious. While it seems clear that 
thoughts like those just seen do generally play some relevant role in explaining the 
actions we are considering, spelling out precisely what that role amounts to is much 
trickier. So far I have been referring to them in the generic terms of ‘thoughts’ or 
‘ideas’. But what kinds of mental states are such thoughts and ideas exactly? And, 
whatever they are, how do they interact with the subjects’ other mental states in order 
to motivate action?  
In my view, the thoughts in question are imaginings, which motivate action 
directly in conjunction with subjects’ desires. When I ask the door to remain shut, I 
(really) want it to remain shut, and – though I obviously don’t believe that it can 
understand me, I imagine that it can: this is what motivates my verbal action. Similarly, I 
imagine that my pen will suggest me the right answers in the exam, and this – together 
with the desire to give the right answers – is what motivates me to use it. An 
explanation along these lines is available for all the cases here in question; and, I shall 
argue, is generally the best available one. But I am aware that, for some cases at least, 
this is controversial: especially for cases of superstitions, which are normally explained 
in terms of belief. I wouldn’t be surprized if you agreed that I don’t really believe that 
the door can understand me, but you took the pen case to be different. In the pen case, 
many would say that I simply used to have a superstitious belief, as students typically 
have when it comes to exams. Alternatively, some may grant that I just imagined that 
the pen would have helped me, yet still deny that this imagining played the direct 
motivating role I suggest: perhaps what happened is simply that I realized that using 
such a pen made me feel less anxious (since the mere fact of imagining that it would 
have helped me in the exam had a relaxing effect), so I just used it to relieve my exam 
anxiety. One might also think that neither imagination nor belief are the relevant 
categories here: I obviously didn’t believe that my pen would have helped me, but I did 
not just imagine that, either – my attitude towards that proposition should be described 
in rather different terms. But what terms, then? 
As it turns out, contrary to what happened with the paradigmatic cases 
considered in the previous chapters, which we straightforwardly explain in terms either 
of imaginings or of beliefs, our intuitions concerning the cases introduced in this 
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chapter are not always so clear, and might vary from subject to subject. From what I 
have just said, the following explanatory options have emerged: 
i) Standard belief explanation. The ‘magic’ thoughts in question are beliefs, which motivate 
the relevant actions in conjunction with subjects’ desires.  
(In a Humean fashion: I believe that using that ‘wise pen’ will help me to do better in 
the exam, I desire to do better, I use that pen.) 
ii) Sophisticated belief explanation. The thoughts in question are imaginings, but they 
motivate the relevant actions just indirectly, via belief-desire pairs.  
(Again, in a Humean fashion: I imagine that using that pen will help me to do better in 
the exam. This imagining – which typically becomes occurrent when I use that pen – 
prompts in me a positive emotion, reducing my exam-related anxiety. I then come to 
believe that using that pen makes me feel better. This belief, together with the desire to 
feel better, is what motivates me.) 
iii) Explanation in terms of imaginings. The thoughts in question are imaginings, which 
motivate action directly in conjunction with subjects’ desires, with no mediation of 
belief.  
(I imagine that my pen will suggest me the right answers in the exam, and this – 
together with the desire to give the right answers – is what motivates me to use it.) 
iv) Radically new explanation. Neither belief nor imagination can play the relevant 
explanatory role here; they can’t capture the hybrid status of subjects’ attitudes towards 
the thoughts in question; we need a new cognitive category. What category then? 
Tamar Gendler has suggested one: ‘alief’. (So: I alieve that the pen will help me to do 
better in the exam; and this alief alone drives my behaviour – in the ways that Gendler 
describes.) 
In what follow I shall discuss these four different explanatory options (i-iv). My aim is 
to defend (iii), showing that superstitious actions are explained at best in terms of 
(directly motivating) imaginings. In order to do that, I shall first discuss and reject the 
two Humean explanations, (i) and (ii). Finally, after having laid out my view, I will also 
criticize (iv).  
Since the most controversial part of my claim concerns superstitions, I will 
initially focus on them. Once argued that they are not beliefs, I will defend a unified 
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account of all the sorts of ‘magical actions’ that I have described in terms of 
imaginings. ‘Unified’, note, does not purport to mean ‘universal’. The claim that these 
actions and behaviours are imagination-driven is in important respects an empirical 
claim that – as such – goes subject to exceptions. But while not denying that we ever 
hold (and are motivated by) genuine superstitious/magical beliefs, I shall argue that in 
most cases our superstitious/magical thoughts are better understood as (directly 
motivating) imaginings. 
2. THE STANDARD BELIEF EXPLANATION 
As I have noted, the thoughts here in question are often called ‘beliefs’. We commonly 
ascribe to each other superstitious beliefs. For example, we say that people believe that 
Friday the 13th is a day of bad luck, or that it is a popular belief that throwing a coin into 
the Trevi Fountain is a way to ensure a return to Rome. This talking in terms of belief 
is quite standard also among psychologists and anthropologists working in this area. 
Stuart Vyse’s seminal book on the psychology of superstition is indeed called ‘Believing 
in magic’; Paul Rozin talks interchangeably of ‘sympathetic magical thinking’ and ‘belief 
in the laws of sympathetic magic’; Bruce Hood, author of the most recent extensive 
monograph on these topics, talks of “supernatural beliefs operat[ing] in everyday 
reasoning, no matter how rational and reasoned you think you are” (Hood 2012: 10). 
Philosophers, too, (though with some notable exceptions I shall discuss) when 
discussing superstitions do generally treat them as beliefs. Lisa Bortolotti, to take a 
recent example, includes superstitions among the uncontroversial instances of ordinary 
beliefs that she uses as benchmark to assess the doxastic status of delusions (Bortolotti 
2010: 85).96 The list of examples could continue, but I don’t think I need many more 
than these to persuade you that talking of superstitious, magic, or supernatural beliefs is 
rather common and, indeed, quite natural.  
Arguably, the reason why it is so common and natural to describe superstitious 
thoughts as beliefs is that they seem to motivate actions in conjunction with subjects’ 
desires, as beliefs typically do. The superstitious thought that throwing a coin into the 
fountain will ensure a return to Rome seems indeed to be what – jointly with a desire 
                                                          
96 To be fair, what Bortolotti claims is that superstitions are uncontroversially ascribed as beliefs. At the 
beginning of her book she makes clear that she is interested in our practices of belief ascription and 
open to the possibility that what we commonly call belief is better described in a different way 
(Bortolotti 2010: 2). I take her point to be a conditional one: if you are happy to call all these things 
‘beliefs’, then you should do the same with delusions. I argue that the antecedent of this conditional, in 
many of the cases she considers, is false. My worry concerning Bortolotti (2010)’s discussion is precisely 
that many things that (apparently) we are happy to call ‘beliefs’ in fact are better described in other 
terms.  
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to return to Rome – is most directly responsible for my action of throwing the coin. 
The thought that Hitler’s pullover is contaminated, together with a desire to avoid 
contamination, seems to be what motivates people’s refusal to wear it. And similarly it 
goes, plausibly, for the other superstitious thoughts (together with the relevant desires) 
in the other cases I introduced. Among these cases, remember, there are also instances 
of verbal actions – which as we have seen play a key role in our practices of belief 
ascription (see above Ch.3: §2). Even though, as psychologists have long recognized, 
people may be reluctant to explicitly avow their superstitions (for fear of ridicule and 
of negative social evaluation – see e.g. Vyse 1999: 14-19), at least some kinds of more 
‘fashionable’ and socially accepted superstitious thoughts (e.g. those on horoscopes, or 
other examples I’ll discuss) do often find more or less explicit verbal expression. When 
they do, they are generally taken as evidence to credit people with the corresponding 
beliefs. Why, indeed, would someone ask you what your astrological sign is – and 
comment on it: “Aha, Sagittarius! So you must be introverted and creative…” – if she 
didn’t believe that horoscopes can tell something relevant on people’s personality? 
However, if on the one hand superstitious thoughts like those just considered 
seem to play the paradigmatic motivational role of beliefs, on the other hand, they 
seem to lack another crucial feature of paradigmatic beliefs – actually two strictly 
related features: what I have called ‘sensitivity to evidence’ and ‘inferential integration’ 
(or ‘holistic coherence’). Differently from paradigmatic beliefs, superstitious thoughts 
do not seem to be formed and maintained in response to the evidence available to us. 
Most notably, they seem to be unresponsive to that kind of inferential evidence which 
makes our beliefs integrated with each other into a (more or less) holistically coherent 
system. The lack of such epistemic features casts serious doubts on the doxastic status 
of superstitious thoughts – as I am about to show.  
2.1. DOUBTS ON THE DOXASTIC STATUS OF SUPERSTITIONS: INFERENTIAL EVIDENCE 
AND HOLISTIC (IN)COHERENCE 
The fact that superstitious thoughts do not cohere with the contemporary scientific 
view of the world is fairly obvious and, in a sense, given by definition: as we have seen 
in § 1, it is also and importantly because they clash with such a view that they classify 
as ‘superstitious’ (or ‘magical’, ‘supernatural’, etc.).97 Ideas about the influences of 
                                                          
97 So for example Vyse adopts the following definition (coming from the Encyclopaedia Britannica) of 
superstitions as “beliefs or practices groundless in themselves and inconsistent with the degree of 
enlightenment reached by the community to which one belongs” (Vyse 1999: 19). One of the two major 
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horoscopes and lucky charms, the contagious powers of invisible essences, the bad 
luck attached to a particular date in the calendar, and other such things, are clearly at 
odds with basic physical laws (e.g. laws of causation, space-time homogeneity, etc.), as 
well as with basic methodological principles of scientific inquiry (which require 
systematic observation and reproducibility of results as a basis to accept hypotheses). 
Of course, the obvious fact that superstitious and scientific propositions are 
inconsistent does not in itself imply that superstitious people hold inconsistent 
thoughts. After all, we can imagine someone whose thinking is consistently non-
scientific, holding a fully coherent system of superstitious/magical thoughts. This is 
precisely how James Frazer famously depicted people of what he calls “primitive” 
cultures: characterized, in his view, by the endorsement of a globally consistent (as well 
as globally mistaken) magical view of the world, which has then evolved over time into 
a more rational naturalistic view. This picture of the ‘primitive mind’, however, is 
highly controversial: few contemporary anthropologists would still endorse it.98 And 
anyway, whether or not it has any plausibility for some individuals belonging to the 
‘primitive’ cultures that Frazer was concerned with, surely it doesn’t for the 
superstitious people I am considering here: people living nowadays in our Western 
society, otherwise committed to a scientific, natural view of the world. As we have 
seen, this category of ‘superstitious people’ is likely to include most of us; interestingly, 
there is not even consistent evidence of an inverse correlation between superstitious 
thinking and levels of scientific education.99 For people like us, superstitious thoughts 
will then surely conflict with many other beliefs (not only, note, beliefs that are strictly 
speaking scientific, but also various ordinary beliefs which follow more or less directly 
from them100). 
                                                                                                                                                                  
components of Nemeroff and Rozin’s working definition of ‘magic’ is the idea that ‘magic does not 
make sense in terms of contemporary understanding of science’ (Nemeroff and Rozin 2002: 5). 
98 In fact, there is room to argue that a ‘primitive creature’ like that depicted by Frazer is highly 
evolutively implausible. Although acknowledging the importance of Frazer’s huge work, anthropologists 
and psychologists have criticized it in many ways, and few would now endorse Frazer’s views (see e.g. 
Nemeroff and Rozin 2002, or Vyse 1999: 8. For the most famous philosophical criticism see of Frazer’s 
conceptual framework, see Wittgenstein 1967). 
99 Most published studies are conducted on college students (and actually some forms of superstitious 
thinking are more common within subjects with higher level of intelligence, education and high socio-
economic status; see Vyse 1999: 67). See also Huston (2013), Introduction.  
100 Think for example of common folk-psychological beliefs on the relation between our mind and other 
minds, or between our mind and the physical world, in relation to such ideas as: crossing your fingers can 
influence someone else’s decision, or speaking ill of a person can make it happen. Moreover, there is a growing body 
of empirical data concerning our intuitions concerning the future, free-will and determinism (see in 
particular research by Shaun Nichols and Joshua Knobe). Apparently our intuitions are not fully clear. 
But it seems that at least for such things as our own actions we are not determinist. If this is true, this 
would conflict with many superstitions – which seem to presuppose some form of determinism. 
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The inferential isolation of superstitious thoughts with respect to the whole 
system of our beliefs is also evident to the extent that we typically fail to draw the 
consequences that would follow from such thoughts – even very obvious 
consequences. Those who move their bed in order not to sleep with their feet towards 
the door thinking that this would lead to death in seven days, do not consistently worry about 
other people (including loved ones!) sleeping in that position, apparently failing to 
appreciate that the same tragic consequences might follow for everyone. Similarly, 
those who avoid travelling on Friday the 13th thinking of it as a day of bad luck do not 
seem to conclude that other people travelling on that day are foolhardy, nor that flying 
companies are blameworthy for lowering the tickets’ prices on such day, even though 
they surely believe that travelling in well-known dangerous conditions is foolhardy and 
that encouraging someone to do something dangerous is blameworthy. 
From all these examples, the lack of consistent integration between superstitious 
thoughts and ordinary natural beliefs seems hardly deniable; and it seems indeed to be 
something of which superstitious people are generally aware. Their reluctance to 
publicly avow (and in some cases tendency to explicitly disavow) their superstitions, 
which we noted before, is likely to be due precisely to that awareness: to their realizing 
that such thoughts are in obvious contrast with many other (more sensible?) ones 
which they themselves would not put into question. 
2.1.1. COHERENT SUPERSTITIONS? Admittedly, some of the thoughts that I included in 
my category of ‘superstitions’ look somewhat different in this respect. Take for 
example thoughts concerning horoscopes, or conspiracy theories (e.g. those circulating 
on Princess Diana’s death). As we have seen, these are thoughts that many subjects are 
not reluctant, but rather quite willing, to express publicly – even ‘very publicly’, as on 
magazines and social networks. This willingness is likely to be due also to the fact that 
such thoughts do not look so obviously inconsistent with their other beliefs. On the 
contrary, they seem to make coherent sense of at least some such beliefs. Ideas on the 
influences of stars upon human life and character, for example, can well make sense of 
subjects’ beliefs about other people’s behaviours; ideas about hidden conspiracies 
behind an event like someone’s death can well make sense of one’s other beliefs 
concerning the complex circumstances of that event. If so, thoughts concerning 
astrology and conspiracy theories might turn out not to be not so inferentially isolated 
after all. And indeed we call them ‘theories’ – a term indicating systems of propositions 
which are somehow logically related to one another. At least in this respect, they differ 
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from traditional superstitions like those concerning Friday the 13th, which typically 
involve just a few propositions that seldom constitute premises for further 
reasoning.101  
Without denying this difference (nor indeed many others that I surely recognize 
into my heterogeneous category of ‘superstitious thoughts’), however, I still don’t think 
that superstitious ideas like those on horoscopes or conspiracy theories can be taken to 
be sensitive to inferential evidence and integrated into a broader coherent system as 
beliefs typically are.102 Ideas on horoscopes are as inconsistent with basic scientific 
propositions as the other traditional superstitious ideas I considered are; and 
apparently they are more likely than traditional superstitions to be endorsed by subjects 
with higher levels of education – hence presumably higher levels of scientific beliefs.103 
Moreover, also the image of astrology as an internally consistent theory is in fact 
bogus,104 so the body of astrological views endorsed by a single subject is likely to be a 
bundle of contradictory claims, too. And something similar seems to hold for 
‘superstitious conspiracist thoughts’. Recent work by Karen Douglas and her 
colleagues at Kent has shown that the system of conspiracists ideas endorsed by a 
single subject is typically characterized by inner inconsistencies. Subjects who distrust 
the ‘official stories’ of Princess Diana’s or Bin Laden’s death, for example, tend to 
simultaneously endorse contradictory accounts of such events (e.g. in a study, those 
who thought that Diana faked her own death in order to retreat into isolation with 
Dodi turned out to be also significantly more likely to agree that Diana was killed by 
business enemies of the Fayeds and marginally more likely to agree that she was killed 
by British intelligence).105 In line with this, subjects who endorse similar views about 
hidden conspiracies do not seem much concerned with supporting them with positive 
reasons, but tend to simply state them in the form of slogans; slogans which then, not 
                                                          
101 In all the respects just mentioned these more structured and ‘theory-like’ superstitious ideas on 
astrology or hidden conspiracies are somewhat similar to systems of religious beliefs. I’ll return to this in 
Chapter 6.  
102 In relation to this, it is interesting to note that that apparently this sort of ‘theory-like superstitions’, 
like those on horoscopes or other New Age ideas are particularly popular among people with higher 
levels of education (Vyse 1998: 47). 
103 McGrew and McFall (1990) provide many compelling examples of the incompatibility of astrology 
and science. 
104 There is little doubt that self-proclaimed astrologists contradict each other all the time. And their own 
theories do often include contradictory claims, as you can easily appreciate by reading ‘zodiac profiles’ 
that ascribe to one and the same sign incompatible properties. Note that these contradictions are 
generally openly recognized.  
105 See Wood, Douglas and Sutton (2012). Similarly, subjects who thought that Bin Laden was already 
dead at the time of the American raid were more likely to agree he is still alive now.  
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surprisingly, they are not really open to abandon or revise in the light of contrary 
reasons.106  
Overall, then, while acknowledging relevant differences between the various 
superstitious thoughts I have been considering, I think we can conclude that none of 
them is really sensitive to reasons and inferential evidence as paradigmatic beliefs are.107  
2.2. FURTHER DOUBTS: OTHER SOURCES OF EVIDENCE AND THE ORIGIN OF 
SUPERSTITIONS 
My discussion so far about superstitious thoughts’ insensitivity to inferential evidence 
has been referring to the way in which they are maintained: I have argued that we keep 
such thoughts without revising/abandoning them in the face of contrary reasons as 
instead we typically do with beliefs. I haven’t said anything about how they are initially 
formed, though. How do superstitious thoughts enter our mind in the first place? If they 
are not maintained in response to inferential evidence, are they at least initially formed 
in response to it, or in response to any of the other kinds of evidence to which beliefs 
can be sensitive?108 These are widely debated questions in psychology and cognitive 
anthropology. Without taking a definite position in this debate, I shall briefly consider 
some influential hypotheses that have been advanced concerning the origin of 
superstitious thinking and discuss their implications for the non-doxastic view I am 
defending. 
2.2.1. A NATURAL MIND DESIGN. When considering the origins of superstitious 
thoughts at a quite general level, various authors – including for example Guthrie 
(1993), Vyse (1999), Hood (2012) – have suggested that they are sorts of natural 
products of our ‘mind design’ – i.e. of the ways in which our minds naturally respond 
to external and internal stimuli, forming representations at various levels. At the heart 
of these suggestions is a widely accepted view of human cognition, according to which 
the mind is not a blank slate which passively receives amorphous information from the 
real world, but is a rather active machine which constantly tries to make sense of such 
information, by filling its gaps in coherent ways and detecting in it meaningful patterns 
                                                          
106 Wood and Douglass (2013). In relation to this, see also Haidt (2012); though Haidt does not focus on 
conspiracy theories, but discusses ideologies (political and religious) more in general. 
107 Admittedly, as I noted in Chapter 3, sensitivity to inferential evidence and holistic coherence are a 
matters of degree. Wouldn’t it be more appropriate to say that superstitious thoughts generally display 
low (to very low) levels of sensitivity to evidence/coherence, then? Perhaps. However, I think that my 
discussion here and in §2.3 shows that in most cases rather than being imperfectly sensitive to evidence, 
superstitious thoughts are systematically formed on the basis of different, evidence-insensitive factors. 
108 I discussed these different sorts of evidence in Ch. 3, §1. 
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– the most meaningful ones for us generally being patterns having to do with human 
agency and intentionality. This can be observed from the lowest levels of our 
cognition, with, for example, our visual system automatically responding to anything 
that is even remotely face-like (whether it is a cloud, a tree trunk, some lines and spots 
on a piece of paper…) making us seeing a face in it; or – at an even lower level – our 
mirror neurons being activated by agent-like movements such as reaching and 
grasping. Within this general framework – it is then suggested – superstitious thoughts’ 
characteristic tendency to posit meaning, reasons and intentionality behind ‘brute’ 
facts/events should be seen as a sort of higher-level manifestation of the natural 
interpretive strategy I just described in relation to the perceptual/sensory level. To put 
this suggestion roughly: as we tend to literally see faces and human-like features in the 
objects around us, we also tend to cognitively ‘see’ hidden meanings, reasons and human 
intentions into a variety of facts/events in our lives – whether they concern someone’s 
death, the stars’ position at the time of our birth, or even just such mundane things as 
spilling some salt on the table. This is why, when we come to know that Princess 
Diana died in a car crash, we are naturally keen to think that someone orchestrated 
this; and so we are naturally keen to think that ‘apparently irrelevant’ facts such as salt 
spilling may mean something important for our lives. Actually, in cases like this latter 
one our superstitious ideas are in important respects the product of cultural 
transmission: traditional superstitions are typically acquired from what we are told by 
other people. But – many authors argue – the reason why their cultural transmission is 
so successful is that they are precisely the sort of ideas which we are naturally keen to 
form ourselves. As Hood puts it: 
[Superstitious] beliefs are not simply transmitted by what other people tell us to think. 
Rather, I would argue that our brains have a mind design that leads us naturally to infer 
structures and patterns in the world and to make sense of it by generating intuitive 
theories. (…) Yes, we can believe what others tell us, but we tend to believe what we 
think could be true in the first place. (Hood 2012: 236)109 
Now, all this may be taken to indicate that superstitious thoughts are actually initially 
formed in response to inferential evidence and reasoning (though obviously flawed 
ones); and, in the case of traditional superstitions, also in response to some sort of 
testimonial evidence. But I do not think this would be quite right – and actually I do 
not even think that this is what Hood is suggesting in the passage just quoted. The fact 
                                                          
109 Note that actually the expression Hood uses is ‘supernatural’ beliefs; but his category of supernatural 
basically coincides with my category of superstition. This basic suggestion about the ‘epidemiology of 
cultural transmission’ is originally put forward by Sperber (1996). See also Boyer (2001). 
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that we are naturally keen to form some thoughts does not in itself mean that such 
thoughts are inferred from beliefs to which we are seriously committed; they may 
simply be triggered by such beliefs and/or by other bits of our cognition like emotions 
and desires, as imaginings often are (so, for example, a belief about Diana’s tragic death 
together with a pervasive feeling of distrust towards authority and medias may well 
prompt us to imagine an alternative story…).110 Nor, on the other hand, everything 
that other people say and do reveal the serious commitment on their part to the 
relevant underlying ideas which seems to be required for testimonial transmission, even 
broadly conceived.111 If I form the idea that there was a child called ‘Little Red Riding 
Hood’ in response to your telling me a story about her, we wouldn’t typically say that I 
formed such an idea in response to testimonial evidence. We would rather say that 
your reading the story to me prompted me to imagine that. Similarly, the naturalness 
with which superstitious thoughts are formed in response to other people’s sayings 
does not really prove them to be evidence-sensitive like beliefs are (and ought to be); 
I’d rather say, again, that these thoughts are naturally prompted by such stimuli in a way 
more similar to that in which imaginings typically are. After all, there are also many 
things that we are naturally prone to imagine.  
2.2.2. SUPERSENSE. What I have just suggested is in line with the psychological 
accounts defended by the authors I am discussing, who – though not talking in terms 
of imaginative prompting – emphasize the role of evidence insensitive factors such as 
emotions, desires, or ‘need for control’ in the formation of superstitions (see Vyse 
1999; Hood 2012; Huston 2012). Admittedly, as we have seen in Chapter 3, all these 
factors can play some role in the formation of genuine beliefs; but not the systematic, 
central role that they are suggested to play in the case of superstitious thinking. Take 
again Hood’s account of the origin of superstitions.112 Far from suggesting 
superstitious thoughts to be rational responses to inferential or testimonial evidence, 
Hood’s basic suggestion (which gives the title to his book) is that they are formed 
through the operations of what he calls our “supersense”: a sort of faculty that doesn’t 
coincide either with our five senses or with our rational thinking, but has rather to do 
                                                          
110 Admittedly, Hood uses the term ‘inference’; but his use of this term is quite sloppy. 
111 Here by the way remember that traditional superstitions, which are the ones supposedly sensitive to 
testimonial evidence – are also those that people are more reluctant to explicitly avow, or even tend to 
explicitly disavow and dismiss as ‘mere rituals’ or ‘bits of fun’– something that makes the idea of 
testimonial transmission even less plausible (on this, see Hood 2012: 20). 
112 The reason why I focus on Hood (2012)’s account is that, as I said, it constitutes one of the most 
recent and extensive discussions of these issues, drawing on a large range of up-to-date empirical 
findings from developmental and social psychology, cognitive anthropology, and neurosciences. 
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with the affective and low-level associative dimensions of our mental lives. Indeed, 
Hood variously characterizes it in such terms as: “a gut feeling operating beneath the 
veneer of rationality”, an “emotional urge that run counter to reason”, “a physical 
feeling of knowing” or even in terms of “wishful thinking”, insisting on its intrinsic 
spontaneity and creativity. And his repeated appeals to psychological constructs such 
as Damasio’s somatic marker or the so-called ‘system 1’ leave little doubt that this 
supersense has more to do with emotions and low-level automatic associations than 
with any reliably evidence-reflective mechanism.113  
Here one might point out that also genuine beliefs can be the product of low-
level perceptual responses that are impervious to rational reflection. Can’t the inputs 
from our supersense be taken as sorts of low-level responses to real-world evidence, 
similar (though not identical) to perceptual responses? I don’t think so, since, as I said, 
what Hood calls ‘supersense’ seems to be a projective, rather than a receptive mechanism. 
However, I won’t insist on this any further. Even granting that some superstitious 
thoughts may be formed in response to low-level reality-reflecting stimuli as perceptual 
beliefs are, a fundamental difference between such thoughts and beliefs would remain 
in that perceptual beliefs (as all other beliefs) as soon as they are formed become 
sensitive to inferential evidence and coherence constraints. Remember what we do for 
example with perceptual illusions, rapidly correcting for first appearances which do not 
cohere with our pre-existing beliefs.114 Superstitious thoughts, we have seen, are not so 
sensitive to coherence constraints. The maximum of coherent integration they reach is 
a temporary and local integration with a few of our beliefs – as indeed typically 
happens with imaginings. Therefore, even granting (which I don’t) that superstitious 
thoughts are initially formed in response to real-world evidence, we should recognize 
that they stop being so sensitive fairly soon. 
 
                                                          
113 Here is are a few passages from Hood’s discussion which can give an idea of the sort of mechanisms 
he appeals to: “Psychologists have come to the conclusion that there are at least two different systems 
operating when it comes to thinking and reasoning. One system is believed to be evolutionarily more ancient in 
terms of human development; it has been called intuitive, natural, automatic, heuristic and implicit. It’s the system that 
we think is operating in young children before they reach the school age. The supersense we experience 
as adults is the remnant of the child’s intuitive reasoning system that incorrectly comes up with explanations that 
do not fit rational models of the world. (…) Mood is an important factor in triggering supernatural 
beliefs in those who score more highly on measures of intuition. (…) The supersense lingers in the back 
of our minds influencing our behaviours and thoughts, and our mood may play a triggering role. This 
explains why perfectly rational, highly educated individuals can still hold supernatural beliefs. (…) The 
neuroscientists Antonio Damasio calls this the somatic marker: it indicates the way emotions affect 
reasoning in a rapid and often unconscious way.” (Hood 2012: 259-260; 40-41). 
114 See above Chapter 3: § 1.1. 
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2.3. BELIEF: EPISTEMIC AND PRAGMATIC DIMENSIONS  
The claim that superstitious thoughts are not sensitive to evidence nor coherently 
integrated in the system of subjects’ beliefs is not terribly controversial. As I have 
shown, it is supported by the available empirical data. And most of the authors of the 
studies I considered explicitly agree with that: Hood describes such thoughts as 
“stubbornly resisting” contrary reasons and critical thinking (Hood 2012: 10); 
Nemeroff and Rozin observe that they coexist with naturalistic thoughts without 
influencing them, nor being influenced by them (Nemeroff and Rozin: 2); Huston 
(2012) does also insist on people’s awareness of such inconsistencies.115 Yet, these 
authors do not hesitate to call such thoughts “beliefs”. In so doing, they seem to 
assume – if only implicitly – that the epistemic dimension of belief is not, after all, 
constitutive of it. Indeed, if one recognizes that superstitious thoughts are not sensitive to 
inferential evidence and holistically coherent, and yet wants to classify them as ‘beliefs’, 
then one seems to be committed to the view that these epistemic features are not 
necessary features of belief after all. On this view, presumably, all that is necessary for 
belief would be its practical dimension – having to do with motivational connection to 
action (and emotion).  
But this, I argue, would be an undesirable conclusion: such a ‘purely motivational 
view’ of belief misses out something important about its nature. The sorts of cognitive 
inputs in response to which beliefs are formed and the sort of relations that they have 
with each other are as important for a proper characterization of beliefs’ functional 
profile as their behavioural (and emotional) outputs are. So, both the practical 
dimension – having to do with motivating power – and the epistemic dimension – having to 
do with sensitivity to evidence – seem to be necessary to define belief: I don’t see why we 
should privilege one dimension over the other.  
Now, admittedly, one may agree that a proper characterization of belief must say 
something on the inputs responsible for belief formation, but object to the idea that 
such inputs must necessarily be ‘evidential’ inputs.116 Bayne and Pacherie (2005), for 
                                                          
115 “Research shows little correlation between people’s levels of rationality or intelligence and their 
susceptibility to magical thinking. I ‘know’ knocking on wood has no mystical power. But my instincts 
tell me to do it anyway, just in case, and I do. A possibly apocryphal tale has the legendary physicist 
Niels Bohr responding to a friend’s enquiry about the horseshoe he’d hung above his door: ‘Oh, I don’t 
believe in it. But I’m told it works even if you don’t!’…” (Huston 2012: 6). Hutson’s discussion is full of 
anecdotes like this. Even if it weren’t true that superstitious thoughts are acknowledgedly incoherent 
with subject’s beliefs, surely Hutson thinks that they are. 
116 There are at least two possible forms of ‘purely motivational accounts’ of belief (as I intend it here). 
One is a dispositional account, according to which believing that p is nothing more than being disposed to act 
(and react) in certain ways. An account like this completely ignores the inputs dimension (see 
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example, argued that though paradigmatic instances of belief are formed in response to 
evidential inputs, there can also be beliefs formed in different ways: 
Beliefs are typically formed in response to perceptual information or by inference from 
other beliefs, but we see no reason to think that these are the only routes to belief. (…) 
We deny that there is a constitutive connection between belief and evidence. As we 
pointed out earlier, folk-psychology – and indeed, scientific psychology – has little trouble 
with the thought that beliefs can be innate, and can be formed by motivation 
mechanisms. (…) Why such states shouldn’t be called beliefs is unclear to us – after all, 
they could guide theoretical and practical reasoning in much the way that standard beliefs 
do. (Bayne and Pacherie 2005: 169) 
In a sense, the dispute here may be taken to be more terminological than substantial: it 
depends on how fine-grained we want our mental categories to be. Bayne and Pacherie 
seem willing to adopt a rather broad characterization of belief, which respects (some) 
common uses of this category. They say: 
The category of ‘belief’ is far from homogeneous. As with many terms of folk-psychology 
(desire, emotion, intention) the states that we are prepared to accept as beliefs differ in 
various ways. Unfortunately, dominant models of belief obscure the multi-dimensional 
nature of belief. (Bayne and Pacherie 2005: 179)  
But what Bayne and Pacherie consider ‘unfortunate’, is something that I see as a 
desideratum for a good account of belief (and of mental states more in general), 
instead. In my view, the fact that we are ready to call ‘belief’ a number of states with 
different features just means that our common linguistic uses are approximate. What a 
good scientific theory should do is precisely to distinguish the different sorts of states 
that our common speech tends to conflate. This, at least, is the sort of account of folk-
psychological states which I am looking for (as I indicated in Chapter 1). The idea that 
belief’s inputs must be evidential inputs, by the way, is not really a strict requirement: 
as we have seen in Chapter 3, there are different kinds of evidence to which beliefs can 
be sensitive – which correspond to different kinds of beliefs (perceptual beliefs, 
testimonial beliefs, introspective beliefs, etc.). I think that, insofar as we are aware of 
these differences, gathering these kinds of beliefs under a unique ‘belief’ label does 
make sense; but surely we shouldn’t broaden our category of belief even further, 
including in it also states that are not formed in response to any kind of evidence 
whatsoever. Hence, we should say that displaying at least some degree of sensitivity to 
                                                                                                                                                                  
Schwitzgebel 2000, 2002, 2009, 2013). Another sort of ‘purely motivational account’ may be a functional 
account according to which beliefs can be formed in response to a variety of different inputs, and what 
distinguishes them from other cognitive states are their action (and emotional) outputs (this is the sort 
of account that I take Bayne and Pacherie 2005 to defend). 
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evidence is necessary for a state to count as belief. Recognizing this, arguably, is 
important also to account for belief’s normative dimension – as I am going to show. 
2.3.1.WHAT GROUNDS FOR EPISTEMIC RATIONALITY NORMS? Authors like Hood, Rozin 
and the others whose views I discussed in this chapter recognize that superstitious 
thoughts are typically produced by evidence-insensitive mechanisms. However, they 
insist in qualifying such thoughts as irrational, thereby implying that even if such 
thoughts are not, as a matter of fact, sensitive to evidence, they ought to be so sensitive. 
This sounds problematic to me. If it is true that superstitious thoughts are not 
constitutively regulated by evidence-sensitive mechanisms, then normatively evaluating 
them on the basis of how well they respond to evidence does not seem appropriate. It 
would be a bit like going to a piano concert and criticizing the pianist for not having 
served us a good dinner. As a criticism like this would be inappropriate – since the 
pianist isn’t supposed to serve us any dinner, so it seems inappropriate to criticize 
superstitious thoughts for not responding adequately to evidence – since they are not 
formed through the operations of a mechanism which is supposed to respond in such 
ways.  
The question here at stake, put in more general terms, is that of what justifies us 
in applying to a given cognitive state a normative constraint of epistemic rationality 
according to which it ought to be sensitive to evidence. The (admittedly tentative) 
answer which I suggested with my analogy of the piano concert is that we are justified 
in applying epistemic norms only insofar as the state to which we apply them is as a 
matter of fact regulated by mechanisms that are designed to track real-world evidence: 
only in such a case it does make sense to ask whether the mechanisms in question 
respond to evidence accurately or not; and, notably, to criticize them to the extent that 
they don’t.117 This seems indeed to be the reason why we do not criticize imaginings 
for being unresponsive to evidence and misrepresenting reality in the ways in which we 
criticize beliefs for that: because responding to evidence and representing reality 
accurately is not what imaginings are supposed to do. Beliefs can fail to track evidence 
and misrepresent reality because tracking evidence and reality is (one of) their proper 
                                                          
117 As Velleman says: “A phantasy [i.e. an imagining] and a biased belief are alike in that they fail to track 
the truth; but the phantasy has no tendency to track the truth at all, whereas a biased belief is diverted 
from the truth; and something can be diverted from the truth only against the background of a tendency 
to track it” (Velleman 2000: 254-255). A type-token distinction may be helpful to better explain my point 
here: what I mean is that it is only because a state [type] is as a matter of fact the product of a mechanism 
that has evidence tracking as its proper function that it [a token of that type] can fail to track it, and be 
criticized thereof.  
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functions. This suggestion is based on the view defended by Velleman (2000), who 
argued that: 
belief aims at the truth in a normative sense only because it aims at the truth descriptively, 
in the sense that it is constitutively regulated by mechanisms designed to ensure that it is 
true. (Velleman 2000: 17) 
Though here I prefer to avoid Velleman’s talking in terms of belief’s ‘aiming at truth’, I 
endorse his basic point according to which the epistemic norms of rationality/truth 
which apply to belief crucially depend on a descriptive fact concerning (the function 
of) the mechanisms that regulate its formation and maintenance – i.e. a descriptive fact 
concerning beliefs’ cognitive inputs.118 
In contrast with this, authors like Hood, Vyse, Rozin and the others seem to 
assume that the epistemic norms of rationality/truth which apply to belief depend on a 
descriptive fact concerning belief’ behavioural outputs. The fact that superstitious thoughts 
motivate action seems indeed to be enough for these authors to say that such thoughts 
ought to be sensitive to evidence and to criticize them as irrational insofar as they are 
not.119 However, it is not really clear how a fact about action guidance may be 
sufficient to ground norms of epistemic rationality. Consider the following explanation 
(the only one I can think of): a cognitive state that guides action in conjunction with 
our desires has the best chances to do that successfully if it represents reality 
accurately, and the best way for it to represent reality accurately is to respond to the 
available evidence; therefore cognitive states that guide action, in order to do that 
successfully, ought to be sensitive to evidence. Though prima facie plausible, this 
explanation is actually unconvincing. For one thing, it is not obvious that responding 
                                                          
118 The question of what it means precisely to say that beliefs ‘aim at truth’ is highly controversial, and I 
won’t address it here (see e.g. Owens 2003, Nishi and Velleman 2005, Steglich–Petersen 2006). What 
matters to my point is Velleman’s idea that beliefs are the product of a mechanism designed to track-truth 
in some way. I am aware that this suggestion makes appeal to the functional role of belief intended 
somewhat differently from how I have intended it so far. While so far I have understood belief’s 
function in terms of its causal role, here I am referring to belief’s teleological function. I think that these two 
approaches to belief’s functional role are not incompatible, though more work would be needed to spell 
out more clearly the relation between them (for a discussion of hybrid functional accounts of mental 
states which appeal both to causal and teleological functions, see Polger 2004: Ch.3). It is also worth 
noting that I am not suggesting that belief’s proper function is just to represent reality accurately; 
arguably, another key function of belief is to guide behaviour.  
119 An explicit statement of this sort of view can be found in Bayne and Hattiangadi (2013), who say 
that: “it is partly because beliefs play the causal role that they do in the production of action that we 
want them to be evidence sensitive. And it is partly because beliefs’ are evidence-sensitive that they are 
the ideal candidates for playing the causal role that they do.” And more generally: “insofar as [given 
mental states] give rise to behaviour typically associated with belief we should care whether they are 
sensitive to evidence” (Bayne and Attianghadi 2013: 130). However, note that strictly speaking here 
Bayne and Hattinghadi do not argue that the fact that a given mental state guides action is sufficient to say 
that it ought to apply to it epistemic norms. They argue the fact that beliefs make action is part of the 
reason why we want them to be evidence sensitive. As I shall say, this is something on which I agree. 
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to evidence and representing reality accurately is always the best way for a cognitive 
state to guide successful actions. On the contrary, it is not difficult to think of cases 
where acting on the basis of cognitive states that are unresponsive to evidence and 
factually inaccurate may be good in various ways. Superstitious thoughts themselves 
seem indeed to provide an example of this sort. Authors like Rozin, Hood, Huston and 
many others insist that even if such thoughts are utterly false and insensitive to 
evidence, entertaining them and acting upon them may bring significant benefits – 
psychological, social and possibly of other kinds.120 And anyway, even if it happened to 
be true in this world that being sensitive to evidence and reality is always the best way 
for a given cognitive state to guide successful action, the following modal argument 
suggests that that this could not be what grounds the relevant norms of epistemic 
rationality which apply to that state.  
Now consider a subject for whom God is ensuring that actions based on a false belief are 
nevertheless successful in so far as their unsuccessful consequences are controlled for. So 
let us say that Katie has the belief that π to three decimal places is 3.147. God makes it the 
case that any actions Katie engages in as a result of holding this belief (and given certain 
appropriate desires), will have the same effects as the true belief that π to three decimal 
places is 3.142. So when Katie claims in a room full of π experts that π to three decimal 
places is 3.147, or when she writes in her maths exam that π to three decimal places is 
3.147, God makes it the case that those maths experts also have a false belief on the 
matter, or fall asleep, or go temporarily deaf (and the same for Katie’s maths teacher), so 
that in terms of the success of Katie’s actions, it is as if she had stated that π to three 
decimal places is 3.142. Now let us ask whether Katie’s belief in this case incorrect. It is, 
but this time we cannot ground this incorrectness on how the belief fares in guiding 
Katie’s actions, because it fares perfectly well. (…) So if Katie’s belief is incorrect in this 
case, the motivational account cannot explain this. (Sullivan-Bissett 2014: 33) 
As this thought experiment makes clear, what justifies us to apply epistemic norms of 
rationality/truth to belief cannot be just a fact concerning belief’s behavioural outputs. 
Hence my alternative suggestion: what justifies us in applying such norms is instead a 
fact concerning the cognitive inputs responsible for belief formation: the fact of being 
constitutively formed via the operations of a mechanism that is disposed to track 
changes in real-world evidence. This of course does not amount to denying that in 
many cases it is actually desirable to act upon cognitive states that track evidence and 
reality accurately: arguably, we would be very poor survivors if we didn’t do that in 
                                                          
120 Indeed, all these authors argue that not only we cannot, but we ought not want to, get rid of our 
(supposedly) irrational superstitious thinking (see above, footnote 94). By the way, note that another 
case where acting upon evidence insensitive representations may be pragmatically beneficial is pretence 
(insofar as the imagination-as-motivation view of pretence that I defended is correct). 
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many cases. My point is not that there can’t be anything wrong with the fact that a 
state which is not regulated by evidence-sensitive mechanisms guides action. My point 
is just that there cannot can’t be anything epistemically wrong with that, since epistemic 
norms apply to states that as a matter of fact are regulated by mechanisms whose 
proper function is track evidence and reality: i.e. mechanisms that have an epistemic 
function.  
If this is right, then the constitutive and the normative dimensions of belief’s 
sensitivity to evidence cannot be separated so easily, since the second is somehow 
grounded in the first. Hence, if one recognizes, as Hood, Vyse and Rozin and many 
others do, that superstitious thoughts are not constitutively sensitive to evidence and 
reasons, then one should not criticize them as epistemically irrational, either (though of 
course one may criticize them in other ways). The lack of these epistemic features is 
sufficient for me to conclude that superstitious thoughts are not, in fact, beliefs.121 
2.5. WHERE ARE WE?  
In this section I have discussed the ‘standard Humean view’ according to which 
superstitious thoughts are beliefs that motivate the relevant actions in conjunction with 
subjects’ desires. On such a view, a superstitious action like my action of using a 
particular pen for written exams would be motivated by the superstitious belief that 
using that particular ‘wise pen’ will help me to do better in the exam, together with the desire to 
do better in the exam – in a standard Humean way. I have argued that an account like this 
has undesirable consequences, forcing us to ‘renounce’ the epistemic dimension of 
belief, and that if we want to preserve that dimension, we should recognize that 
superstitious thoughts are, in fact, not beliefs.  
At this point, my suggestion that superstitious thoughts are imaginings starts 
getting some more plausibility. The picture of such thoughts that has emerged from 
my discussion so far is that of cognitive states which are similar to beliefs in important 
respects, but differ from them with respect to sensitivity to evidence and holistic 
coherence – a picture that matches the picture of paradigmatic instances of imaginings 
emerged in the previous chapters. And indeed I guess that the same people who think 
that I didn’t really believe that my wise pen could help me in the exam, would say that I 
did, instead, just imagine that.  
                                                          
121 Here note that even if you are not persuaded by my argument that the epistemic norms which apply 
to belief depend on its being as a matter of fact produced by evidence-sensitive mechanisms, still the fact 
remains that superstitious thoughts are as a matter of fact insensitive to evidence. As have it, even only 
this would be sufficient to deny their doxastic status.  
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If this is right, can we then conclude that imaginings, and not beliefs, play the 
relevant motivating role in the case of superstitious actions? Not yet. Acknowledging 
that superstitious thoughts are imaginings and not beliefs is not tantamount to 
acknowledging that superstitious actions are motivated by imaginings and not by 
beliefs. While it seems clear that superstitious thoughts play some role in the explanation 
of superstitious actions, we cannot take it for granted that they play the most direct 
motivating role. One may well agree that superstitious thoughts are imaginings and not 
beliefs, but argue that they motivate superstitious actions just indirectly, via beliefs and 
desires.122 In the next section I shall discuss this possible explanation. 
 
3. A MORE SOPHISTICATED HUMEAN STORY 
3.1. EMOTION-DRIVEN BELIEFS AND DESIRES?  
Take again the wise pen case. The fact – if it is a fact – that my action is not motivated 
by superstitious beliefs and desires does not mean that no belief-desire explanation is 
available for it. Perhaps what happens is this. I imagine and do not believe that using 
that pen will help me to write down the right answers in the exam. This imagining – 
which typically becomes occurrent when I use that pen – prompts in me a positive 
emotional response (as we have seen imaginings can do), reducing my exam-related 
anxiety. Noticing this, I come to believe that using that pen makes me feel better. This 
belief, together with a reasonable desire to feel better, is what motivates me to use the 
pen. This is a Humean account of my action – call it ‘the sophisticate Humean 
account’ – which differs from the ‘naïve’ one discussed in § 2 in that here the relevant 
belief and desire, rather than concerning the superstitious content itself, concern my 
emotional responses to such content.123 In a sense, as Currie and Jureidini observed, 
                                                          
122 The parallel with children pretending to be cowboys and Indians may help to clarify this point. While 
it is uncontroversial that the imagining that they are Indians and cowboys plays a crucial role in children’ 
pretence game, what precisely this role amounts to is questionable: is it a direct motivating role (as, e.g., 
Currie and Ravenscroft argue), or does this imagining motivate only indirectly, via beliefs and desires (as, 
e.g., Nichols and Stich argue)? One difference between cases of superstitious actions and cases of 
pretence, though, is that in cases of pretence everyone seems to agree that the relevant thoughts are 
imaginings, so the debate is just on whether these imaginings motivate directly or indirectly. While in the 
case of superstitious actions even the very nature of superstitious thoughts is controversial. So with 
superstitious actions we have more options on the table: (i) superstitious thoughts are beliefs, which 
motivate action directly, in conjunction with the relevant desires; (ii) superstitious thoughts are 
imaginings, which motivate action indirectly via beliefs and desires; (iii) superstitious thoughts are 
imaginings, which motivate action directly. Having criticized (i) – i.e. the standard Humean explanation 
of superstitious actions, in the next section I will turn to (ii) – i.e. a more sophisticated Humean 
explanation – which I will also criticize. Finally, I shall argue in favour of (iii) – i.e. my own explanation 
of superstitious actions in terms of imaginings. 
123 An account along these lines is discussed by Currie and Jureidini (2004), who present it as a 
suggestion originally put forward in informal discussion by Paul Noordhof. For another brief discussion 
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what an account like this does is not so much to explain superstitious actions as to 
explain them away, construing them as the result of a rational affect-management 
strategy, rather than the result of irrational superstitious thinking. On this account, 
indeed, superstitious thoughts themselves do not play any direct role in bringing about 
my action. They just bring about an emotion; and then what motivates me to act is the 
belief that such emotion may be supported by performing the action in question – that 
is, a belief of the form: by performing action A, I will experience the emotion E (or a belief of 
some logically equivalent form) in conjunction with a desire to experience the emotion E.  
3.1.1. HOW PLAUSIBLE IS THIS ‘SOPHISTICATED HUMEAN ACCOUNT’ OF MY ACTION? 
There is little doubt that a belief like the one just seen (in conjunction with the relevant 
desire) would rationalize my action: if, when I was at high school, I really believed that 
using that pen would have made me feel better (and I desired to feel better), of course 
it would have been rational for me to use that pen. 124 But the relevant question here is: 
did I actually hold such a belief – and was it what actually drove my action? Let’s put it 
in more general terms. There is little doubt that a belief like: By performing action A, I will 
experience the emotion E would constitute a reason for an agent (who desires to 
experience E) to perform action A. However, as we have seen, not all reasons are 
motivating reasons. If the sophisticate-Humean theorist wants to argue that beliefs like 
this are indeed the agents’ motivating reasons in the cases of superstitious actions that 
we are considering, she must also show that in such cases: 
(i) the agents actually hold such beliefs; and 
(ii) such beliefs are, among all the agents’ beliefs, the ones that actually cause 
their superstitious actions.125 
In fact, I have doubts on both (i) and (ii). I shall argue that in at least some cases of 
superstitious actions (i) is implausible: the agents do not plausibly believe their 
                                                                                                                                                                  
of this account, see also Currie and Ichino (2012), on which I will come back in the next chapter. Note 
that several versions of this account can be construed, appealing to different variants of sophisticated 
beliefs and desires. So for example Hood (2012) discusses a sophisticated Humean explanation of 
superstitious actions in terms of beliefs and desires concerning the social (rather than emotional) benefits 
of performing such actions. On that view, subjects would refuse to wear the serial-killer’s cardigan 
because they believe that wearing it would be socially blamed and desire to avoid social blame. Here I 
will focus on a version of the sophisticate Humean account that appeals to beliefs and desires 
concerning superstitious actions’ emotional effects. But I think that what I am going to say applies 
equally well also to various other versions of that account.  
124 Henceforth I will focus on the relevant belief, omitting the specification that it motivates in 
conjunction with an appropriate desire. But of course I assume that this is the case. 
125 Of course, (ii) entails (i). But I will consider (and criticize) them separately anyway: even if you are not 
persuaded by my criticisms towards one of them, you may be persuaded by my criticisms towards the 
other. 
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superstitious actions to produce positive emotional experiences. And, most 
importantly, even when (i) is plausibly true, (ii) is not: even when it seems plausible that 
the agents believe that their superstitious actions will produce positive emotions, it 
seems unlikely that it is this sorts of beliefs that directly drive their actions. Let’s 
consider these two claims in turn. 
3.2. UNPLEASANT SUPERSTITIONS 
So, my first point is that there are a number of cases where it is not really plausible to 
say – as the sophisticate Humean account does – that superstitious agents believe that 
their actions will bring about positive emotions. My argument for this is based on the 
consideration that there are a number of cases where it seems to be obviously false that 
superstitious actions will bring about positive emotions. Assuming a principle of 
charity in belief ascriptions, I see no reasons to think that subjects in such cases hold 
obviously false beliefs.126 
Examples of superstitious actions that do not produce relevant positive 
experiences (and generally produce overall negative ones) can be found both within 
what I called ‘traditional’ and ‘idiosyncratic’ superstitions. As to traditional 
superstitions, in § 2 I have noted that they are often associated to some embarrassment 
and worries about negative social evaluation. These worries, as we have seen, are 
sometimes so strong that they prevent people from publicly performing the relevant 
superstitious actions – as with people reluctant to verbally express their superstitions 
for fear of ridicule.127 Of course, those negative feelings are not always so strong 
(otherwise we would hardly ever see anyone avoiding ladders or throwing salt over her 
shoulders!); but anyway, stronger or weaker that they may be, in many cases they do 
not seem to be compensated by other sorts of emotional benefits deriving from 
performing the actions in question. Indeed, differently from some personal 
superstitious actions which may be invested with important emotional values, 
                                                          
126 With ‘principle of charity’ here I refer, roughly, to a principle according to which the beliefs that we 
ascribe to each other should be, until proof to the contrary, rational and true – or better: they should in line 
with the evidence available to the subject to which we ascribe them. 
127 This is indeed how Vyse explains people’s reluctance to answer questionnaires about their 
superstitions: “Undoubtedly, many believers are reluctant to confess their superstitions for fear of 
ridicule. (…) Even when they reply anonymously, as in the case of Gallup Polls, survey respondents may 
imagine that the interviewers are forming judgements about them. This fear makes some people 
reluctant to reveal their true feelings on questions revealing unconventional beliefs or behaviour. (…) In 
conventional use, the word superstition has a distinctly negative flavour, and superstitious people are often 
thought to be primitive and ignorant. Unlike belief in the paranormal, belief in superstition is thoroughly 
unfashionable. (…) Reports of traditional superstitions are thus particularly vulnerable to bias caused by 
apprehension about being evaluated. Psychologists have long recognized that research participants are 
sometimes motivated by a fear of negative evaluation” (Vyse 1997: 16-18). 
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traditional superstitions nowadays are often treated as little more than ritual routines, 
which are, overall, ‘emotionally neutral’.128 This becomes quite evident in situations 
where, for whatever reasons, we find ourselves unable to perform them. Though we 
may be keen to touch wood after having made an optimistic prediction, or to cross 
fingers when we wish something to happen, an impossibility to perform such actions 
(due for example to the simultaneous engagement in another activity) is not, for most 
of us, really distressing. If I can touch wood, well; if I’m driving my car and I can’t do 
that… Well, it’s just the same!129 At least in cases like these, traditional superstitious 
actions do not seem to yield significant emotional benefits; and I do not see reasons to 
think that superstitious agents mistakenly believe that they do. Note that this is not the 
same as to say that superstitious agents in these cases have the definite belief that their 
actions have negative (or even just neutral) emotional effects – let alone that they do 
occurrently believe so at the time where they act. Indeed, belief has the property to be 
negation incomplete: from the fact one does not believe A, we cannot infer that she does believe 
not-A (see Currie 1990: 174). One may simply don’t know whether A or not-A. So 
superstitious agents may, in some cases, simply lack a definite view on the emotional 
effects of their actions. All that I am arguing is that I don’t see why, in cases where as a 
matter of fact superstitious actions seem to have neutral or even negative emotional 
effects, we should ascribe to the agents the definite and occurrent belief that such 
effects are good – as the sophisticated Humean account would require. 
Cases where the emotional costs of superstitious actions are even more evident 
and, arguably, disproportionately higher than their possible benefits, can be observed 
in obsessive-compulsive disorders (OCD).130 Psychologists largely agree that 
                                                          
128 With “emotionally neutral” I mean that performing such actions does not, in itself, make a great 
difference to our pre-existing emotional state. One here may argue that any intentional action will be 
accompanied by some conscious, phenomenal experience – which must have some emotional value. 
This may be true, but anyway I think we all agree that there are some actions that make little or no 
difference to the value of our conscious experience at a given time. Here is an example: now I exit the 
room and I close the door a little. This is something I do intentionally, but arguably it does little or no 
difference to my emotional state. Closing the door a little doesn’t make me feel either better or worse 
than I would feel if I left it entirely open. Or at least – which is what matters more to me here – I don’t 
believe that it makes me feel either better or worse. 
129 Another similar example here is the superstitious action of drawing a cross on pizza’s dough before 
leaving it raising: we do not feel really distressed if we can’t perform it. Contrast this with a case where 
you’re unable to perform a personal superstitious action: think of a case where you realize that you’ve 
lost your lucky object just before an important performance. It seems that in this latter case you would 
feel much more distressed. The different emotional investment that we put into traditional vs. personal 
superstitious actions is pointed out by various psychologists (see e.g. Hood 2012: 31). 
130 While the precise relation between OCD and superstitious thinking is debated, many authors agree 
that some sort of superstitious thinking is a fundamental feature of OCD and that some typical 
obsessive-compulsive actions – such as turning the light on and off a certain number of times before 
exiting a room, or washing-hand obsessive rites – classify as superstitious. (see e.g. Einstein and Menzies 
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compulsive stereotyped actions involving e.g. hand-washing, skin-picking, 
doors/lights-checking, do not really make the agents feel better, but on the contrary 
tend to make them feel worse, fostering their doubts and obsessions: the more one 
repeats those sorts of actions, the more she will feel anxious and in need to repeat 
them again, without really getting any benefit from that – let alone emotional benefits. 
It is indeed also because of the distress they produce that these actions classify as 
symptoms of a pathological condition.131 One of the objectives of the so-called 
“Exposure and Response Prevention treatment” (EX/RP) – the most used and, 
arguably, effective treatment for OCD to date – is indeed to make patients fully aware 
of this, showing them that refraining from performing the relevant actions will reduce 
their anxiety and make them feel overall much better (See Huppert & Roth 2003). 
Admittedly, here we need to distinguish between ‘feeling overall much better’ 
and ‘getting an immediate relief from anxiety' – or, in other words, between longer-
term, all-things-considered emotional benefits and immediate, though short-lived and 
shallow, emotional benefits. Moreover, of course, we should also distinguish between 
the actual emotional effects of compulsive superstitious actions (as they may be 
‘objectively’ assessed by psychologists) and the emotional effects that obsessive-
compulsive subjects may believe such actions to have. Even if a compulsive action like 
turning the light on and off five times won’t actually make one feel ‘all thing considered 
better’ in the long term, one may (rightly or wrongly) believe that this action will give her at 
least an immediate relief from her anxiety.132 And in order for a sophisticate Humean 
account of this action to be plausible, it is enough that the agent holds a belief like that 
(in conjunction with a desire to get an immediate relief from their anxiety).  
I don’t want to deny that subjects suffering from OCD do ever hold beliefs like 
that; I grant that in various cases they may do. What I argue, though, is that there are 
                                                                                                                                                                  
2004; Brugger and Viaud-Delmon 2010). Anyway, even if obsessive-compulsive actions did not count as 
superstitious, these would still remain intentional actions that call for an explanation; and in my view no 
plausible Humean explanation is available for them.  
131 According to the DSM V, in order for the obsessions or compulsions to classify as symptoms of 
OCD it must be the case that: “they are time-consuming (e.g., take more than 1 hour per day) or cause 
clinically significant distress or impairment in social, occupational, or other important areas of functioning”. 
It is also worth noticing that obsessive-compulsive actions are, in various cases, physically painful: as 
with compulsive skin-picking producing extensive excoriations, or compulsive hand-washing (with very 
hot water and aggressive soaps) provoking serious dermatitis. 
132 And indeed, one may ask: doesn’t the fact that the therapy aims to make the patients aware of the 
negative effects of their actions suggest that they typically have some belief to the contrary – i.e. that 
they typically believe that their actions make them feeling at least in some respects better? In fact, I do not 
think this necessarily the case. As belief is negation incomplete, the fact that one does not believe that her 
action is emotionally bad does not imply that she believes that it is emotionally good. Obsessive-
compulsive agents may simply lack a definite belief about the emotional effects of their actions.  
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also cases in which they don’t: cases where they perform their compulsive actions 
without actually believing that they will get any emotional benefits from them (even not 
shallow, temporary benefits). Take for example subjects who have ‘a good insight into 
their OCD condition’133 and are actively trying to get over it – as are indeed many 
patients willingly engaging in the EX/RP cognitive-behavioural therapy I mentioned. 
Apparently, as a (fairly successful) therapy progresses, such patients typically become 
convinced that performing their compulsive rituals won’t make them feel better, and 
vice versa refraining from doing that will. Having got direct experience of this in the 
first sessions, they are often very motivated to achieve the full ‘ritual prevention’ that 
the therapy envisages, and think that missing this achievement and repeating their 
compulsive rituals will make them feeling (immediately!) very bad. Yet, they often slip 
back into repeating such rituals – and this may happen many times during the recovery 
process (after which, by the way, relapses can still happen).134 One here may want to 
insist that, insofar as they do that, they must believe that their actions have some sort of 
emotional benefits. But I don’t really see on what grounds we could insist on that: in 
cases like these, I simply don’t see any reasons to ascribe to the agents the belief that 
their actions will have any sort of emotional benefits whatsoever. On the contrary, we should 
recognize that they perform those actions in spite of their belief that this will make them 
feel worse.135 So here again, as in the cases of traditional superstitions discussed above, 
the sophisticate Humean account does not seem to work.136 
My perplexities on the sophisticated Humean account, however, are not limited 
to such cases. In fact, I think that this account fails to explain most cases of 
superstitious actions, including also cases where admittedly superstitious agents do 
believe that their actions will bring about positive emotions. Indeed, as I shall argue, 
                                                          
133 The DSM V distinguishes three sorts of cases. Patients with: (1) “good or fair insight” into their 
OCD condition, (2) “poor insight” into their OCD condition, (3) “absent insight/delusional belief” 
about their OCD condition. Notice that subjects can have a good insight into their condition (realizing 
that their compulsions make them feel bad) and yet not being actively trying to get over it (e.g. not 
undertaking a EX/RP therapy), for a number of reasons.  
134 Recovery is unfortunately a slow, and not-linear, process. And relapses are not uncommon. See 
Huppert and Roth (2003): 69-70. 
135 Here, again, note that – because of belief’s property of negation incompleteness which I noted above –the 
claim that agents do not believe that their actions will have any emotional benefits does not 
straightforwardly imply the claim that they do have a definite belief to the contrary – i.e. that they do 
definitely believe that their actions will not have any emotional benefits. But I think that in the case we are 
considering (i.e. the case of OCD patients engaged in a successful therapy) it is plausible to ascribe to the 
agents such a definite belief.  
136 Now, one may raise a fundamental doubt on my argument here, suggesting that it is part of the 
functional role of desire that satisfying it will produce positive emotions. However: (i) this suggestion is 
not obviously true; (ii) note that I am not talking about desires themselves, but about our beliefs concerning 
desires; and anyway (iii) my argument does not crucially depend on this – as we shall see in the next 
section. 
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even when it is plausible to ascribe to superstitious agents the belief that their 
superstitious actions will be emotionally beneficial, it still doesn’t seem plausible to say 
that it is because of such belief that they perform those actions (this was indeed the second 
doubt I raised above in relation to sophisticated Humean accounts). My argument for 
this will lead me to introduce, finally, my own explanation of superstitious actions in 
terms of directly motivating imaginings.  
3. SUPERSTITIOUS IMAGININGS 
While so far I focussed on cases where this seems unlikely, I grant that there are also 
cases where it is vice versa quite plausible that superstitious agents believe their actions 
to be emotionally beneficial. After all, superstitious actions are intentional actions; and 
generally speaking it may be reasonable to assume that (until proof to the contrary) the 
actions we perform intentionally are actions that we believe apt to bring about some 
emotional benefits.137 So I shall grant that, as when I perform such actions as sitting 
here writing my thesis, or answering a phone call, I do plausibly believe that they can 
produce some positive emotions, similarly when I perform superstitious actions like 
using a lucky pen for exams, wearing a lucky shirt, or reading my horoscope I do 
plausibly believe that they can somehow make me feel good.  
What I shall not grant, on the other hand, is the idea that such sort of beliefs 
concerning the emotional benefits of my actions are the cognitive states that (most 
directly) motivate me to act. To better understand this point it is worth remembering 
that belief’s connection to action is a dispositional connection mediated by desire (see 
above, Ch. 3: §2). This means that while an agent A will have, at any time T, a large 
number of beliefs all of which have some motivating potential, which among such 
beliefs end up actually motivating her actions crucially depends on what are her 
strongest, occurrent desires at T. Hence, the reason why I don’t think that beliefs 
concerning the emotional benefits of our actions (i.e. beliefs of the form: by performing 
action A, I will experience emotion E) are, in most cases, the cognitive states that directly 
motivate us is simply that I don’t think that in most cases our strongest occurrent 
desires are generic desires concerning the positive emotions which our actions may 
bring about. Instead, I think that our strongest occurrent desires are more often ‘goal-
                                                          
137 My point in §3.2 was just that in cases of weary traditional superstitious actions and of self-damaging 
compulsive superstitious rituals we do have proof the contrary. In fact, I should say that what seems to 
me most reasonable to grant is that generally when we do something intentionally we do not 
(occurrently) believe it to be emotionally harmful. But here for the sake of the argument I concede that 
we may also have the positive belief that it is emotionally beneficial. 
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specific desires’ – i.e. desires concerning ‘external’ outcomes related to the particular 
activities we are engaged in – which do then motivate us in conjunction with cognitive 
states that represent how to achieve such specific outcomes. 
In cases of ordinary non-superstitious actions, we can probably all agree on this. 
So for instance I think we can all agree that, if now I am sitting here writing, this is 
likely to be because my current strongest desire is to put down this paragraph; and if I 
stop a moment to answer my phone, this is plausibly because, as the phone rings, the 
desire to know who is calling me becomes temporarily predominant. Indeed, I guess 
that if you had to explain why I act in these ways you would mention these or other 
similar desires, rather than a generic desire to feel good as the one invoked by the 
sophisticate Humean theorist (you would not typically say that I answer my phone 
because I desire to feel good and believe that answering the phone will make me feel good). 
Of course, you may well think, in line with psychological hedonists, that specific 
desires like my desire to finish the thesis, or to know who is calling me, are just 
instrumental to the satisfaction of an ultimate desire for good 
feelings/pleasure/happiness. But to say that such a basic desire for positive emotions 
is my ultimate motive does not amount to denying that what most directly motivates me 
when I write/answer a call are such goal-specific desires as the desire to write this para, 
or to know who is calling – which seem indeed the ones that make maximally close 
contact with the actions of writing/answering. 
Why then deny that analogous goal-specific desires play the relevant motivating 
role also in the case of superstitious actions? I don’t see any reasons to deny that. 
Arguably, my strongest occurrent desire when I sit in the exam-room waiting for the 
exam to start and I and take my lucky pen out of the pen case is the desire to do well in 
the exam; David Beckham’s strongest desire when he wears his brand-new outfits 
before a match is to play at his best and win the match; the tourist’s strongest desire 
when she throws a coin into the Trevi Fountain before leaving Rome is to return there 
soon; and so on.138 I think that there is little doubt that the agents in these cases have 
goal-specific desires of these sorts – which indeed are manifested also in other of their 
non-superstitious actions/reactions;139 and that, in the moment when they act, these 
desires are stronger than the desire to experience/reinforce a positive emotion. If my 
                                                          
138 And the strongest desire of an obsessive-compulsive subject who repeatedly washes her hands will 
be, typically, the desire to get rid of germs: this is indeed what her obsession is all about. 
139 For example,  my desire to do well in the exam is also manifested in my anxious last-minute reviews 
of the exam material. As I will notice, cases like this, where the very same desire motivates almost at the 
same time in conjunction with some belief and with some imagining, are very common. 
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strongest desire at the exam time were to feel better, I could just take a heavy 
tranquillizer to reduce my anxiety. But I don’t do that, because this would hinder my 
performance in the exam and, after all, it seems that what I currently desire most 
strongly is to have a good performance. The fact that I do have such a goal-specific 
desire, by the way, is not denied even by the sophisticated Humean theorist, but on the 
contrary is presupposed by her own account: it is precisely because I desire to do well 
in the exam that the mere fact of imagining that my lucky/wise pen will help me in the 
exam makes me feel better. Still, the point of the sophisticate Humean theorist is that 
such a desire cannot be the one that motivates my superstitious action of using the 
lucky/wise pen, because I do not believe, but just imagine that using that pen is a way 
to do well in the exam – and, on a Humean perspective, desires can manifest their 
motivating power only in conjunction with beliefs about how to satisfy them.  
But this is a perspective I have already rejected. In Chapter 3 I have argued that 
there are, plausibly, cases where our actions are motivated by genuine desires in 
conjunction with belief-like imaginings. And I think that this is precisely what happens 
in most cases of superstitious actions we are considering. Remember Chapter 3’s 
example of my pretence action of biting the empty plate in front of me when I 
hungrily wait for pizza at the restaurant, which I suggested to be explained at best as 
motivated by a desire to eat together with the imagining that I can eat a bite of my 
‘pizza-plate’. Similarly, now I suggest that the superstitious action of using my lucky 
pen in the exam is explained at best as motivated by my desire to do well in the exam 
together with my imagining that the lucky pen can help me to do well; that the tourist’s action of 
throwing a coin into the Trevi fountain is explained at best as motivated by her desire 
to return to Rome together with her imagining that throwing the coin will propitiate her return; 
that David Beckham’s wearing a brand-new outfit before each match is best explained 
by the desire to play at his best together with the imagining that the brand-new outfit will make 
him play better; and so on.  
With this, note, I don’t want to deny that superstitious actions are ever motivated 
by desires for positive emotions in conjunction with beliefs like those postulated by the 
sophisticate Humean account. Admittedly, in circumstances that are heavily 
‘emotionally charged’, our strongest occurrent desires may be desires about (how to 
enhance/dampen) our own emotions, and we may then be moved to act by beliefs 
about how to satisfy such desires. So for example in some of Rozin and colleagues’ 
experiments, which were expressly built in order to elicit strong emotional responses of 
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disgust or distress, such disgusted/distressed responses may well have been the objects 
of participants’ strongest desires: a participant in the Poisoned-water experiment may 
well have had as her strongest desire that of reducing the unsettling feeling provoked 
by the idea of drinking poison, and her refusal to drink it may have been motivated by 
the belief that to avoid any contact with it could help to reduce her unsettlement.140 
But if a sophisticate Humean explanation of this sort may be plausible in particular 
cases like this, where the agents’ only purposeful activity consists in participating into 
the experiment, I do not think it is plausible in the majority of cases of superstitious 
actions, which are performed in circumstances where the agents are pursuing specific 
external goals (such as taking an exam, playing a match…), and their strongest desires 
do typically concern such specific goals. Since – this is a point of agreement between 
me and the sophisticate Humean theorist – the agents in all these cases do not believe, 
but just imagine, that the actions they perform are ways to satisfy such goal-specific 
desires, I think we should conclude that the cognitive state which plays the relevant 
causal role in conjunction with such desires is imagination and not belief.  
This is even more evident in other instances of ‘magical’ actions I introduced. 
When I ask the door to please remain shut, arguably this is because I really want it to 
stay shut, and I imagine that if I ask her gently I might persuade her to do that. And so 
when I yell at the driver in another car who obviously can’t hear me, this is because I 
really want to insult him, and I imagine that he can hear my insulting yells; and when I 
loudly root for the players of my favourite team that I am watching on TV, this is 
because I really want to cheer them on and I imagine that they can be cheered on by 
my loud rooting. Of course, once again, sophisticated Humean explanations may be 
concocted for all these cases: one may say that I talk to the door because I desire to 
vent some of my irritation for its annoying broken handle and I believe that I can vent 
it by talking to the door. But, even granting that I do have a belief-desire pair like this, 
I don’t think they are likely to be the states that most directly motivate me. Arguably, 
when I struggle with that broken handle my strongest desire is a desire to keep it shut 
once for all. This desire is indeed manifested also in some of my realistically purposeful 
actions, such as pushing the door hard with both my hands – which I believe to be a way 
to keep it shut. Besides (and probably also because such realistic actions does not seem 
                                                          
140 See above, §1; I will discuss this ‘Poisoned-water’ experiment more in detail in the next section: §5.2. 
Note that also ordinary, non-superstitious actions are sometimes primarily motivated by desires and 
beliefs concerning our own emotions. For example, roller coaster’s goers may typically be motivated by 
the desire to feel excited together with the belief that roller coasters’ runs will make them feel excited. 
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to prove fully effective) such desire motivates also actions which are just imaginative 
ways to fulfil it: since what I take to be realistically effective ways to keep the door shut 
do not seem to work, I imagine some unrealistic ways to do make that happen (Perhaps, 
if I ask her gently…) – and I then act upon such imaginings. 
4.1.THE PERVASIVENESS OF SUPERSTITIOUS THINKING (AND SOME CONCLUSIONS 
ABOUT IMAGINATION’S MOTIVATING POWER) 
Cases like the one just considered – where the very same desire motivates almost at the 
same time in conjunction with some belief and with some imagining – are far from 
uncommon. When a few minutes ago the scary message that “Windows has stopped 
responding” appeared on my screen, my reaction (obviously driven by the desire not to 
lose my work) has been, almost simultaneously, to press CTRL+ALT+DEL and to 
implore ‘him’ not to abandon me right now, a few days before thesis submission. 
When I go out climbing, wanting to be safe, I carefully tie-up my harness (which I 
believe to be the crucial safety measure) and I do that with my lucky golden karabiner 
(which I imagine to be the safest one). Just before the match, David Beckham’s desire 
to play at his best motivates him to wear his brand-new lucky outfit and to do some 
helpful warm-up exercises. Our view and interactions with the world are pervaded by 
more or less ‘magical’, over-coherent elements, strictly intertwined with ‘natural’, 
realistic ones. This ubiquity of magical thoughts and actions, as I noted before, is 
something on which all psychologists and anthropologists agree, and that they have 
stressed in various ways. So for example Nemeroff and Rozin write: 
We discard the notion of an evolutionary sequence from magic to religion to science, 
based primarily on our own evidence of the abundant presence of all three simultaneously 
in modern Western societies and in the thinking of individuals within these societies. (…) 
People comfortably employ multiple modes of thinking and action, blending scientific 
and natural approaches in a complementary fashion. (Nemeroff and Rozin 2001: 2) 
And Guthrie (who, as we have seen, understands most magical thinking in terms of 
anthropomorphism) observes that: 
Faces and other human forms seem to pop out at us on all sides. Chance images in 
clouds, in landforms, and in ink blots present eyes, profiles, or whole figures. Voices 
murmur or whisper in wind and waves. We see the world not only as alive but also as 
humanlike. Anthropomorphism pervades our thought and action. (Guthrie 1995: 62) 
Insofar as my account of superstitious actions and expressive behaviours is correct, 
then, we have a very large number of cases where imaginings motivate us to act as belief 
do, suggesting that the motivating power of imagination is far more extensive – and 
more similar to that of belief – than it is generally taken to be. How extensive and how 
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similar, precisely? As I said in the Introduction to this chapter, I think that these cases 
reveal imagination’s motivating power to be actually the same of belief. But in order for 
this conclusion not to be hasty, some more argument is needed. Indeed, from the fact 
that in a number, however large, of cases, an agent who imagines that p is motivated to 
act as she would if she believed that p, it obviously does not follow that in any possible 
case an agent who imagines that p will be motivated to act as she would if she believed 
that p – which is what ought to be true if imaginings really have the same motivating 
power of beliefs. This latter claim needs independent support, based on a careful 
consideration of the conditions under which imaginings and belief motivate – which 
will be the business of the next chapter. Before moving to that, however, I shall defend 
my account of superstitious and magical actions from a radical challenge. 
5. SUPERSTITIOUS ALIEFS?141 
A radical challenge to the view that I have been defending in this chapter has been 
raised by Tamar Gendler in two seminal papers published in 2008 (reprinted in 
Gendler 2010). While agreeing that superstitious thoughts cannot be beliefs, Gendler 
warns us against jumping too easily to the conclusion that therefore they must be imaginings. 
In her view, neither belief nor imagination can play the relevant explanatory role here. 
Cases like those I have been discussing in this chapter require us to postulate the 
existence of a previously unrecognized mental state, that she calls alief. In this section I 
shall defend my view from Gendler’s challenge. 
5.1. WHAT IS AN ALIEF? 
Gendler characterizes alief as a mental state with three associatively linked 
components: a representational component R (‘the representation of some object or 
concept or situation or circumstance, perhaps propositionally, perhaps non-
propositionally, perhaps conceptually, perhaps non-conceptually’); an affective 
component A (‘the experience of some affective or emotional state’); and a behavioural 
component B (‘the readying of some motor routine’) (Gendler 2012: 263–4). The link 
between these three components consists in the fact that they are co-activated by some 
feature of the subject’s environment, and this co-activation is difficult to break. While 
traditional objectual or propositional attitudes are two-place relations between a subject 
and a simple representational content (naturally expressed as S believes that R), alief is 
                                                          
141 The work presented in this section was written with Greg Currie; a version of it appears in Currie and 
Ichino (2012), followed by a reply from Gendler. Here it appears somewhat revised.  
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a four-place relation between a subject and a threefold associatively linked content of 
the kind just described (S alieves R–A–B). The difference between alief and traditional 
cognitive attitudes is a radical one: alief is ‘developmentally and conceptually 
antecedent’ to such attitudes, and it is not definable in terms of them (See Gendler 
2010: 262, 288).142 Indeed, alief’s three components do not constitute a mere cluster of 
different mental states; rather they form a unified representational-affective-
behavioural state, that “there is no natural way of articulating” (Gendler 2010: 289). 
Nor, importantly, is the representational component of an alief a belief, or an 
imagining, or some other recognized state. 
5.2. ‘POISON’ AND ‘NOT POISON’ 
To explain why, according to Gendler, a mental state of this sort is necessary to a 
proper understanding of superstitious actions, I shall focus on an example that she 
discusses at length. This is a case from a couple of psychological experiments I briefly 
mentioned before, conducted by Rozin and colleagues. In a first experiment subjects 
were invited to pour some sugar into two different bottles of water, and then to apply 
on one bottle the label “sugar” and on the other the label “Poison”, making their own 
choice about which label to put on which bottle. Despite having poured the sugar 
themselves, and having applied the labels themselves, they turned out to be 
subsequently very reluctant to drink from the bottle marked “Poison”. Call this the 
Poison scenario. In a follow-up study subjects were invited to do the same but using the 
two labels: “Safe to consume” and “Not Poison”. Interestingly, though the effects 
where a bit less pronounced than in the original study, the subjects again showed much 
more reluctance to drink from the Not poison bottles. Call this the Not Poison scenario. 
This is a case for which I have granted a Sophisticate Humean explanation to be 
plausible. The explanation I suggested is something like this: seeing the label, a subject 
imagines the drink as poisoned, and this imagining has certain unpleasant emotional 
effects (as imaginings often do), which intensify the closer she gets to actually drinking 
the stuff; naturally, she is therefore disinclined to drink it. Gendler, on the other hand, 
takes this to be a paradigmatic case of alief, the threefold content of which can be 
expressed (in an avowedly rough and ready way) as: ‘Poison, Dangerous, Avoid!’.  
                                                          
142 Is alief itself supposed to be an attitude? Gendler denies that aliefs are attitudes (Gendler 2010: 263); 
but she says that she will introduce a new attitude called alief, and one section heading in her paper reads 
‘Alief and other attitudes’ (Gendler 2010: 267). 
115 
 
Now, one may think that our two explanations are not incompatible. After all, 
we both agree to the salience of three elements in any plausible explanation of what is 
going on here: a state which represents the drink as poisoned, an affective state or 
states, a set of activated behavioural tendencies. And as I said, we do also agree, that 
the representation is not a belief: the subjects are convinced the drink is harmless. The 
point, however, is that in Gendler’s view this representation cannot be an imagining, 
either. She provides two arguments for this.  
Her first argument is (by her own admission) basically an appeal to intuitions. In 
a case like the one we are considering, she notes, explanations in terms of imagining 
are implausible because people are also unwilling (to a degree) to drink from bottles 
labelled ‘Not poison’. Most subjects in the follow-up study, when faced with the choice 
of drinking from bottles labelled ‘Not poison’ or ‘Safe to consume’, opt for the latter. 
In Gendler’s view, it is not likely that seeing a ‘Not poison’ label induces one to 
imagine that one actually is drinking poison: 
Can’t we say that the source of subject’s hesitation is that she first imagines that the bottle 
does contain poison and that she then somehow negates this, and that this enables her 
(…) to imagine the absence of poison? Perhaps this is indeed what happens. But how is 
this supposed to explain the subject’s hesitancy to drink the liquid? Is the reason for her 
hesitancy supposed to be that she had been imagining that the bottle contained cyanide, 
though now she is not – and that what she imagined in the past (though fails to imagine 
now) somehow explains her action at present? Or that her current imagining that the 
bottle does not contain cyanide somehow contains within it (in not-fully-aufgehoben 
form) the antithetical imagining that the bottle does contain cyanide? And that somehow 
this negated semi-imagined content – content that she has, throughout the entire process, 
been fully consciously aware of explicitly disbelieving – sneaks into the control center for 
her motor routines and causes her to hesitate in front of the Kool-Aid? Really? Is this 
really what you think imagining is like? (Gendler 2010: 269–70) 
However, we don’t need to assume that subjects’ avoidance behaviour is the product 
of some past but mysteriously still-active imagining, or that part of a negative 
imagining takes on a causal life of its own: in many situations it is entirely plausible that 
seeing a message of the form ‘Not-p’ provokes one to imagine p.143 When Donne says 
that no man is an island, a spontaneous, appropriate and perhaps intended response is 
that we should imagine men as islands, though doubtless we go on to do other things 
with the metaphor. If a threatening Mafioso puts a label ‘Not dead’ on your loved one, 
                                                          
143 Depending on cases, of course, it may also provoke imagining that Not-P. Generally speaking, what 
imaginings are prompted by what expressions is highly context dependent. My point here is just that in 
the context of Rozin’s experiment it is very plausible to suppose that ‘Not poison’ will provoke the 
imagining of poison. I discuss context dependence in connection with hyperopacity below: §5.3. 
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that may very well be because it so easily prompts the contrary imagining. Notably, in 
the ‘Not poison’ case, the label also bore a skull and crossbones image preceded by the 
word ‘Not’. An erotically charged image preceded by the word ‘Not’ is unlikely to 
provoke images of celibacy.  
Similar sorts of worries lead me to reject Gendler’s second argument – which she 
takes to be more general and substantive, but eventually, as I will show, turns out to be 
based on the same questionable intuitions just discussed (and on some conceptual 
confusion). “For those unconvinced by examples or lines of rhetorical questioning”, 
Gendler offers the argument from hyperopacity. 
 
5.3. THE ARGUMENT FROM HYPEROPACITY 
According to this argument, the representational component of alief is irreducibly 
different from imagination because it has the property of being hyperopaque, which 
imagination does not have. 
Alief contexts are what we might call hyperopaque: they do not permit salva veritate 
substitution even of expressions that the subject explicitly recognizes to be co-referential. 
Even if I believe that the phrases ‘not poison’ and ‘safe to consume’ pick out co-extensive 
classes of substances, even if I focus on that belief and hold it vividly before my mind, 
even if the synonymy of these two terms is crucial to my views about some other matter, 
still the aliefs activated by the two expressions may be wildly dissimilar. Imagination, by 
contrast, is not hyperopaque in this way. If I explicitly recognize that P and Q are 
synonymous, and I imagine P while focusing explicitly on the co-referentiality of P and Q, 
then in imagining P I imagine Q. Alief just isn’t imagination. (Gendler 2010: 270; 
emphasis mine) 
There are two ambiguities in this argument. The first is due to an unacknowledged 
transition from ‘co-referentiality’ to ‘synonymy’. Since the example given in the 
quotation, on which I want to focus, concerns the pair ‘safe to consume’/‘not 
poisonous’, I will simply grant that this pair meets the condition of synonymy, and 
hence also the weaker condition of co-referentiality.144 The second ambiguity is more 
significant: the definition of ‘hyperopacity’ changes as we go from the case of alief to 
that of imagination – a crucial change, since Gendler’s claim is that there is a single 
                                                          
144 While granting this for the sake of the argument, I observe that ‘Not poisonous’ and ‘Safe to 
consume’ are not really synonyms, and not even co-referential. The expression ‘Not poison’ picks out a 
class of substances which includes substances that are ‘safe to consume’ (e.g. water), as well as 
substances that, even if not poisonous, are not ‘safe to consume’ (e.g. water with pieces of glass inside). 
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property which alief has and imagination lacks. What is the change? Gendler specifies 
the hyperopacity that applies to alief as follows: 
1) Alief is hyperopaque insofar as, even if a subject vividly understands that two 
expressions P and Q are synonymous, the aliefs activated by P can be different 
from those activated by Q. 
But the hyperopacity test applied to imagination is different: 
2) Imagination is not hyperopaque because, if a subject vividly understands that 
two expressions P and Q are synonymous, then her imagining that P will be the 
same as her imagining that Q. 
Thus we have two distinct definitions: 
H1) A state-type S is hyperopaque if it is possible that, when a subject vividly 
understands that two expressions P and Q are synonymous, a token of S 
activated by P is different from a token of S activated by Q.  
H2) A state-type S is hyperopaque if it is possible that, when a subject vividly 
understands that two expressions P and Q are synonymous, her S-ing that P 
is distinct from her S-ing that Q. 
As defined in H1, hyperopacity is a property that has to do with the causal power of 
expressions; in H2, it appears as a property concerning the identity conditions for 
mental states. These are quite different (and independent) properties: possession of the 
first, but not of the latter, is an empirical matter, depending on the contingent 
psychological effects of a given stimulus. Should we understand Gendler as claiming 
that alief is hyperopaque in the sense of H1, while imagination is not? That claim 
would be false. There is every reason to think that imagination is hyperopaque in the 
sense of H1; indeed I don’t know of a single, conventionally recognized mental state 
that isn’t hyperopaque in this sense. Take the Not poison scenario. I grant that this 
scenario provides an instance of H1: even though the subject recognizes the synonymy 
of ‘not poison’ and ‘safe to consume’, these two expressions cause her to act in two 
different ways, because they activate in her mind two different representations. The 
question then is: what kind of representations? My answer, already given, is that they 
are instances of imaginings. I have suggested that in the context of Rozin’s experiment 
the label ‘Not poison’ activates an imagining of poison, while the label ‘Safe to 
consume’ does not. Thus imagination is hyperopaque in the sense of H1. But so is, by 
the way, belief. Suppose Rozin’s subjects are told that the experiment has been 
hijacked by a mad scientist who puts real poison in the bottle labelled ‘Not poison’; 
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seeing that label will cause them to believe that the bottle is poisoned, while seeing the 
label ‘Safe to consume’ won’t. Context can always interfere with the effects an 
expression has on the mind. Gendler has not given any reason to think that 
hyperopacity of type H1 distinguishes alief from imagination, or from anything else. So 
there is now no barrier to thinking of imagination as the mental state that best explains 
Not Poison. And since the Not Poison scenario was brought on by Gendler as a way of 
casting doubt on the possibility that imagination explains the Poison scenario, 
neutralizing her argument about Not Poison allows me to explain Poison in terms of 
imagination as well. What about hyperopacity as defined in H2? I can grant Gendler’s 
claim that imagination is not hyperopaque in this sense, while alief is.145 After all, I have 
never argued that alief and imagination are identical. Their distinctness is established by 
definition: alieving, in Gendler’s view, is a four-place relation between a subject and a 
threefold content, imagining is a two-place relation between a subject and a single 
content. My interest here was in showing that imagination can account for cases like 
Not Poison, and hyperopacity in the sense of H2 is irrelevant to that question. What is 
relevant is H1, because the state involved in Not Poison needs to be hyperopaque in the 
sense of H1. And H1, far from being an exclusive property of alief, is a characteristic 
property of imagination, as well as of all other representational states I know of.  
To conclude, I must note that Gendler’s argument for alief is not based just on 
superstitious actions. She considers various examples of problematic behaviours of 
rather different kinds that in her view cannot be explained by appeal to ‘traditional’ 
folk-psychological states. Elsewhere, in a paper with Greg Currie, I have considered all 
her cases more systematically and argued that none of them require us to acknowledge 
the existence of aliefs, at least as those states are officially characterized by Gendler 
(though the alternative explanations we suggested are not always in terms of 
imaginings).146 But my interest in the present discussion was more specific: I meant to 
                                                          
145 More precisely, I grant that, if alief existed, it would be hyperopaque in the sense of H2. 
146 In fact, we suggest that most of Gendler’s cases are better explained by lower-level representational 
states: generally of a perceptual kind, and sometimes even lower (though for some cases we consider the 
possibility of belief explanations). Our point is that while a few of these cases do plausibly require us to 
acknowledge representations at levels other than the personal one, none require us to acknowledge the 
existence of aliefs – at least as they are officially characterized by Gendler. Here it is worth noting a new 
argument for the existence of aliefs, recently put forward by Miri Albahari (2013). Albahari argues that 
aliefs (or, at least, some states with an associative, tripartite structure R-A-B very similar to aliefs) actually 
exist, though they do not have the pervasive explanatory role that Gendler gives them. Insofar as 
Albahari’s argument is not based (just) on the exam of ‘Gendler cases’, but appeals also to independent 
empirical evidence (from Antonio Damasio’s research), it might escape Currie and mine’s criticisms. 
Indeed, Currie and I just argue that none of Gendler cases require us to recognize the existence of alief; 
we do not argue that there is no evidence whatsoever for the existence aliefs. I am actually inclined to 
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reject Gendler’s claim that alief is necessary to explain my cases of superstitious 
actions, since imagination cannot do the job. I have argued that she does not provide 
good arguments for this view. I hope to have persuaded you of this. Gendler 
apparently is persuaded: 
Currie and Ichino are – I suspect – correct in their claim that my hyperopacity argument 
rests on an ambiguity. Alief is – of course – hyperopaque in their sense H1. But they have 
convinced me that a good deal more work is required for me to show that this 
distinguishes alief from imagination – or, for that matter, from any other mental state. 
(Gendler 2012: 807-808) 
CONCLUSION 
In this chapter I have considered four possible explanations for what I called 
‘superstitious’/’magical’ actions. I have shown that Humean explanations in terms of 
belief-desire pairs are problematic: in the best case, they are implausible (Sophisticated 
Humean explanation); in the worst case, they presuppose an undesirable revision of 
our notion of belief, which misses out its epistemic dimension (Standard Humean 
explanation). I have argued that the best explanation for superstitious/magical actions 
is in terms of imaginings, and that there is no need to introduce new cognitive 
categories like that of alief. Far from being marginal and isolated, actions like these are 
very pervasive in our lives. This, I have suggested, reveals that imagination’s motivating 
power is the same of belief. A proper defence of this suggestion, though, requires a 
closer consideration of the conditions under which imagination’s and belief’s 
motivating power is manifested – which I am going to articulate in the next chapter. 
 
 
 
  
                                                                                                                                                                  
think that our argument against the need to postulate a weird tripartite entity like Gendler’s alief (rather 
than three distinct, though causally, related entities) may well apply also to Albahari’s discussion. 
However, Albahari’s interesting and rich paper is surely worth further consideration. 
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Chapter 5 
THE POWERS OF IMAGINATION 
 
 
 
 
In the last chapter I argued that there are a large number of cases – cases I gathered 
under the (broad) labels of ‘superstitious’ and ‘magical’ actions – where the cognitive 
states that motivate us to act jointly with our conations seem to be totally insensitive to 
evidence and inferentially isolated from our whole system of beliefs. I have argued that, 
since at least some degree of sensitivity to evidence and inferential integration is 
necessary for belief, those cognitive states cannot be beliefs, and are better described as 
imaginings. I ended with the tentative suggestion that these cases reveal that 
imagination and belief have basically the same motivating power. In this chapter I will 
better defend this suggestion, developing a line of argument put forward by J. David 
Velleman (2000). After a recap of my discussion so far and of its place in the current 
debate on propositional imagination (§1), I shall discuss Velleman’s argument for the 
view that imaginings and beliefs motivate action in the same ways, showing that it does 
not have the absurd consequences that it is generally taken to have (§2). I shall then 
point out some important differences between Velleman’s view and my own, notably 
having to do with the different roles that we take imagination to play in our view of – 
and interactions with – the world (§3). Hence – since the final chapter following this 
one is to some extent more speculative than the rest of the thesis – I will end this 
chapter by drawing some general conclusions about the view of imagination and belief 
that I have been defending, indicating some possible developments for future research. 
 
1. WHERE ARE WE?  
Let’s start with a brief recap of the big picture and our place in it. As I noted in 
Chapter 1, the basic reason that we have for thinking that mental states like belief, 
desire, imagination (or indeed any other mental state of that sort, functionally defined) 
actually exist is that postulating their existence helps us to explain a great number of 
things. Hence, any account of such states that aims for some psychological plausibility 
will be guided by considerations of explanatory power. Are those states helpful to 
explain our actions, reactions, and conscious experiences? And, if so, what is the most 
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explanatorily helpful way to characterize their functional structure and their contents? 
Being notably concerned with propositional imagination, I have been targeting this 
question at the relationships between imagination and belief, focussing on (the so-
called) Hume’s Question of how to distinguish one from the other. What is the most 
explanatorily helpful way to draw the distinction between these two states? 
My natural starting point to answer this question has been cases of daydreaming, 
engagement with fiction, pretence games, and ‘modal thinking’.147 These are indeed 
what we can call ‘the standard imaginative explananda’: the phenomena of our human 
lives that most obviously require us to postulate an imaginative capacity somehow 
distinct from belief in order to be properly understood.148 According to the dominant 
view in the contemporary debate, the relevant distinction here lies at the functional level. 
The cognitive states underlying our engagement with daydreams, fiction, or pretence, 
may have precisely the same contents as our beliefs, but differ from them in two key 
functional respects: (1) with respect to the cognitive inputs in response to which they 
are formed (they are not formed in response to real-world evidence as belief are), and 
(2) with respect to the behavioural outputs that they are able to produce (they do not 
motivate us to act as beliefs do). Call this the ‘Standard View of imagination’.  
As we have seen, some controversies concerning the motivational difference 
between imagination and belief arise within the Standard View in relation to cases of 
pretence, where imaginings are associated with characteristic action outputs. Advocates 
of the traditional ‘Humean Theory of Motivation’ point out that ‘associated with’ here 
does not mean ‘causally responsible for’: belief is the only cognitive state that can cause 
and rationalize action, and it does so also in cases of pretence, where the role of 
imaginings is merely indirect (see e.g. Nichols and Stich 2000). By contrast, advocates 
of the ‘Imagination-as-Motivation Theory’ contend that a proper understanding of 
pretence requires us to recognize that imagination has some autonomous motivating 
power that can be exerted with no mediation of beliefs (see e.g. Currie and Ravenscroft 
2002). In Chapter 3 I defended a version of this latter view, arguing that pretenders are 
typically motivated by pairs of belief-like and desire-like imaginings. I have, however, 
                                                          
147 With ‘modal thinking’ (or ‘reasoning’), I refer to that class of ‘serious uses of imagination’ which I 
have described in my initial examples, including counterfactual reasoning, hypothetical reasoning, 
formulation of thought-experiments, and various possible forms of modal judgements. 
148 The apparent lack of these phenomena in the lives of some non-human animals, on the other hand, 
may be taken to indicate a lack of imaginative cognition. Indeed, the question of whether dogs, monkeys 
or apes have some sorts of imaginative capacity is often framed also in terms of whether they are able to 
engage in pretence play (see also the related debate on whether they possess a theory of mind, and their 
capacity to lye; e.g. in Hauser 2000).  
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also granted that this in itself does not prove that imagination has the same motivating 
power as belief. Indeed, beliefs typically motivate in conjunction with real desires; not 
with imaginative ones. And, perhaps more importantly, beliefs motivate action across 
many different contexts. If imaginings lead to action only in conjunction with 
imaginative desires and in the context of pretence, this would suggest that their 
motivating power is relevantly different from that of belief – if anything, much more 
limited. This is something on which almost everyone seems to agree: whether episodes 
of pretence require us to credit imagination with direct motivating power or not, they 
do not in themselves require us to credit it with precisely the same motivating power of 
belief. So, they can at most constitute a challenge to the Humean View that motivating 
power is an exclusive prerogative of belief. But they do not ultimately challenge the 
Standard View, according to which belief has a distinctive motivating power that sets it 
apart from imagination.149 
My departure from the Standard View is due to the fact that, while I obviously 
agree that the ‘standard explananda’ just seen must be accounted for in terms of 
imaginings, I do not think that they are the only ones. The role of imagination in our 
lives is not limited to cases of daydream, fiction, pretence and modal reasoning; it is 
actually much larger than that. In the last chapter I argued that imaginings play the 
relevant explanatory role in a number of other cases: ‘non-standard imaginative 
                                                          
149 Nor, by the way, is the standard view challenged by another imaginative explanandum that has 
become quite standard in the contemporary debate on propositional imagination: the phenomenon of 
mindreading. Some of the most influential accounts in that debate, such as Nichols & Stich (2000) and 
Currie & Ravenscroft (2002), have been based on the idea that the same imaginative mechanisms that 
underlie pretence, play a key role in explaining our capacity to understand our own and other people’s 
mental states. What imagination’s role in mindreading precisely is and how it relates to its role in 
pretence is controversial, and surely considerations on this have important implications for the different 
accounts’ architectural commitments. But not so much for their commitments concerning imagination’s 
motivating power, since everyone agrees that whatever role imagination plays in mind-reading, that is an 
off-line role, which does not amount to generating behavioural outputs, but only to allowing mental 
predictions about other people’s (or our own) behaviour.  
In fact, here I should mention two candidate ‘non-standard imaginative explananda’ which have been 
discussed as such in the recent philosophical and psychological literature, and which do arguably 
constitute a challenge for the Standard View of imagination: namely, the phenomena of self-deception and 
delusion. For both these phenomena there have been advocates of non-doxastic accounts, defending 
alternative explanations in terms of imaginings (see e.g. Gendler 2007 for self-deception, and Currie 
2000, Currie and Ravenscroft 2002: Ch.8 for delusions; see also Egan 2009’s account of delusions as 
‘bimaginings’). Perhaps delusions may not be a big worry for a Standard Theorist: even if it turned out 
that they are best explained as imaginings (something on which I have doubts), the Standard View may 
still hold for the adult non-clinical population. That is, the Standard Theorist may (perhaps) still argue 
that in properly developed well-functioning subjects, imaginings do not motivate as beliefs do. But the 
case of self-deception is much more threatening, given the pervasiveness of this phenomenon in 
cognitively normal population (in relation to this, see some examples I shall discuss in what follows and 
in Chapter 6; though, as I shall note, much more should be said on this topic, which I couldn’t properly 
discuss in this thesis but I hope to address in future developments of this work). For recent reviews and 
discussions of doxastic and non-doxastic accounts of self-deception and delusion, see contributions in 
Nottlemann (2013) – notably by Matthews (Ch.5) and Bayne and Hattiangadi (Ch.6) 
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explananda’ which I gathered under the labels of ‘superstitious’ and ‘magical’ actions. 
Far from being marginal and circumscribed, the actions in question are pervasive in all 
sorts of everyday contexts. If I am right that all these cases are explained in terms of 
imaginings, this has important consequences for our account of imagination, revealing 
its motivating power to be the same of belief – as I shall argue in what follows. 
2. VELLEMAN AND I  
The only philosopher I know who holds a view of imagination that is non-standard in 
the sense I just described is J. David Velleman: one of the basic claims for which he 
argues in his 2000 paper “On The Aim of Belief” is that imaginings and beliefs cannot 
be distinguished on the basis of their motivating powers. As I repeatedly said, the view 
of imagination that I have been defending here owes a lot to Velleman’ view. It is now 
time to make this debt more explicit – and, hopefully, do something to pay it off, 
defending Velleman from (at least some of) his critics. 
This, note, does not mean that I am going to endorse and defend Velleman’s 
view of imagination in full. As I shall point out, there are some aspects of that view 
that leave me unpersuaded. Still, what matters for me is Velleman’s conclusion that 
imagination and belief have the same motivating powers. I think that this conclusion is 
supported by the account of superstitious and magical actions that I defended in 
Chapter 4, and my main aim in this section is to show how it is so. 
2.1. VELLEMAN’S ARGUMENT 
Surprisingly (and, I shall argue, somewhat unfortunately), Velleman’s argument for the 
non-standard view that imagination and belief have the same motivating powers starts 
from the consideration of a very standard imaginative explanandum: pretence – and gives 
it considerable weight. The example discussed more at length in Velleman’s paper is 
that of a child pretending that he is an elephant. This is due to the fact that, as we have 
seen in Chapter 3, Velleman doesn’t seem to recognize the existence of desire-like 
imaginings, and takes pretence to be typically motivated by imaginings in conjunction 
with real desires (real desires of a special kind: what he calls ‘wishes’). So, in his view, 
pretence actions are clear cases where imaginings motivate precisely as beliefs do. I have 
already expressed my perplexities on this point: while endorsing most of Velleman’s 
critical considerations against Humean accounts of pretence, I criticized the alternative 
account he defends, and argued that real desires (of any sort) are unlikely to play the 
relevant explanatory role in most cases of children’s pretence (see above, Ch.3: § 4.3).  
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Luckily, however, I don’t think that Velleman’s conclusions about the motivating 
power of imagination crucially depend on his account of pretence. Velleman also 
discusses many cases of non-pretence actions that seem to elude belief-desire explanations 
and to require explanations in terms of desire-imagining pairs. These are the sorts of 
actions we are already familiar with from Chapter 4: his examples include actions like 
talking to yourself (when you imagine being in conversation with someone else); expressive 
behaviours (like my case of the sport fan who loudly encourages her team while watching 
a TV match); or psychoanalytic cases of actions where symbolic objects are treated as if 
they were what they imaginatively (and sub-consciously) stand for (like young Goethe 
throwing crockery out of the window as a phantasy of casting out his baby brother150). 
Admittedly, Velleman’s discussion of these cases is a bit quick – especially if compared 
with his thorough discussion of pretence; his arguments for the view that these actions 
are imagination-driven rely more often on appeals to intuitions than on full-fledged 
reasons against the plausibility of belief-desire explanations.151 Later on I shall say 
something more on this – and more in general on how Velleman’s prevalent focus on 
pretence is problematic in the economy of his argument. But this is not too much of a 
worry for me, since the idea that in these (and indeed other, more or less similar) cases 
the agents’ imaginings motivate them to act in conjunction with their real desires is 
something I have already extensively argued for in Chapter 4. What I am notably 
concerned with here, as I said, is the next step of Velleman’s argument: his move from 
the consideration of all these cases where imaginings motivate, to the conclusion that 
imaginings have the same motivating power of belief – the same dispositional 
connection (via desire) to action: 
I have now introduced several categories of examples that feature motivation by 
imagining. These examples show that imagining that p and believing that p are alike in disposing the 
subject to do what would satisfy his conations if p were true, other things being equal. Admittedly, the 
examples have also shown that other things are rarely equal between cases of imagining 
and believing, and hence that the actual manifestations or these states are often different. 
But these differences do not undermine my thesis. After all, belief itself (…) can be 
characterized only in terms of its disposition to produce behaviour under various 
                                                          
150 So, at least, Freud’s explanation (which Velleman endorses) goes. 
151 Here is an example of how Velleman argues for some of his non-pretence cases: “Why do you 
scratch your head when you’re puzzled, hold your head when you’re worried, or smack your head when 
you’ve made a dumb mistake? Are these gestures a kind of sign-language? And then, if no one else is in 
the room, are you talking sign-language to yourself? No, you’re acting out corporeal images of your own 
thinking – your mind’s body-image, so to speak. You’re acting out the phantasy of your memory as a 
balky machine, your curiosity as an itch, your worries as raising the pressure inside your skull. Your 
behaviour is thus motivated by wish and imagination rather than by desire and belief” (Velleman 2000: 
270). 
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conditions, such as the presence of a relevant conation and the requisite motor skills, and 
the absence of conflicting motives and inhibitions. The examples suggest that imaginings can be 
characterized as having the same conditional disposition as belief; the only differences have to do with the 
satisfaction of the associated conditions. (Velleman 2000: 271-272, emphasis mine)  
This argument needs a bit of unpacking – and, as I shall say, some better development. 
§2.2 will be devoted to that. 
2.2. VELLEMAN UNPACKED AND DEFENDED 
At the risk of being a bit pedantic, let’s distinguish clearly the two claims that are at 
stake here: 
(i) There are a large number of cases where an agent who imagines that p is 
motivated to act in the same ways in which she would act if, all else being 
equal, she believed that p.  
(ii) In any possible case, an agent who imagines that p is motivated to act in 
the same ways in which she would act if, all else being equal, she believed 
that p.  
My cases of superstitious/magical actions, and Velleman’s analogous examples just 
seen, prove claim (i) to be true (insofar as the account we defended for them is right). 
That is, they are all cases where an agent’s imagining that p motivates her to act in ways 
that would promote the satisfaction of her desires if p were true – which is the way in 
which beliefs typically motivate. But, of course, (i) does not entail (ii). And (ii) is what 
ought to be true if imaginings really had the same motivating power of beliefs.  
Velleman’s critics blame him for switching too easily from (i) to (ii).152 According 
to Neil Van Leeuwen, for instance, “Velleman mistakenly generalizes from cases in 
which imagining that p and believing that p happen to yield similar behaviour to the 
conclusion that this holds for all cases”. A conclusion which Van Leeuwen – in this 
respect fully aligned with the Standard View of imagination – considers “indefensible 
in virtue of its absurd consequences” (Van Leeuwen 2009: 232). Indeed – so the 
standard argument goes – even granting (if only for the sake of argument) that there 
are cases where imaginings motivate in conjunction with our desires, as beliefs do, 
                                                          
152 More precisely, those critics who grant some version of (i) to be true: i.e. those critics who grant that 
in at least some of the cases that Velleman considers imaginings motivate as beliefs do. I take Currie and 
Ravenscroft to be critics of this sort (see Currie and Ravenscroft 2002: 118-130). 
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there still remain many more cases where imaginings do not motivate in such ways – 
daydreams and responses to fiction being the most obvious examples.153  
However, I do not think Velleman is the one who jumps to conclusions here. 
Although Velleman’s argument requires some alterations and better development, I 
think that in general it provides compelling reasons for the view that imaginings have 
the same motivating power as beliefs. Conversely, the sorts of standard criticisms we 
have just seen tend to switch too easily from the consideration of cases where 
imaginings do not motivate to the conclusion that imagination’s motivating power 
differs from that of belief – overlooking the fact that there are plenty of cases where 
beliefs do not motivate, either. 
To see this point more clearly, consider again my standard example of 
daydreaming, where I imagine that I am the Duchess of Cambridge on the day of my 
wedding. We all agree that, in cases like this, my imaginings do not motivate me to act: 
I do not wear an elegant white dress, I do not look for my chauffeur in order to be 
taken to Westminster Abbey, I do not pack my bags for the honeymoon... Indeed, I do 
not do anything but sit here, staring into space. However, it is one thing to agree on 
this; it is quite another thing to conclude that my imagining in this case does not 
motivate me to act as I would if I believed what I imagine to be true. This conclusion is not as 
obvious as it may prima facie seem to be. The fact is that it is not so obvious how I 
would act if I believed that I was the Duchess of Cambridge on my wedding day. 
Actually, I think that if I really believed that, then I would probably try to escape 
before it was too late. The idea of marrying Prince William does not really sound 
appealing at all to me! And even granting that I was happy with this wedding… Would 
I wear a white dress? I probably would, if I wanted to conform to traditional practices 
and I believed that brides traditionally dress in white. Though I wouldn’t if, instead, I 
wanted to surprise everyone with a bohemian style, or if I believed that brides 
traditionally dress in pink. Would I look for my chauffeur to be taken to Westminster 
Abbey? I probably would, if I believed that the ceremony will take place there. Though 
I wouldn’t if, instead, I believed it to take place in a London registry office. And what 
if I got up in the morning with one of my awful migraines? In such a case, I may well 
have to remain in the darkness of my room for a while, hoping that it passes and it 
doesn’t completely ruin my day as only migraines can do.  
                                                          
153 As we have seen in Chapter 3 (§2), indeed, the idea that “when we consume fiction, daydream or 
fantasize, we don’t typically produce actions that would be produced if we believed what we are 
imagining” is widely accepted as “a central fact about propositional imagination” (Nichols 2006: 6-7). 
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What these hypothetical scenarios reveal is a basic fact about the motivating 
power of beliefs, which I have already observed in previous chapters: whether beliefs 
motivate us to act and what sort of actions they motivate depends on a number of 
factors concerning our internal and external environment – factors which include, but 
are not exhausted by, the presence of relevant desires. In Chapter 3 I characterized 
belief’s connection to action as a dispositional connection which is expected to manifest 
itself in the presence of the relevant desires, if a number of other conditions are also satisfied – 
while failures to satisfy such conditions can excuse lacks of behavioural manifestations 
without thereby compromising the holding of the disposition itself.154 This is important 
to keep in mind when we compare belief’s and imagination’s motivating powers. It is 
true that the existence of cases where imaginings motivate in ways that would promote 
the satisfaction of our desires is not enough to conclude that imagination’s motivating 
power is the same of belief. But in order to support this conclusion we do not need to 
show that imaginings always motivate us to act in ways that would promote the 
satisfaction of our desires. We need to show that they motivate us to act in such ways 
under the same conditions under which beliefs do so.  
This is indeed what Velleman is arguing when he says that his examples “suggest 
that imaginings can be characterized as having the same conditional disposition as 
belief; the only differences have to do with the satisfaction of the associated 
conditions”.155 Now, I have granted to his critics that he is a bit too quick in drawing 
this conclusion. Most of his discussion focuses on the cases where imaginings’ 
motivating power is actually manifested, though to prove that their conditional 
disposition to action is precisely the same as belief he should have paid attention also 
to cases of lack of manifestation. More precisely, he should have shown that whenever 
an imagining that p does not motivate actions that would promote the satisfaction of the 
agent’s desires, this lack of behavioural manifestation is excused by some condition C 
which (all else being equal) would also excuse the lack of behavioural manifestation of 
a belief that p. While granting that Velleman does not, strictly speaking prove this, 
                                                          
154 See Chapter 3, §2. As I noted there, the number of conditions like these which may excuse a lack of 
manifestation of belief’s behavioural disposition even in the presence of the relevant desires is, arguably, 
indefinitely large – which is why in describing belief’s dispositional profile we refer to them generically as 
ceteris paribus conditions. 
155 This is the conclusion of the passage quoted above (§2.1). One may observe that here Velleman is 
just saying that the examples suggest that imaginings and beliefs have the same dispositional connection to 
action; he is not claiming that he has proved this. However, the view that imaginings and beliefs have the 
same dispositional connection to action is a crucial premise in his main argument (i.e. the argument for 
the thesis that belief can only be defined by its ‘aiming at truth’). And Velleman clearly thinks to have 
provided conclusive evidence to support that premise. 
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however, I think that this is true – and my aim here is to develop Velleman’s argument 
in such a way as to prove it. Of course, I can’t possibly consider every possible case 
where imaginings do not motivate. But I will identify some basic conditions that in my 
view excuse all the cases of non-motivating imaginings pointed out by Velleman’s 
opponents (i.e., notably, cases of daydreams and responses to fiction), as well as all 
other cases of non-motivating imagining I can think of. Hence, I will conclude by 
shifting the onus of proof onto our opponents. 
2.3. EXCUSING CONDITIONS 
There are two sorts of factors that are most typically responsible for the lack of 
behavioural manifestation of our imaginings in paradigmatic cases of daydreams and 
fiction consumption: (1) factors concerning the meta-cognitions that typically 
accompany our imaginings in such cases: the beliefs and desires that, in such cases, we 
typically have about our imaginings; and, (2) factors concerning the kinds of 
propositional contents that our imaginings typically have in such cases, and the 
inferential networks into which they are integrated. I shall discuss these two sorts of 
factors in turn (in §§2.3.1, 2.3.2), and I shall argue that, all else being equal, these very 
same factors would also excuse the lack of behavioural manifestation of corresponding 
beliefs – i.e. of beliefs with the same contents.156  
2.3.1. META-COGNITIVE FACTORS: THE ‘META-COGNITION CONDITION’. Why, when I 
daydream that I am the Duchess of Cambridge on the day of my wedding, do I not act 
upon this imagining? Plausibly, that is because I believe that it is just a daydream, and I 
do not see any point in acting upon it. I am sat at my desk in the office, it is already 
7pm, and what I really want to do now is to stop daydreaming and procrastinating, in 
order to finish writing this section soon. A situation like this is quite paradigmatic. 
Typically, when we have a daydream with content p, we are aware that p is something 
that we merely imagine and do not believe to be true; and – partly because of this – we 
desire to inhibit our motivation to act upon p (since we believe that the best chances to 
satisfy our desires rest on our representing reality accurately, and we want our actions 
to be realistically purposive). Simplifying a bit, let’s say then that a standard case of 
daydreaming is one where the agent imagines that p, and: 
                                                          
156 For the sake of simplicity, here I will focus on cases of daydreams. I think it won’t be hard for the 
reader to see how my arguments apply equally well to cases of fiction consumption; I will briefly show 
how it is so in footnote 166 below. 
129 
 
(a) Believes (occurrently) that she does not really believe, but just imagines that p; 
and, 
(b) Desires (occurrently) not to act upon her imagining that p.157 
These meta-beliefs and meta-desires concerning the agent’s imagining are both factors 
that prevent the imagining itself from motivating.158  
Arguably, either of these two meta-cognitive factors would also (all else being 
equal) prevent a belief that p from motivating. Now, admittedly, if we stick to the 
wedding case, the scenario we get if we keep everything the same as the daydream 
scenario, apart from the fact that I believe, and not imagine, that I am the Duchess of Cambridge, is 
somewhat improbable. This would be a scenario where I believe that I am the Duchess 
of Cambridge, though I have also for some reason come to believe that I don’t believe 
but just imagine that, so I don’t want to act upon this imagining, and I’m rather sat 
here in my office, wanting to finish my thesis… Yes: definitely improbable. Indeed, at 
least in cases of ‘exotic’ daydreams like this, the circumstances in which we imagine are 
not likely to be equal to the circumstances in which we would find ourselves if we 
believed what we imagine to be true. But improbable does not mean impossible.159 
What matters to my argument here is that you grant the following counterfactual claim: 
if that scenario occurred, the behavioural consequences of my belief that I am the 
Duchess of Cambridge would not be different from the behavioural consequences of 
the corresponding daydream (i.e.: if that scenario occurred, I would fail to act upon my 
belief as I do fail to act upon my imagining in the daydream scenario). This seems very 
                                                          
157 What precisely does ‘being occurrent’ amount to? Here I’m assuming (stipulated definition) that for a 
mental state to be occurrent its content must somehow be part of the subject’s conscious experience. 
On this view, being occurrent seems to be at least to some extent a matter of degree: there will be states 
‘very vividly occurrent’ (in the way in which the content of what I am writing right now is vividly present 
before my mind), and states that are ‘a bit in the back of my mind’, but ready to emerge (e.g. when I am 
watching Psycho I may have the belief that it is just a fiction ‘barely occurrent’; the more I get immersed, 
the less it is occurrent – the more I am disposed to feel the story to be true and to react/act upon it). 
158 In the scenario just sketched they do that jointly, but note that even just one of them taken alone may 
be enough. 
159 A (somewhat more plausible) example of a counterfactual scenario of this sort may be the following. 
My parents forced me into the Royal Wedding for convenience reasons, and I feel awful at the very idea 
of being led down the aisle by Prince William. My unease at the idea of this wedding is so deep that it 
makes me temporarily repress the awareness that the unpleasant event is going to happen today. When I 
open my eyes in the morning I just feel sick, and remain in my bed thinking: ‘Luckily the weeding was 
not scheduled for today’… In a case like this, you would not say that I don’t believe that today is the day 
of my wedding. Actually it is precisely because I believe this that I feel so bad and remain into my bed 
till late in the morning – something that I never do otherwise. But the motivating force of my belief is 
inhibited. Freudian literature on ‘motivated forgetting’ is full of examples like this – where people forget 
also things that mean a lot to them, like their own wedding. 
This would be a case where I believe that I am the Duchess on the day of my wedding but I fail to 
perform typical (?) wedding actions due to the fact that either I have a wrong meta-belief, or I desire not 
to act upon my belief. You may think that these scenarios are improbable; but surely they’re not 
impossible. 
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plausible. I think we can all agree that, all else being equal, if one believes that p but for 
some reason comes to believe that she does not believe that p, and/or comes to desire 
not to act upon p, then she won’t act upon her belief that p.  
As an example of the first condition – i.e. of a case where one believes that p, 
comes to believe that she does not believe that p, and hence fails to act upon p – think 
of a subject who believes that her partner is cheating on her, but somehow brings 
herself to believe that she doesn’t really believe that (e.g. she tells herself that she is just 
paranoid, that she is excessively jealous, etc…). This subject will plausibly fail to act 
upon her first-order belief (the belief that HE IS CHEATING) in various ways. If you 
ask her about her romantic life, for example, she may well sincerely tell you that it is 
coming up roses.160 Typical examples of the second condition – i.e. of cases where a 
lack of behavioural manifestation of a belief that p is ‘excused’ by the desire not to act 
upon p – are cases of pretence. The child who pretends that she is a cat and responds 
to your questions only by meowing, obviously does still believe that she is a child and 
that she can talk properly. But, for the duration of the game, she desires not to act 
upon these beliefs (and to act upon her imaginings, instead).  
Eventually, then, it seems that we can formulate the following ‘excusing 
condition’ that holds both for belief’s and imagination’s lack of behavioural 
manifestation. The meta-cognition condition: both a belief that p and an imagining that p 
motivate the agent to act in ways that would promote the satisfaction of her desires if p 
were true unless the agent (1) believes that she doesn’t really believe that p, or (2) 
desires not to act upon her representation of p. If either (1) or (2) are the case, this may 
excuse a lack of behavioural manifestation of the belief/imagining in question (without 
thereby compromising the holding of its behavioural disposition).161 Since (1) and (2) 
                                                          
160 This looks like a classic case of self-deception, which is a complex and controversial phenomenon. 
Without committing myself to any particular account of self-deception, I think that the description I 
sketched for the ‘betrayed-partner’ behaviour has some psychological plausibility – i.e., that it is a 
plausible description of (some aspects of) what goes on in at least some cases of this sort. If this doesn’t 
persuade you, however, I think you can find your own example of a mistaken meta-belief that excuses a 
lack of behavioural manifestation of the related first order belief (arguably, another example may be 
provided by the psychological experiment I discussed in Chapter 2, § 4.5.1). And even if you cannot find 
any such examples, no problem – just skip to the next paragraph (and then to the next section). I am 
about discuss other excusing conditions for the lack of behavioural manifestation of paradigmatic 
imaginings. If you will agree with me that such conditions would also, all else being equal, excuse the 
lack of behavioural manifestation of beliefs with the same contents, this will be enough for me to 
establish my conclusion. 
161 Note that in making this point I am not claiming that the meta-belief that I AM BELIEVING THAT 
P is necessary for my belief that p to have motivating force. This would be absurd, both developmentally 
(think of children who lack capacities for meta-cognition, but obviously act upon their beliefs) and 
conceptually (it would generate an infinite regress of meta-meta-meta-beliefs required to act). What I am 
suggesting is something different, and much more modest. Normally a belief that p has motivating 
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are typically the case when we daydream, we can say that the lack of behavioural 
manifestation of our imaginings in such cases does not, in itself, reveal the difference 
between imagination’s and belief’s motivating powers that Velleman’s opponents (and 
indeed all the standard imagination theorists) typically point out.  
As I said, I think that there are also other factors that play a relevant role in 
preventing our imaginings (in cases of daydream, but also in other cases) from 
motivating us: factors that do not (directly) concern the meta-cognitions we have about 
such imaginings, but have more to do with the inferential network of other imaginings 
and representations into which such imaginings are integrated. I turn to these in the 
next section. 
2.3.2. INFERENTIAL NETWORK: THE ‘KNOW-HOW-TO-DO-THAT CONDITION’. A further 
reason why, when I daydream that I am the Duchess of Cambridge on my wedding 
day, I do not act in ways that would promote the satisfaction of my desires seems to be 
this: nothing in the content of such an imagining actually tells me what I should do in 
order to act in such ways. Even if wanted to do that, I wouldn’t know where to start. A 
comparison with paradigmatic cases of belief-desire motivation will make this point 
clear. As we have seen, beliefs are (and ought to be) inferentially integrated with each 
other into a holistically coherent system, in a way in which imaginings are not. And the 
whole pattern of beliefs to which a belief that p belongs is crucial in determining what 
sort of actions, if any, p will motivate in conjunction with the relevant desires. In 
particular, in Chapter 3 we noted the key role of a specific type of belief that must be 
present in the system in order to allow the other beliefs to manifest their motivating 
potential: beliefs about what sort of actions we should perform in order to satisfy our 
desires – i.e. beliefs of the form “I can obtain ϕ if I perform action A” (where ϕ is 
something I desire). If the belief that TODAY IS MY WEDDING motivates any 
action at all, this is (also) because I have a number of wedding-related desires – e.g. the 
desire to dress properly, to be on time for the ceremony, etc. – and a number of beliefs 
about how to satisfy them – e.g. the belief that I can wear my white dress if I take it from 
the wardrobe, that I can be on time if I book a taxi for 11am, etc. Without beliefs of 
this form, my belief that today is my wedding would fail to motivate me, even in the 
presence of relevant desires. 
                                                                                                                                                                  
power in itself, but we excuse lacks of manifestation of this power in case one has the mistaken meta-
belief that she doesn’t believe p. 
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The point is that imaginings of that form are typically absent in paradigmatic 
cases of daydreaming. Daydreams are often little more than fleeting images:162 for a 
moment I imagine that I am the Duchess of Cambridge, walking down the aisle – and 
that’s all. This propositional content is quite self-standing. I may, of course, elaborate 
on this, adding a number of other propositions. But the propositions I add are not 
typically the ones that would be needed to practically implement desire-satisfaction. 
This is, in a sense, a privilege of daydreaming: we can wear wonderful dresses without 
having to think about having to try them on beforehand, and enjoy wonderful parties 
without having to think about how to get there on time. And the fact that our patterns 
of imaginings when we daydream do not typically include imaginings whose contents 
specifically indicate how to satisfy our desires is then another reason why daydreams 
do not typically move us to act.163  
So we seem to have found another excusing condition that holds both for 
belief’s and imagination’s lack of behavioural manifestation. Call it the ‘know-how-to-
do-that condition’: both a belief that p and an imagining that p motivate the agent to 
                                                          
162 With ‘images’ here I do not refer to visual imageries, but to scenarios that can be articulated in a 
propositional form. Though of course various kinds of imageries (visual, but also auditory, motor, 
olfactory etc.) can – and, arguably, typically do – accompany and ‘enrich’ the propositional contents of 
our daydreams. The ways in which such imageries are related to propositional imaginings is a fascinating 
topic, which however I am not going to tackle here (for classic discussions, see Williams 1973: Ch. 3; 
Peacocke 1985). 
163 This is why I said that in paradigmatic cases of daydreaming, even if I wanted to act upon my imagining, 
I wouldn’t know where to start. In fact, it is worth noting that this way of putting it may be a bit 
imprecise. In the case of belief, the formation of new beliefs about how to satisfy our desires is often 
triggered precisely by the presence of the desires themselves. For instance, my desire to arrive at the 
ceremony on time prompts me to ‘look’ into my beliefs, searching for those that could be relevant to the 
desire’s satisfaction and drawing from them the due consequences: I believe that the ceremony is at 
12pm, that to get there takes 20 minutes by taxi, that I can arrange for a taxi to arrive here promptly if I 
book it now, etc… Hence, I conclude that I can get to the ceremony on time if I now book a taxi for 11.30am – 
thereby forming a belief that I wouldn’t have formed otherwise. The fact that when I imagine in the 
context of my daydream I typically do not draw this sort of conclusion (i.e. I typically do not form 
imaginings of the form “I can obtain ϕ if I perform action A”) may then be due, in some cases, precisely 
to the presence of an inhibiting meta-desire not to act upon my daydream-imaginings. In cases like these 
it wouldn’t be right to say that even if I wanted to act upon my daydream, I wouldn’t know where to start: 
since if I really wanted (i.e. if my desire to act weren’t inhibited by a stronger contrary desire), I may well 
form the relevant action-related imaginings. And I may also (if nothing else prevents it) actually perform 
the relevant actions. This is confirmed by common experience: when we daydream alone, with no 
particular inhibition, we may find ourselves moving around, or talking to ourselves, acting our 
imaginings out in various ways. When I am alone in my room and imagining the wedding party, I may 
form the imagining that I COULD LEAD THE DANCING IN THIS WAY, and actually move some 
dance steps. That said, I think that there may be also different reasons (not involving meta-desires) why 
in cases of daydreams we typically lack the relevant action-related imaginings (in some cases we may 
simply lack the imaginative capacity to form them). Here I won’t go further into the discussion of such 
possible reasons, and more in general of what motivates us to form some imaginings rather than others. 
I simply limit myself to noting that in many paradigmatic cases of daydreaming we do not have the 
relevant action-related imaginings; this in itself is a condition that excuses the lack of behavioural 
manifestation of our daydreams (and that, all else being equal, would also excuse the lack of behavioural 
manifestation of corresponding beliefs). 
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act in ways that would promote the satisfaction of her desires if: either p is a 
proposition of the form “I can obtain ϕ if I perform action A” (where ϕ is the content 
of one of the agent’s relevant desires), or p is inferentially integrated into a network of 
believed/imagined propositions which includes also propositions of that form.164 If 
this ‘know-how-to-do-that condition’ is not satisfied, this can excuse a lack of 
behavioural manifestation of the belief/imagining in question, without thereby 
compromising the holding of its behavioural disposition.  
This condition highlights the crucial role that the larger network of 
beliefs/imaginings to which a given belief or imagining belongs has in determining its 
behavioural manifestations. In particular, it highlights the fact that whether or not an 
imagining or a belief motivate, and what sorts of actions they motivate, crucially 
depends on the consequences that we (do or do not) draw from them. This is 
important not only to understand why imaginings in cases of daydream do not motivate 
any action at all (while we would expect beliefs with the same contents, against the 
same background of desires, to motivate); but also to understand why in cases where 
imaginings do motivate, the ways in which they motivate look somehow sui generis (i.e. 
different from the ways in which we would expect beliefs with the same contents, 
against the same background of desires, to motivate).  
Take, for example, some of the cases of motivating imaginings discussed in 
Chapter 4. My superstitious grandma, who avoids travelling on Friday the 13th like the 
plague, does not warn me against travelling on that day; even though, I assume, she 
desires for me to be safe as she desires to be safe herself. If she really believed that 
travelling on Friday the 13th is dangerous, then we would expect her to warn me, too, 
against travelling. The reason why her superstitious imagining does not motivate her to 
do that, arguably, is that she does not draw from it the same consequences that she 
would draw from a belief with the same content. If she believed that TRAVELLING 
ON FRIDAY THE 13TH IS OBJECTIVELY DANGEROUS, she would also come to 
believe a number of propositions that obviously follow from the conjunction of this 
belief and the various other beliefs that she plausibly has about dangers, warnings, 
moral duties, etc.. So, she would plausibly come to believe not only that travelling on 
Friday the 13th is dangerous for her (hence that she should avoid travelling that day), but 
also that travelling on Friday the 13th is dangerous for me (hence that I should avoid 
                                                          
164 Importantly, “if” here should not be intended in the sense of a material conditional: the satisfaction 
of the ‘know-how-to-act condition’ is not in itself sufficient to guarantee behavioural manifestation, 
since – as we have seen - other excusing conditions may block it.  
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travelling that day as well, and that if I am not aware of this, then she should warn me). 
These are indeed obvious consequences that follow from the proposition that 
TRAVELLING ON FRIDAY 13TH IS DANGEROUS, and believing that proposition 
would normally commit an agent to believing such consequences. Imagining that 
TRAVELLING ON FRIDAY 13TH IS DANGEROUS, on the other hand, does not 
commit my grandma to imagine all the obvious consequences of this proposition. As 
we have seen in the previous chapters, when we imagine a proposition we are much 
more free to decide what consequences to draw from it, and what consequences to 
ignore, instead. The fact that my grandma’s superstition is an imagining and not a 
belief, then, explains why she only draws from it the obvious consequences concerning 
her own danger, and does not draw from it the equally obvious consequences concerning 
my own danger. This explains why the belief that travelling on Friday 13th is dangerous 
would motivate my grandma both to avoid travelling herself and to warn me against 
doing that; while the imagining that travelling on Friday 13th is dangerous does only 
motivate her not to travel herself, and not to warn me against travelling.165  
As it turns out, the fact that such an imagining and belief (having same contents, 
and operating on the same backgrounds of desires) motivate different actions is not 
due to their having intrinsically different motivating powers; it is rather due to the 
different inferential networks into which they are integrated. Once again, the critical 
difference between imagination and belief can be seen in their respective sensitivity to 
evidence (or to the will) and inferential integration (or lack thereof), rather than in their 
respective dispositional connections to action.  
Cases like this latter one I discussed, anyway, are not typically considered by 
Velleman’s (and my) opponents as counterexamples to the claim that imagination and 
belief have the same motivating power – for the simple reason that our opponents do 
not typically even consider superstitious actions to be imagination-driven. The standard 
counterexamples to the sameness of imagination and belief’s motivating powers, as we 
have seen, are paradigmatic cases of daydream (and fiction consumption). Let’s then 
return to them. 
2.3.3. MY CHALLENGE. I have identified two basic factors that seem to be responsible 
for the fact that in paradigmatic cases of daydreaming an imagining that p will typically 
fail to motivate actions that would promote the satisfaction of the agent’s desires if p 
                                                          
165 But don’t worry: she will keep her fingers crossed for me whilst I travel! 
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were true. First, the presence of ‘inhibiting meta-cognitions’: when I imagine that p in 
the context of a daydream I do also typically (occurrently) believe that I do not really 
believe, but just imagine that p, and I (occurrently) desire not to act upon my 
imagining. Second, the absence of imaginings about the sorts of actions I should 
perform in order to satisfy the relevant desires: daydreams do not typically include 
many propositions of the form “I can obtain ϕ if I perform action A”. As we have 
seen, even just one of these two factors would be enough to also prevent a belief that p 
from motivating in the relevant ways (all else being equal).  
What I argue is that these same factors are also responsible for the lack of 
behavioural manifestation of other paradigmatic cases of imaginings – such as 
imaginings in response to fiction – as well as of all other cases of imaginings I can 
think of.166 I can, of course, think of cases where the lack of behavioural manifestation 
of imaginings is determined by some different factors (e.g. physical inability); but these 
factors are always factors that, all else being equal, would also excuse lack of 
behavioural manifestation of corresponding beliefs. What I can’t think of, indeed, is a 
case in which an imagining that p fails to motivate and this lack of manifestation is not 
excused by a the presence of a factor that would also excuse the lack of behavioural 
manifestation of a belief that p. Can you think of a case like that? Here is my challenge 
to Velleman and my opponents: find a case where an imagining does not motivate 
while, all else being equal, a belief with the same content would. I insist that no such case 
exists. As long as no one comes up with a counterexample, I think I can conclude that 
imagination and belief dispose us to act in the same ways, and do that under the same 
conditions; they may contingently differ with respect to the satisfaction of such 
conditions, but they do not differ in motivating power.167 
                                                          
166 I won’t discuss such other cases in detail here, since I would basically just repeat the strategy just 
employed for daydreaming cases. I think it is not hard to see how my arguments for daydreams apply, 
for example, to fiction. So, to come back to an example introduced in Chapter 2, a competent spectator 
of Psycho (who imagines that a young woman has been murdered in the shower) typically: (1) believes 
that she does not really believe, but just imagines, that a murder has taken place; (2) desires not to act 
upon this imagining; and (3) does not form imaginings about how to act in order to satisfy her story-
related desires (e.g. imaginings like: in order to prevent that killer from killing other people, I should call 
the police). This is why she is not moved to inform the police that a murder has taken place.  
167 Van Leeuwen (2009) is the only one I know who seems to have taken this challenge seriously, 
suggesting a case that in his view would constitute a counterexample to Velleman and my claim (Van 
Leeuwen 2009: 233-234). In fact, I do not think his supposed counterexample is a good one, since – in 
spite of his good effort – Van Leeuwen obviously does not keep everything equal when comparing the 
imagination scenario and the belief one he considers. However, here I would also stress the fact that 
even if someone did actually find a case that constitutes a counterexample to my claim that all else being 
equal imagining and believing p motivate in the same ways, this would not be the end of the world for 
me. I do not need to defend at any cost the strongest thesis that imagination’s and belief’s motivating 
powers are identical: I would be very happy even only to have established that they are very similar, much 
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3. VELLEMAN AND I – AND THE LEGACY OF THE STANDARD VIEW 
“OK” – one may say at this point – “I can’t find the counterexample you ask for, 
hence I concede that imaginings dispose us to act in the same ways and under the same 
conditions as beliefs. However, I find plenty of cases where imaginings fail to satisfy 
these conditions, while beliefs with the same contents meet them; so anyway the fact 
remains that beliefs play a much larger and important motivating role in our lives than 
imaginings do.” 
Velleman grants this. Indeed, this is basically his position: imaginings have the 
same motivating power of beliefs, but they are much less likely to cause actual behaviour 
(Velleman 2000: 272). In his view, this is due notably due to the presence of (what I 
called) ‘inhibiting meta-desires’. He sketches a developmental picture according to 
which imagination’s motivating power is largely manifested during childhood, where 
pretence has a pervasive role in children’s lives; and then is progressively suppressed 
on the way to adulthood, when we acquire an “inhibition against the motivational force 
of unrealistic attitudes... [which] prevents us from manifesting the motivational force 
of wishes and imaginings, so that we tend to act only on desires and beliefs” (Velleman 2000: 
263). In this respect, Velleman seems still quite influenced by the Standard View of 
imagination. Though, as we have seen, he recognizes that imagination motivates also a 
number of non-pretence actions (such as talking to oneself, or symbolic actions…), he 
takes these actions to be overall quite marginal and circumscribed in adult life. The 
basic behavioural manifestation of our imaginings remains as pretence, which has a 
rather limited space in properly developed cognitive systems. 
As I said before, I take Velleman’s focus on pretence to be misplaced. If 
anything, I take it to be somewhat in tension with his project to defend the non-standard 
view that imagination’s motivating power is the same as belief’s. I think this is indeed 
the reason why most critics reject Velleman’s view. Many, myself included, do not even 
grant that pretence is a case where imagination motivates in conjunction with real 
desires as belief does. And even granting that, I can agree with Velleman’s critics that if 
imagination’s motivating power were manifested only, or primarily, in pretence, then the claim that 
this power is the same as belief’s would not sound very plausible. Of course, there is 
nothing intrinsically objectionable in the view that the same disposition is manifested 
in systematically different ways. But on what grounds say this? Rather than postulating 
                                                                                                                                                                  
more similar than they are generally taken to be, and that imagination plays a role almost as crucial as 
that of belief in our cognitive life.  
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a power that is the same as belief’s, but systematically inhibited, why not simply 
recognize a more limited power? Van Leeuwen (2011), for example, suggests that we 
describe imagination’s motivating power in terms of a disposition to act in ways that 
would promote the satisfaction of our desires were the imagined contents true, which 
is manifested if the agent believes that she is in the context of pretence play (and wants to play) 
(Van Leeuwen 2011: 227-229). 
Now, Velleman here may reply that a characterization like this of imagination’s 
motivating power does not allow for the other non-pretence manifestations of such 
power that he pointed out (e.g. expressive/symbolic behaviours) – which, even though 
circumscribed, must anyway be accounted for. But my point is that the reason why 
neither this nor any other attempts to differentiate imagination and belief’s 
dispositional profiles seem to work is that the behavioural manifestations of our 
imaginings are not really that circumscribed: far from being limited to specific contexts 
(such as ‘pretence’ or ‘symbolic ritual’), they are extremely pervasive and intertwined 
with beliefs’ behavioural manifestations in most contexts of everyday life. This is 
indeed what I have argued in Chapter 4, showing how our thinking is permeated by 
‘magical’ elements that motivate actions in all sorts of circumstances. Whether we are 
driving our car, watching a TV match, climbing a mountain, or sitting for an important 
exam, our desires motivate us in conjunction with both beliefs and imaginings at the 
same time, producing behaviours that display at the same time realistic and ‘magical’ 
components (see Chapter 4: § 4.1 for a number of examples). In my view, it is this 
pervasiveness of imagination’s actual behavioural manifestations that constitutes the 
strongest reason in favour of the non-standard view that imagination’s motivating 
potential is on a par with that of belief. So it is this pervasiveness that Velleman would 
need to stress in order to defend his non-standard view from the attacks of his critics.  
Velleman’s problem, in the end, turns out to be this: that he tries to defend a 
non-standard characterization of imagination’s functional profile without resolutely 
abandoning an overall quite standard view of the role that imagination actually plays in 
our cognitive life. That is, he tries to defend a non-standard characterization of 
imagination’s functional profile without really abandoning the idea that imagination’s 
actual explanatory role is basically limited to what I have called the ‘standard 
imaginative explananda’, among which pretence is the only one with a behavioural 
component. What I have tried to show here, on the other hand, is that Velleman’s 
non-standard characterization of imagination’s functional profile can be successfully 
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defended if we recognize – as we should – that the actual motivating role of 
imagination goes far beyond standard cases of children’s pretence and is manifested in 
a number ways across the whole span of our life. It is not true that when we grow up 
imagination’s motivating power is inhibited and its role is confined to daydream and 
fiction’s consumption. In fully developed and well-functioning cognitive systems, 
imagination keeps competing with belief to influence the representation of the world 
and the interactions with it. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Much of the discussion so far has concerned Hume’s problem of how to distinguish 
imagination from belief. Finally, on the basis of what I have argued in this chapter I am 
now in the position to clearly articulate my suggested solution for this problem. This 
will give me the opportunity to wrap up the account of imagination emerged in the 
discussion so far, and draw some conclusions. 
Distinguishing imagination from belief has not proven easy. On the account I 
have been defending, imagination and belief are alike in important respects. They have 
the same sorts of contents: namely, propositions. And their functional roles are more 
similar than they may prima facie seem (and are generally taken) to be. Notably, such 
roles are the same with respect to behavioural, emotional and, to some extent at least, 
also with respect to cognitive outputs. The critical difference between imaginings and 
beliefs has to do with the cognitive inputs responsible for their formation; and – 
somewhat relatedly – with the ways in which they are (or are not) inferentially 
integrated with each other into a holistically coherent system. Let’s briefly review these 
various aspects of the functional roles of imagination and belief as I characterized them 
in my discussion. 
Behavioural outputs. All else being equal, both imagining that p and believing that p 
dispose us to act in ways that would promote the satisfaction of our desires if p were 
true (as I argued in the present Chapter, building on the evidence from Chapters 3-4). 
Emotional outputs. All else being equal, both imagining that p and believing that p 
dispose us to undergo affective/emotional experiences that would be appropriate if p were 
true – experiences which include a peculiar feeling of conviction about p (as I argued 
in Chapter 2168). 
                                                          
168 Here we can finally settle the question concerning the emotions vs. quasi-emotions debate, which I 
left open in Chapter 2: §3.1. As we saw there, philosophers like Walton have questioned whether the 
sorts of experiences produced by our imagining that p may really be the same – genuinely emotional – 
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Cognitive outputs. All else being equal, both when we imagine that p and when we 
believe that p we are somehow disposed to draw theoretical inferences from p, thereby 
coming to imagine/believe various of p’s consequences (as I argued in Chapter 2). 
This last similarity concerning imagination’s and belief’s cognitive outputs, 
however, breaks down fairly soon. Though it is true that both beliefs and imaginings 
can be premises in our theoretical reasoning, the ways in which we draw inferences 
from a given proposition p are not the same irrespective of whether p is believed or 
imagined. Most notably, we seem to be (to some extents at least) free to decide what 
new imaginings to form from a given imagining that p, in ways in which we are not 
with a belief that p. This leads us, finally, to the key functional difference between 
imaginings and beliefs, which (as we have seen in Chapter 3) has to do ultimately with 
the cognitive inputs in response to which they are formed and maintained – and with 
some related normative constraints. 
Cognitive inputs (and inferential integration). Beliefs are formed and maintained in 
response to real-world evidence in ways in which imaginings are not: the formation of 
imaginings can be determined by our will, desires, intentions or, basically, by any sorts 
of evidence-insensitive factors. Among the kinds of evidence to which beliefs, but not 
imaginings, systematically respond, there is also what I called the ‘inferential evidence’ 
constituted by the whole system of the subject’s pre-existing beliefs. This explains why 
beliefs are inferentially integrated with each other into a holistically coherent system, in 
a way in which imaginings are not. These differences at the level of cognitive inputs, as 
we have seen in Chapter 4, have also significant implications for the sorts of normative 
constraints that govern imaginings and beliefs respectively. Beliefs are not only as a 
matter of fact sensitive to evidence to some degree; they are also governed by 
epistemic norms according to which they ought to be so sensitive – norms which do 
not apply to imaginings.169 
                                                                                                                                                                  
sorts of experiences produced by a belief that p, on the grounds of the idea that imagination-driven 
emotional states lack the motivating force of belief-driven emotional states. In considering this question, 
however, I also noted that strictly speaking the motivating force of emotional states piggybacks on the 
motivating force of the cognitive and conative states by which they are produced. Hence, since – as I 
argued – imaginings and beliefs have the same motivating force, we are entitled to say the same of the 
emotional outputs of imaginings and beliefs. Therefore, insofar as a difference in motivating force is the 
reason why advocates of ‘quasi-emotions’ argue that imagination-driven emotions are not, in fact, real 
emotions, we can reject their argument, and conclude that imagination-driven emotional experiences 
count as genuinely emotional. 
169 Here it should be emphasized that, although the difference in cognitive inputs is the only critical one, 
it is a really big one. Belief’s sensitivity to evidence is what makes it (more or less) reliably connected 
with reality: arguably something crucial for our survival in this world. And, as some authors have 
pointed out, this connection between beliefs and reality seems also to be what makes it possible for 
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This is, briefly, the account of imagination and belief’s functional architecture 
that I have been defending in this thesis. It suggests that to solve Hume’s problem we 
should look at how imaginings and beliefs are formed, since once they are formed, 
their powers upon action and reaction are basically the same.  
Where does this account fall with respect to the kinds of folk-psychological 
accounts that I discussed in Chapter 1? Does it presuppose a substantial revision of 
our folk-psychological notions of imagination and belief? 
One may think that it obviously does. After all, this account departs quite a bit 
from the folk-psychological picture of imagination and belief that emerged in Chapter 
3 from an analysis of our common uses of these terms. On that folksy picture, belief 
represents reality accurately, guiding our practical interactions with it; while 
imagination is reality insensitive and motivationally inert (or anyway motivationally very 
weak), and allows us to disengage from reality, escaping into 
fictional/daydreamed/hypothetical worlds. These imaginative escapes need not 
necessarily be just ‘ends in themselves’; they may well be useful tools to get a better 
representation of reality (as when we imagine a possible world with a planet in which 
the liquid that people call ‘water’ is not H2O in order to clarify the essence of water and 
other natural kinds in our, real world).170 But what characterizes them is that imaginings 
as such remain perfectly isolated from our view of the world; they do not feature in our 
appraisal it, nor do they compete with belief to influence our practical interactions with 
it. If imaginings have any motivating power at all, it seems to be limited to children’s 
pretence. 
My account, on the other hand, credits imagination with much stronger 
motivating, cognitive and emotional powers; and with a much larger role in our lives. 
Imagination does not merely allow us to escape from reality into fictional worlds, but it 
plays a key, direct role in our representation of – and practical engagement with – 
                                                                                                                                                                  
mental states in general, including imaginings, to have (wide) content (the suggestion here being, roughly, 
that beliefs can be about the world insofar as they are caused by real-world stimuli; while the other 
propositional attitudes ‘inherit’ their contents from beliefs; on this see e.g. Van Leeuwen 2014: 704; 
Currie and Ravenscroft 2002: 18-19).  
It is also worth noting that that the functional differences here at stake are actually two. First, a 
difference having to do with the inputs responsible for the formation of imaginings and beliefs. Second, 
a difference having to do with the relations that imaginings and beliefs have to each other. As it turns 
out, these differences are strictly related, and in this thesis I have often treated them together, as two 
aspects of one and the same thing – i.e. belief’s sensitivity to evidence. 
170 Note that those two possible functions of our imaginative escapes from reality – i.e. pure 
disengagement vs. epistemic tool for the formation of true/justified beliefs – are not in tension or 
alternative to each other. For example, our imaginative engagement with fictions is typically something 
that we undertake both for the sake of fun and with the hope of gaining important insights into the real 
world (as argued in Currie and Ichino 2015). 
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reality. And indeed many actions and reactions that are commonly called beliefs – such 
as superstitious, magical, ideological (and, as we shall see in the next chapter, also 
religious) ‘beliefs’ – on my view turn out to be better understood in terms of 
imaginings. 
In fact, I would like to add a word of caution here: I think that my departure 
from folk-psychological intuitions may be less dramatic than it may prima facie seem to 
be. For one thing, as I noted in Chapter 1, our common linguistic uses may be 
misleading in various ways. The fact that we commonly use a broad category of belief 
does not necessarily indicate that we do not make any distinctions among the various 
states that we gather under it. On the contrary, in Chapter 4 we have seen that at least 
some of us seem to draw an intuitive distinction between – e.g. – superstitious ‘beliefs’ 
and natural, scientific ones – treating them rather differently. A distinction which, by 
the way, on closer inspection may also emerge in our language: though admittedly 
sometimes we talk indistinguishably of ‘scientific’ or ‘superstitious’ beliefs, in other cases 
we do instead tend to contrast ‘beliefs’ with ‘mere superstitions’. 171 The fact that we do 
not call such superstitious states ‘superstitious imaginings’ may simply be due to the 
fact that we tend to identify imagination with some of its standard exercises – notably 
those having to do with playful or childish activities. Yet, we do somehow recognize 
that the states in question are like belief with respect to action guidance, though 
differently from belief they respond to the will, or to other motivational factors, rather 
than to real-world evidence. Cases like this suggest that we may have room, in our  folk 
psychology, for a mental state like the one that here I have called ‘imagination’. 
I don’t place great weight on this point, though.172 As I said in Chapter 1, 
whether there is anything in our folk-psychological picture of the mind that 
corresponds to what I have called imagination, and whether it actually deserves to be 
called this, is a question that I will eventually leave up to the reader (see above, Ch. 1: 
§3). I do think that the answer to this question is by and large positive: my 
account is revisionary, but just mildly so. However, if you are not comfortable with my 
use of ‘imagination’, you are welcome to provide your own label. What matters to me 
is that you grant the existence of a mental state with the functional role I ascribed to 
imagination. What matters to me is that you grant the existence of a cognitive that state 
that is not formed in response to evidence, but can drive actions (and reactions) in 
                                                          
171 In relation to this, see also next chapter’s discussion of religious (vs. ordinary) uses of “belief” (i.e. see 
below, Ch.6: §3). 
172 "Squabbling about intuitions strikes me as vulgar…” (Fodor 1987: 10). 
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much the same ways in which belief does – and does so in a large range of 
circumstances.173 
To conclude, let me note that imagination as I characterized it is a rather broad 
category. In this sense, too, it is not dissimilar from belief. As there are different sorts 
of evidential inputs in response to which beliefs can be formed (e.g. perceptual, 
testimonial, introspective inputs), corresponding to different sorts of beliefs, so too 
there are different sorts of non-evidential inputs in response to which imaginings can 
be formed, which will correspond to different sorts of imaginings. In this thesis I have 
said very little on this – and on the formation of imaginings more generally. But this is 
a really fascinating issue – which arguably has important implications also for our 
understanding of imagination’s normative dimensions and proper functions. In the 
case of belief, I argued that the epistemic norms which apply to it depend on its having 
an epistemic function: i.e. of its being the product of mechanisms which have the 
function to represent reality accurately. What are the proper functions of the 
mechanisms which produce imaginative representations? Here I have been working 
mostly with the claim that imaginings are not – nor ought to be – formed in response to 
real-world evidence as beliefs are and ought to be. But how are imaginings formed, 
then? And are there any norms in accordance to which they ought to be formed?  
These questions may open an exciting research program, concerned with 
developing a more fine-grained taxonomy of different sorts of imaginings, of their 
proper functions (intended both causally and teleologically) and their related normative 
dimensions. Thus for example we may have aesthetic imaginings, formed in response to 
fictional works of arts, which have fun and recreation as their most proper functions; 
and ‘responsiveness to what the author puts forward as true in the fiction’ as a 
normative constraint to which they ought to obey. Superstitious imaginings, formed in 
                                                          
173 Why does this matter? Why does it matter to get clearer on the functional architecture of the mind? 
Why should we care whether a given cognition qualifies as a belief or imagining? My recent 
collaboration with Lisa Bortolotti’s Project on the Pragmatic and Epistemic Role of Factually Erroneous 
Cognitions and Thoughts (PERFECT) has given me a new perspective on these questions, highlighting 
the significance of my research. A clear understanding of a given cognition’s causal outputs and inputs is 
not only worthwhile in its own right; it is the basis for a proper assessment of its pragmatic and 
epistemic benefits/costs, on the one hand, and for the identification of effective ways to interact with it, 
on the other hand. And this, in turn, leads to a number of important implications. A consequence of my 
non-doxastic account of superstitious (and – as we shall see – religious) cognitions, for instance, is that 
we may enjoy their pragmatic benefits without worrying about their compromising agents’ accurate 
representation of reality. Another is that to challenge such cognitions we won’t appeal (only) to reasons. 
Discussions of these topics on the project blog have encouraged me to think about how such 
considerations can inform psychological therapies and public policies. And, conversely, about how the 
success or failure of different interventions may tell us something about the mental mechanisms in play 
in different cases. All these are questions which I hope to develop in my future research. 
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response to cultural transmission, with the proper function of promoting social 
cohesion; and ‘fidelity to tradition’ as a proper normative constraint. And so on, with 
daydream imaginings (perhaps the most unconstrained?), pretence imaginings, ideological 
imaginings, etc.. 
So far I have tended to emphasize the similarities between these forms of 
imaginings, as opposed to doxastic states. But it would be really interesting also to 
explore the differences between them – and possibly between them and various other 
forms of imaginings that we may find as operating in our view of the world. This is a 
big project, which of course I cannot complete here. However, I shall conclude this 
thesis with something in this spirit, devoting my last chapter to a specific kind of 
imaginings which play a crucial role in human life and culture since very ancient times: 
religious imaginings.174 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                          
174 Some greatly interesting work in line with this project has recently been done by Neil Van Leeuwen 
(see notably Van Leeuwen 2014; and also Van Leeuwen 2009: §5). As I have already said, Van 
Leeuwen’s work would have deserved a larger space in this thesis than I could devote to it; but I hope to 
do that in the future. 
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Chapter 6  
RELIGIOUS (SO-CALLED) BELIEFS AND IMAGINATION 
 
 
 
 
In the previous chapters I have argued that imagination plays a larger role in our 
cognitive life than it has traditionally been taken to play. This role goes far beyond the 
domains of daydreams, fiction, pretence and modal thinking, encompassing also all the 
thoughts and actions that I have gathered in the broad categories of ‘magic’ and 
‘superstition’. I am inclined to think that imagination’s role is actually even larger than 
that: many other thoughts and actions that are commonly understood in terms of 
belief may turn out to be better explained as imaginings, instead. In this chapter I shall 
argue that this is the case with so-called ‘religious beliefs’ (or, at least, with many 
instances of them).  
I see that my claims may look less plausible for religion than for superstition. 
Hopefully my arguments in chapter 4 managed to persuade you that most superstitious 
people do not really believe, and just imagine, that travelling on Friday the 13th is 
dangerous. But if I tell you that most religious people do not really believe, and just 
imagine, that God exists, I’m not so sure you’ll still agree. Religious beliefs, you will 
say, are different, far more serious things: why deny that people really hold them? I 
don’t deny that religious ‘beliefs’ differ from superstitions in important ways – which is 
why I am treating them separately; let alone I deny that religion is a serious thing – 
quite the opposite. But I argue that the relevant differences here are not at the level of 
the attitude: like superstitions, religious attitudes are best understood as kinds of 
imaginings. In §1 I specify what precisely I refer to by the label religious beliefs, and what 
types of religious ‘beliefs’ I am mostly concerned with. In §2 I review some key 
features of belief and consider why religious attitudes are commonly taken to display 
such features. In § 3 I argue that, on closer inspection, religious attitudes do not display 
such features, and are rather better understood as kinds of imaginings. In §4 I develop 
and defend this view, considering two possible ways to interpret religious ‘believers’’ 
sincere avowals, and two corresponding forms in which religious imaginings typically 
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come. I conclude with the speculative suggestion that religious propositions are more 
apt to be imagined than to be believed.175 
 
1. SO-CALLED “RELIGIOUS BELIEFS” 
My aim here is to gain a better understanding of those kinds of mental states that 
people commonly avow and ascribe to each other as “religious beliefs”. I take it that 
what identifies these states as such is their peculiar content: the non-controversial 
feature shared by all religious (so-called) beliefs is indeed that of having a religious 
content. My notion of ‘religious content’ is fairly broad: it includes any propositional 
content concerning entities or situations that are, not just metaphorically or 
symbolically, somehow transcendent, not fully explainable in natural terms, and purely 
spiritual – provided that the content in question is part of a set of contents (i.e. of 
propositions) at least one of which makes reference to some sort of God/Gods.176 The 
kind of attitude by which such a content is entertained, on the other hand, seems much 
more questionable, and anyway variable. Philosophers, psychologists and 
anthropologists interested in different aspects of religion typically assume that it is an 
attitude of belief – and what I am going to do here is to question this common 
assumption.177 I do not say that religious propositional contents cannot be genuinely 
                                                          
175 This view has important implications for our understanding of the rationality of religious cognition, 
which will emerge along my discussion. Note that, on the other hand, my view has no (straightforward) 
implications for the ontological question of God’s existence. What I discuss are people’s attitudes 
towards God’s existence, not God’s existence itself. My thesis that so-called religious beliefs are in fact 
imaginings does not exclude the possibility that the propositional contents of such imaginings are true. 
176Typically, but not necessarily, the God/Gods of an established religious tradition. This is a rather 
broad characterization of religious contents; but the reference to God/Gods is enough to set religious 
‘beliefs’ apart from other sorts of supernatural thoughts like superstitions. On this view, indeed, generic 
‘beliefs’ in hidden supernatural forces/entities such as ghosts or spirits do not in themselves count as 
‘religious’ unless they are linked to other ‘beliefs’ concerning some kind of god (e.g., unless ghosts are 
considered to be the souls of the departed who have not been welcome by God in paradise). Nor on the 
other hand, would count as ‘religious’ a belief concerning just the ideals of love and altruism expressed 
by Jesus in the Gospel, with no essential commitment to transcendent truths (e.g. Jesus is God’s son), 
even if of course such a belief might be strictly related to a system of proper religious ones. In sum, here 
I am characterizing religious ‘beliefs’ as attitudes (of whatever kind) towards propositions that: (i) refer 
to something supernatural/transcendent and (ii) belong to a set of propositions at least one of which 
refers to some sort of god. ‘Beliefs’ in ghosts fail to meet (ii); beliefs in immanent ideals such as love and 
altruism fail to meet (i). 
177 To be fair, in philosophy of religion there are extensive debates on the nature of faith and the mental 
attitudes it involves. Many agree that it is not reducible to propositional belief, but involves has also 
affective and conative components (cf. Bishop 2010 for a review of the relevant literature). More in 
general, I think that few would argue that an exhaustive description of the inner life of religious people 
can be traced back to propositional belief. My point is just that it is not generally questioned that among 
the mental states of religious people there are also authentic propositional beliefs – i.e. that most 
religious people really believe propositions such as GOD EXISTS. A notable exception to this is 
constituted by a recent great paper by Neil Van Leeuwen (2014), which defends a view a view very 
similar to the view I shall defend here. Van Leeuwen’s view and mine are very similar in particular with 
respect to the negative claim that religious attitudes are not genuine belies. While there are some 
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believed, nor that as a matter of fact they are never believed; but just that in many cases 
where we take them to be believed, they actually are imagined.  
The cases I am going to discuss concern primarily religious attitudes of members 
of our contemporary Western society, normally educated, sensitive, and intelligent. I 
will consider notably Christian people, whose fundamental religious ‘beliefs’ are related 
to the idea that there is one God who created the Universe and everything in it, and 
that Jesus of Nazareth is his son, who died and was resurrected for us. This Christian 
God is conceived as an immaterial omnipotent being with important psychological 
properties – such as omniscience and infinite goodness. Actually, I do think that most 
of my claims could be extended to other religions, epochs and cultures, as the cognitive 
underpinnings of religion are likely to display some nearly universal features. But I 
won’t commit myself to this broader view here, since the empirical evidence I have 
considered so far is mostly restricted to the contemporary, Western, Christian religious 
‘believers’ I mentioned.178 Unless otherwise specified, what I say should then be 
intended as restricted to them– even when, for the ease of exposition, I will make 
apparently unqualified claims about religious people/attitudes. Again for ease of 
exposition, I will sometimes use the expression “religious beliefs” – omitting to specify 
that they are just supposed beliefs.179 Henceforth, the expression “religious beliefs” should 
be intended as label indicating those propositional attitudes (whatever they are) 
towards the kind of religious contents I described, which are commonly avowed by (or 
ascribed to) religious people. 
2. DOXASTIC REASONS 
Here are three important reasons why religious attitudes look so much as authentic 
beliefs, or anyway much closer to authentic beliefs than superstitions.  
                                                                                                                                                                  
differences between our positive suggestions about how to best characterize religious attitudes in non-
doxastic terms. I appeal to imagination; Van Leeuwen argues that we need to recognize a distinctive 
cognitive category that he calls ‘religious credence’. I think that this difference between us is not merely 
terminological; though our positions are anyway quite close to each other. Unfortunately I couldn’t 
include a discussion of Van Leeuwen’s view in this chapter, as it came out too late for that. Recently Van 
Leeuwen and I had a very interesting exchange on these issues in a series of posts on the Imperfect 
Cognition Blog of Project Perfect. You can find my last reply to him – as well as the previous thread – 
here: http://imperfectcognitions.blogspot.co.uk/2015/01/imagination-is-not-just-for-fakers.html.  
178 I will refer in particular to some recent studies in psychology and cognitive anthropology. I will also 
draw on analysis of ordinary language in religious contexts (including Catholic Catechism and literature 
from theological studies / philosophy of religion). Empirical research in the cognitive sciences of 
religion has been growing fast in the last decades, and lots of relevant cross-cultural data are now 
available, which open interesting new scenarios of research. 
179 When I will do that, I will use scare quotes to indicate that what I am referring to is just a so-called 
‘belief’. 
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1) Sensitivity to evidence. Religious ‘beliefs’ are not indifferent to evidence as 
superstitions seem to be. Religious people justify their ‘beliefs’ by appeal to evidence 
from at least two sources. First, a (kind of) testimonial evidence from the sacred 
tradition: such things as sacred texts, catechism, or also documents on lives and 
miracles of saints are often pointed out as tangible signs of god’s existence. Second, 
religious people often appeal to a (quasi-)perceptual evidence from peculiar spiritual 
experiences: many religious people take their ‘beliefs’ to be supported by special 
experiences they have lived through, such as the overwhelming feeling of God’s 
disembodied presence, a mystic communion with other souls, or even spiritual 
encounters with the person of Jesus Christ (see Kierkegaard 1844). Both these kinds of 
evidence are hard to find in support of superstitions. 
2) Holistic coherence. Religious ‘beliefs’ display a kind of holistic coherence that 
cannot be equally seen in superstitions. Not only religious ‘beliefs’ form a pretty wide 
internally coherent system; but they also seem to be quite well-integrated with subjects’ 
other earthly beliefs, at least insofar as they attempt to make sense of such other 
beliefs, framing them into a globally coherent picture of the world. If a superstition like 
that concerning Friday the 13th is at odds with some basic physic laws that any 
normally educated person recognizes as valid (i.e. space/time homogeneity), the 
religious ‘belief’ that our world has been created by an intelligent God might be taken 
to account for everything that happens in this world, physical laws included.  
In the previous chapters I have argued that sensitivity to evidence and holistic 
coherence are key features of belief – not only necessary, but also sufficient to set it 
apart from imagination. Insofar as that is true, (1) and (2) look as powerful – if not 
conclusive – reasons to qualify religious attitudes as beliefs. There is also a third reason 
to do that, having to do with a feature of belief which – even if not constitutive in the 
sense just specified – plays a crucial role in our practices of belief ascription: typically, a 
subject who believes that p does also believe that she believes that p and is disposed to 
manifest that belief in her sincere avowals.  
3) Sincere avowals. This seems to be the most straightforward reason why we credit 
religious people with authentic beliefs: they earnestly avow such beliefs. While, as we 
have seen in Chapter 4, superstitious people are often reluctant to admit their 
superstitious thoughts (in public, but even to themselves), religious people are eager to 
avow their ‘beliefs’. Religious ‘beliefs’ are expressed much more frequently and with 
greater conviction than superstitions; actually, more frequently and vehemently than 
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any other ordinary belief. In ordinary talk, we often omit explicit expressions of belief 
towards our own assertions. In religious contexts, on the contrary, people tend to 
make their attitude of ‘belief’ explicit, and with a particular emphasis: assertions like “I 
believe that God is listening to me” are (quite emphatically) uttered much more often 
than corresponding assertions as “God is listening to me”. And the public profession 
of the Credo (‘I believe’) is indeed an essential part of Catholic mass.  
Since we generally have no reason to take such public avowals to be insincere – 
and given the reasons presented in (1) and (2) above – it seems after all quite 
reasonable to credit religious people with authentic religious beliefs.180 However, I will 
argue that, in spite of the apparent reasonableness, we shouldn’t do that. 
3. ANTI-DOXASTIC REASONS 
While surely agreeing that reasons (1)-(3) just discussed point out important differences 
between religious ‘beliefs’ and superstitions, I argue that these differences do not lie at 
the level of the attitude as they are purported to do: reasons (1)-(3) are not good 
reasons to think that religious attitudes, differently from superstitious attitudes, are 
genuine beliefs. Vice versa, on closer inspection, the features of the religious attitude 
that these three reasons highlight turn out to be much better understood if we qualify 
this attitude as imagining. In what follows I shall defend this view, overturning (1)-(3) 
in three opposite anti-doxastic reasons.  
1*) Religious ‘beliefs’ are not really sensitive to evidence as they prima facie seem 
to be. For a propositional attitude to be sensitive to evidence, the subject to which we 
ascribe that attitude must display some degree of openness to revise or reject the 
relevant proposition – even if her revisions’ criteria are far from perfectly rational. 
Religious ‘beliefs’ do not seem to display even a minimal degree of such sensitivity. 
They are related to evidence just in the sense that religious people appeal to some 
evidence to justify them; but the evidence which is appealed to seems to be available 
only to corroborate, and never to revise/falsify, religious propositions. Appealing to 
evidence is not the same as being sensitive to it. This applies to both the kinds of 
evidence mentioned above: evidence from the Sacred tradition, as well as evidence 
from inner experiences. Sacred texts are not really read with the critical (even 
minimally critical) eye with which people read other non-fictional texts. There doesn’t 
                                                          
180 There are arguably other reasons why religious beliefs look so much as authentic beliefs (e.g. reasons 
having to do with the strong support they get from well-established traditions). Here I have selected 
these ones because they are the most critical for an assessment of their doxastic status. 
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seem to be any piece of independent evidence that could persuade a religious reader to 
reject the biblical claim that God created human kind in his image. And something 
similar is true, mutatis mutandis, for to the evidence from inner experience. In fact, here 
it is not even clear how precisely the evidential relation between the content of such 
experiences and the propositions describing God is supposed to work. How is it that 
the (presumably non-conceptual) content of such idiosyncratic experiences supports 
propositions concerning the existence of an eternal omnipotent God, rather than, say, 
propositions concerning a temporal and finitely powerful being? (Rey 2009: 10 raises a 
similar question) And anyway it seems clear that, however it works, this is always a 
relation of corroboration/confirmation: the experiences in question provide evidence 
that strengthens, and (almost) never weakens or discards, the relevant religious 
attitudes. Conversions based on mystic experiences go typically in one and the same 
direction: from atheism to religion; while, apparently the fading of inner feelings is not 
among the reasons that people mention to explain their abandonment of previous 
religious ‘beliefs’. Empirical studies on religious disaffiliation show that subjects 
typically provide a rather different sorts of reasons – appealing to factors such as 
maturation (“When I grew up and started making decisions of my own, I stopped 
going to Church”), practical contingencies (“I moved to a different community and 
never got involved in a new church”), or personal conflicts with other members of the 
Church – most often with a religious leader (see Roozen 1980; Albrecht and Bahr 
1983; Sauvayre 2011). These are not really the sort of evidence-sensitive factors that 
seem to be required for belief formation/maintenance/extinguishment.  
Note that the distinction I am making here between sensitivity and appeals to 
evidence is not just a matter of degree. Of course, sensitivity to evidence does come in 
degrees. And the rich empirical literature on confirmation bias strongly suggests that the 
sensitivity of most ordinary beliefs is much lower than one would expect from a 
perfectly rational subject. But my point is not that religious attitudes’ sensitivity to 
evidence is too low – even lower than the already low average – in order for them to 
count as beliefs. What I am suggesting is that generally their relation to evidence is of a 
rather different kind, which parallels very closely that of paradigmatic instances of imaginings. The 
religious attitude towards a proposition like GOD IS GOOD AND HIS LOVE 
ENDURES FOREVER (Psalm 100) is not ‘very resistant to counterevidence’, but 
seems to depend on factors other than evidence. Notably, it seems to be in important 
respects subject to the will: the commitment to the idea of a loving God is often 
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described as ‘a matter of choice’, a conscious decision (or a ‘bet’): something springing 
primarily from inner motivation. Not that religious ‘beliefs’ are always the outcome of 
an intentional deliberation (people sometimes say that after certain experiences – such 
as an unexpected recovery – they couldn’t help but believe in God). But nor do 
imagining, which can similarly ‘come to our mind’ without our previous decision, and 
even against our will. What matters is that, once imaginings and religious ‘beliefs’ are 
present to our mind, we can, as it were, decide what to do with them.  
And, importantly, there does not seem to be anything wrong with that. Like 
imaginings, religious attitudes do not seem to be regulated by the same normative 
constraints that govern belief. While the tendency to confirmation biases is obviously a 
fault of ordinary beliefs, the firmness and steadiness of religious ‘beliefs’ can be – and 
often is – seen as a virtue.181  
2*) The supposed holistic coherence of religious ‘beliefs’ is also highly dubious. We 
can often detect incoherencies internal to individual sets of religious ‘beliefs’ (e.g.: the 
same subject believing that God is omnipotent and that God cannot prevent natural 
disasters). Most importantly, there seem to be many external incoherencies between 
religious and natural beliefs. Many religious views seem to contradict widely accepted 
scientific views, as well as other beliefs that play crucial roles in our view of the 
world.182 To be clear, the problem here is not that religious people hold beliefs that a 
careful analysis reveals to be inconsistent: admittedly, this happens quite frequently also 
in the sets of our ordinary beliefs.183 In fact, it is not even obvious whether the 
religious and scientific ‘beliefs’ in question actually are inconsistent: the question 
whether there might be ways to reconcile them is a hard and highly controversial one, 
that goes far beyond the scope of my discussion here.184 What matters here is the fact 
that, rightly or wrongly, religious people themselves do often see and openly recognize 
tensions among their religious and natural beliefs; but do not drop any of the views 
                                                          
181 Think for example of Tertullian’s proud motto Credo quia absurdum (“I believe because it is absurd”); 
or of Karl Barth’s celebration of the decision of faith (Barth 1964: Ch.2). Failures of recognizing these 
normative differences between religious and ordinary beliefs lead to positions such as those of so-called 
“Brights”, according to which religious people do not have a rational view of the world, and base their 
reasoning on bad science or logical fallacies (http://www.the-brights.net/ ; see e.g. Dawkins 2006; 
Dennett 2003). Similar positions in my view misunderstand some basic aspects of the phenomenon 
religion.  
182 E.g. ‘beliefs’ in the ‘creation from nothing’ vs. beliefs in physical principles of conservation; ‘belief’ 
that humans are designed by God vs. belief that humans are the product of natural selection. 
183 As I noted in Chapter 3, psychological literature on human reasoning shows how prone we are to 
systematic mistakes in deductive and probabilistic thinking (see above, Ch.3: §1.1). 
184 On this, see the current live between Plantinga and Dennett; Plantinga argues that many alleged 
contradictions between religion and science (e.g. creationism vs. evolutionism) are not really such 
(Dennett and Plantinga 2011). 
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from which such tensions arise, nor indeed seem to feel a pressure to do that. Think 
for example of common views about death and afterlife, where religious and natural 
explanations pull in opposite directions. A number of studies in psychology and 
cognitive anthropology confirm that religious people hold ‘in parallel’ two opposite 
views of death: the ‘natural view’ that death implies the total cessation of any physical 
and mental process, and the ‘supernatural view’ that death is a transition after which our 
disembodied minds/souls continue a conscious existence. The natural view is generally 
acquired first (a proper understanding of the idea of an afterlife emerges around 
six/seven years old); but it is not subsequently abandoned. The newly acquired 
supernatural view does not displace the natural view, nor influence it in any respect; it 
simply coexist alongside it. Religious and natural reasoning on this topic do not interact 
(Astuti and Harris 2008; Harris 2012: Ch.9185). 
The same seems to happen with all religious ideas, since the first moment when 
they are acquired. Children’s developing beliefs about various kinds of natural causal 
relations (e.g. relations between their mind and other minds or between the mind and 
the physical world) are not affected by their simultaneous acquirement of religious 
ideas about supernatural relations (e.g. relations between and God and humanity, or 
God and angels). Around three/four years old, when children become aware of the 
fact that other minds and the physical world cannot be modified by thought alone, 
those educated in religious families are also introduced to the idea of silent inner 
prayer. Even though the power of silent prayer presupposes mechanisms that run 
against the natural mechanisms of mental-mental or mental-physical causation that 
children are mastering, their developing understanding of those natural relations is not 
compromised. Children do not make deductions from the idea that inner mental 
prayers can be heard and answered: for example, they do not come to think that, since 
prayer can be effective, so it is possible that also silent wishes on falling stars are 
effective. On the contrary, their confidence in the efficacy of wishes quickly decreases 
between four and six years, and by the age of six very few children display it; while 
‘belief’ in the efficacy of prayer follows the opposite trend, and at the age of six about 
all children who have received a religious education declare that prayers can be 
answered (See Wolley 2000; Harris and Koenig 2006). 
Psychologists explain this and other similar findings with the very same notion 
of ‘quarantining’ by which they characterize the imaginative attitude: the idea is that, 
                                                          
185 See notably Astuti and Harris’ studies on Spanish Catholic and Mexican Vezo communities. 
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similarly to what they do with ‘imaginary beliefs’ about fictional stories, children 
segregate their religious ‘beliefs’, preventing them from influencing their understanding 
of real world’s mechanisms. One question here is how children come to understand 
that they should keep this ‘quarantined attitude’ towards religious beliefs, 
notwithstanding that, differently from fictional stories, religious matters are presented 
utterly seriously, just as real beliefs. This leads me to my next point, concerning 
religious people’s sincere avowals of belief. 
3*) Reason (3) presented above makes appeal to what we can call a ‘principle of 
first person authority’, which credits people with a reliable knowledge of themselves, 
and consider their self-reports as ‘true by default’: i.e. true until proof to the contrary. 
If acceptance should be our default attitude towards people’s self-reports, surely it 
should be our attitude towards their religious self-reports, which are expressed with a 
particular emphasis and conviction. So we should credit religious people with genuine 
religious beliefs. This was, roughly, the point of reason (3) above. But it is not so 
obvious that applying the principle of first person authority to religious believers’ 
avowals leads to the conclusion that their religious attitudes are genuine beliefs. That 
principle does not prescribe unconditional acceptance of people’s self-reports; it 
prescribes, as I have just noted, acceptance until proof to the contrary. And, arguably, 
reasons (1*) and (2*) just discussed do constitute proofs to the contrary in the case of 
religious people: religious people’s emphatic avowals are controverted by the 
insensitivity to evidence and inferential isolation of their supposed ‘beliefs’.  
Actually, the characteristic emphasis with which religious beliefs are avowed – 
and indeed the very fact that they are avowed more often and eagerly than beliefs on 
other mundane matters, may even provide further proof against their doxastic status. 
This is indeed one of the hypotheses that have been suggested to explain how children 
come to quarantine the religious ‘beliefs’ that they acquire from adult’s testimony. 
Considering testimonies about entities that they cannot experience by first-hand 
observation, children use what psychologists call the ‘presupposition metric’ (see e.g. 
Harris 2012: Ch.8): depending on whether the existence of such entities is 
unreflectively presupposed or vice versa ostentatiously affirmed, they draw different 
conclusions about the sort of attitude that their informants bear towards the entities in 
question. Compare for examples the testimonies that children hear about invisible 
entities like germs and oxygen with those they hear about invisible religious entities like 
God. Children will typically learn about germs or oxygen from adults’ remarks that take 
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the existence of these entities for granted, without making it explicit. They will often 
hear remarks as: “Wash your hands, which are full of germs!”, or “Anyone needs 
oxygen to breathe”; but very rarely explicit assertions such as: “There really exist germ, 
and they can hurt us”, or “I believe in oxygen”. On the other hand, children will often 
hear such explicit assertions about God (for example, each time they go to church 
services), as well as about fictional characters like Santa Claus: “I believe in God!”; 
“Trust me: Santa really exist!”. Hence, children will come to the conclusion that God’s 
existence is not considered by adults in the same way in which oxygen’s existence is 
considered. And they will do the same, keeping God and Santa Claus apart from their 
real-world beliefs.186 
Arguably, there are also other linguistic differences that children’s sensitive 
antennae might capture. There are some striking differences between our uses of 
“belief” in religious and ordinary contexts, which seem to reveal substantial differences 
in the underlying mental attitudes. While in ordinary contexts “I believe” weakens our 
assertions, in religious contexts it typically has an opposite, intensifying role. Compare: 
“I believe they never met before” vs. “I believe that God will listen to my prayers!”. In 
the former case, “I believe” expresses an attitude which is open to corrections (“as far 
as I know, they never met... But I might be wrong”); in the latter, it expresses a strong 
conviction, based on self-sufficient inner trust which doesn’t need further confirmation 
(“I think so... And that’s all!”). 
Another obvious difference between religious and ordinary talk of “belief” 
(which corresponds, somewhat, to the one just mentioned) has to do with the use of 
“believe in” vs. “believe that”. Actually, we do happen to use “believe in” also in non-
religious contexts – e.g. for encouragements such as: “you can do that, I believe in you!”. 
However, this is precisely because in similar cases – as in most cases of religious 
avowals – we do not use “believe” to express our opinion on how we deem things 
actually to be, but rather to express something different, which can be an exhortation, 
                                                          
186A related possibility that psychologists point out is that children use a ‘consensus metric’, registering 
the degree of expressed consensus concerning the existence of the invisible entities they are told about. 
Since the consensus about God’s existence is not at all universal, they are more circumspect in taking 
this existence for true and drawing inferences from that. It is also possible that children notice the 
inconsistencies between the religious and the earthly testimonies they are given and, realizing that the 
circle of ordinary beliefs where the earthly testimonies come from is much bigger than the circle of 
religious ‘beliefs’ where religious testimonies come from, they make a difference between them, treating 
the religious ‘beliefs’ more as particular stories than as real, universal truths. These seem all plausible 
hypotheses that can explain, or concur to explain, how children come to quarantine their religious beliefs 
from all their other beliefs. See Harris and Koenig (2006); Harris (2012): Ch.8; Harris and Corriveau 
(2014).  
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an assurance, a hope, a wishful hypothesis; but not really an evidence-grounded 
judgement.  
As it turns out, then, sincere avowals of religious ‘beliefs’ are not only in 
themselves insufficient to credit people with genuine religious beliefs, such avowals may 
even provide positive reasons not to do so, suggesting that we ascribe a different sort 
of attitude instead. My reasons (1*) and (2*), in turn, suggest that this attitude has 
much in common with paradigmatic instances of imaginings. In the next section I shall 
better develop and defend this suggestion.  
4. RELIGIOUS IMAGININGS 
The picture that has emerged from my considerations so far reveals some striking 
functional similarities between the religious attitude and imagination. In particular, 
similarities concerning the cognitive inputs in response to which religious attitudes and 
imaginings are typically formed, and concerning the sort of inferential relations that 
they typically have with each other and with the whole system of religious subjects’ 
beliefs. Religious attitudes display the same sort of sensitivity (or insensitivity, or 
selective sensitivity) to such factors as will, inner feelings, and inferential reasons that 
imaginings typically display. Here I haven’t said much about religious attitudes’ 
characteristic phenomenology; nor about the various (ritual and non-ritual) actions that 
such attitudes typically motivate. But though these are surely important and interesting 
dimensions of the religious attitude, I do not take them to be critical to assess its 
doxastic/non-doxastic status – since on my account beliefs and imaginings do not 
critically differ neither in emotional nor in behavioural outputs.  
However, there is an output factor that raises some problems for my suggestion 
that religious attitudes are imaginings: the characteristic verbal actions motivated by 
religious ‘beliefs’, which I discussed in (3*) above. As I have portrayed it, the case of 
religious ‘believers’ is a case where people avow something that in fact they do not 
really believe, but just imagine. In order for my suggestion to be plausible, I should 
explain why religious people make such avowals.  
To begin, I would like to emphasize the fact that so far I have been assuming 
that religious avowals are sincere. This is not an assumption I really want to question; at 
least, not for the vast majority of cases. Of course, there may be some cases of 
hypocrisy – like those described in Dan Dennett and Linda La Scola’s recent book 
Caught in the Pulpit. Leaving Belief Behind (Dennett and La Scola 2013). The book, based 
on Dennett and La Scola’s ongoing research, tells a number of stories of “men and 
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women who entered the pulpit with the best intentions, and have come to recognize 
that they no longer hold the beliefs they parishioners think they do”; yet “still have a 
congregation awaiting for them each Sabbath, trusting them to speak the truth from 
the pulpit” (Dennett and La Scola 2013: 1). In fact, the authors themselves admit that 
the dimension of this phenomenon is far from clear: the pilot study discussed in the 
book, which is all the evidence available at this stage, is based on a sample of thirty-five 
subjects. And anyway, no matters how widespread hypocrisy may be among clerics, I 
would not say that it is the norm, and even not that it is particularly frequent, among 
common secular ‘believers’. If I can see some reasons – such as social pressure or 
financial worries – why a priest with an established position in her community may be 
moved to make insincere avowals of religious belief, I do not think these are reasons 
that plausibly hold for the majority of the members in such community.187 
4.1. TWO FORMS OF RELIGIOUS IMAGININGS 
Ruling out the hypothesis that they are insincere, I would then suggest that religious 
people’s avowals of beliefs can be explained in two different ways, which correspond 
to two different meanings we may attribute to such avowals. On the one hand, we 
could take them literally, as genuine expressions of authentic beliefs, thus assuming 
that religious people have faulty self-knowledge (that is: we could explain religious 
beliefs avowals in terms of meta-cognitive mistakes). On the other hand, we could think 
that religious beliefs’ avowals are uttered with the intention of communicating 
something different from their literal meaning; if so, they would not necessarily come 
from a fault in self-knowledge, and indeed what I argue is that in similar cases they 
would be conscious expressions of (a kind of) imaginative attitude. These two different 
explanations correspond to two forms in which religious imaginings typically come. 
Let’s briefly consider both of them.188  
4.1.1. META-COGNITIVE MISTAKES: RELIGIOUS ‘BELIEFS’ AS UNRECOGNIZED 
IMAGININGS. It seems plausible that, at least in some cases, religious people’s avowals 
                                                          
187 Nor, indeed, I think Dennett and La Scola would suggest that hypocrisy is the norm. After all, as we 
have seen, they say that their unbelieving-clergies have “a congregation awaiting for them each Sabbath, 
trusting them to speak the truth from the pulpit”. The disagreement between these authors and I has to 
do with how we understand the religious attitude of the typical members of such congregations. Dennett 
and La Scola take such attitudes to be false, irrational beliefs (although, interestingly, note that in this 
passage they talk in terms of trust!). I have argued that they are better understood as imaginings. But I 
should still explain why, then, such attitudes are avowed as beliefs.  
188 Here I limit myself to put these forward as plausible hypotheses to explain many instances of religious 
people’s avowal of belief. Arguably, they are both empirically testable in various ways; though admittedly 
here I do not provide much empirical evidence in their favour.  
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of beliefs are precisely what they seem to be: sincere assertions of genuine beliefs. That 
is, with their avowals, sometimes religious people really intend to communicate their 
beliefs about God, in the same way in which they intend to communicate their beliefs 
about other things when they avow to believe those things. Since we have seen that 
there are more compelling reasons to think that religious people do not really believe, 
but merely imagine, the contents of their avowals, then we should conclude that such 
avowals are due to a fault in self-knowledge: a mistaken beliefs about their own beliefs. 
Roughly, what may happen in such cases is that some other powerful mental state – 
such as fear of death, or a desire for meaning, or even just a desire for social solidarity 
– blurs religious people’s view of their minds, and in particular shut out their awareness 
that God’s existence is purely imagined, while leading them to believe that they really believe 
in it. Importantly, notice that these cases are different from Dennett’s cases of 
hypocrisy: here the relevant non-doxastic factors (such as emotions, or social pressure 
that are causally responsible for beliefs’ avowal are not clearly recognized as such by 
religious ‘believers’. This arguably involves some irrationality on their part; but no 
insincerity (and by the way, as I noticed in previous chapters, that is a sort of 
irrationality not uncommon in cognitively normal population).  
Anyway, I do not think this is the best explanation for most cases of religious 
beliefs avowals.  
4.1.2. NON-LITERAL SPEAKING: RELIGIOUS ‘BELIEFS’ AS TRUSTING IMAGININGS. I do 
not think that religious people’s avowals of beliefs generally come from a mistaken 
view of their own minds. On the contrary, religious people are generally aware of the 
peculiarity of their attitudes towards God’s existence and other religious (supposed) 
facts. They see that they do not take such facts in the same way they take many other 
facts in their ordinary lives, since ‘believing’ in God is something they somehow decide 
to do, while other ordinary, earthly beliefs are things that, so to say, force themselves in 
their minds. Hence, they also realize that they cannot properly believe that God exists, 
but they can at most imagine it, trying to give to this imagining the serious form of an 
hypothesis through which to read the world. The point, then, is to explain why 
religious people, even being aware that their attitude is not really belief, do persist in so 
calling it belief, instead of choosing a more precise term. Here we should recall first of 
all that a basic feature of belief is the fact to be ‘negation incomplete’: there are 
propositions that a subject neither believes nor disbelieves (see above, Ch.4: §3.2). The 
fact that religious ‘believers’ do not really believe that God exists, does not imply that 
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they believe that God does not exist. Lacking a definite belief on whether God exists or 
not, religious ‘believers’ have something like an inclination (perhaps due to some 
related spiritual experience), or a preference (perhaps due to need of 
meaning/metaphysical answers, or even just to a calculus à la Pascal) for the view that 
He/She exists.189 Their penchant for this view makes religious people very willing to 
enjoy (at least some of) the imaginings which represent it, and to give to these 
imaginings a great role in their lives, since this represents the best possible 
approximation to the experience they would have if that view were indeed true. Thus, 
they imagine that God exists and that they believe so, i.e. they make-believe that God 
exists. In many cases, in order to make-believe at best that p is the case, one should 
behave as much as possible as if she believed that p (see Walton 1990: Part IV); hence 
she should also avow to believe so. That is why religious people do often avow to 
believe that God exists: if, on the contrary, they avowed to (merely) imagine that God 
exists, this would damage their participation in the quasi-experience of God existence. 
But in doing this they do not merely pretend to avow an attitude of belief; ì by means 
of such a little pretence they also seriously avow a different attitude. They avow an 
attitude of faith, which, in turn, could be seen as a decision to give space in their lives to 
an imagining: an imagining that is not taken as mere fiction, but rather as serious and 
fruitful hypotheses by which looking at – and making sense of – the world.  
As I said, I am inclined to think that this latter, more mindful, form in which 
religious imaginings may come is more common than the first, ‘unrecognized’ form I 
described. Though it is of course possible for the latter to harden into the first. 
4.2. RELIGIOUS CONTENTS AND IMAGINATIVE CONTENTS 
I would like to conclude with a very speculative suggestion in favour of the view that 
so-called religious beliefs are best seen as imaginings, based on the consideration of the 
kinds of contents that they typically display. I am aware that this may sound weird. 
Conforming to the dominant view in the contemporary debate, in this thesis I have 
repeatedly said that propositional imagination and belief have the same sort of 
contents, and only differ in functional roles. If there is no feature pertaining just to 
content that can distinguish imaginings from beliefs, of course I cannot plausibly 
                                                          
189 George Rey argues that most religious people definitely believe that God does not exist, and are self-
deceived. I find this implausible. As I have it, religious people always believe that it is possible, or even 
probable, that God exists. These beliefs, even if logically consistent with the belief that God exists, are 
not ‘pragmatically consistent’ with it: generally, if I believe that x is probably true I do not at the same 
time believe that x is true. On the other hand, the belief that x is probable fits well with the imagining 
that x is the case.  
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appeal to some feature pertaining to the content of so-called religious beliefs in order 
to argue that they are, instead, imaginings. And indeed in §1 above I explicitly 
recognized that, though I take religious contents to be most often imagined, I allow 
that the very same contents can also be believed. Without denying any of this, 
however, I am going to argue that there are some kinds of propositional contents that 
are much more likely to be imagined than to be believed; and that religious beliefs do 
often have contents of those kinds. 
Imaginative contents often display some peculiar features that we do not so 
commonly find in belief’s contents. One is a high degree of ‘narrativity’.190 Narrativity 
is a property that representations can possess to various degrees. Typically, highly 
narrative representations are stories, which represent particular events connected by 
temporal and causal relations, where intentional agents usually play a prominent role. If 
we can draw an intuitive distinction between stories and – for example – theories, this is 
at least partly because theories represent just general, abstract principles, which are 
often causally, but not chronologically, related to each other. This difference can be 
described by saying that theories are not narrative in kind (or that they display a very 
low degree of narrativity). Now, narrativity in itself is not peculiar to imaginative 
contents. In our lives we deal also with many non-fictional narratives. But I think that 
imaginative contents are quite univocally characterized by narrativity at least when 
narrativity occurs in conjunction with two other features: incoherence and 
incompleteness. 
Narrative imaginative contents are often incoherent: fictions typically involve 
contradictions of various kinds. Think for example of the story where 5 and 7 do and 
do not equal 12; or of time-travel stories where the same event occurs and does not 
occur at a time t. We can easily imagine similar contradictions, while at the same time 
recognizing them as such. Indeed, we are perfectly able to enjoy similar stories. On the 
contrary, believing them, if we recognize them as such, is something we are not able to 
do. Besides, imaginative contents, especially (but not only) when they are narrative in 
kind, are often intrinsically incomplete, undetermined in their details. When we imagine 
the story of Hamlet, the detail about what Hamlet had for breakfast on the day of his 
death is undetermined, and questions about this detail seem inappropriate (or anyway 
impossible to answer). In the case of beliefs’ contents, on the contrary, incompleteness 
                                                          
190 I take this notion of narrativity and its characterization from Currie and Jureidini (2004) and Currie 
(2010). 
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does not seem to be intrinsic: all lacking details seem to be, at least in principle, 
possible to fill out.191 
Even if we do not consider any of the previous features to be in themselves 
exclusive of imaginative contents, I think we can grant that the conjunction of these 
three features is very common in some kinds of imaginative contents (e.g. those of 
imaginings in response to fictional stories); whilst it can hardly, if ever, be found in the 
contents of beliefs (for a similar claim, see Gendler 2010: §5). My point is that these 
features of high narrativity, inconsistence, and intrinsic incompleteness that typically 
characterize imaginative contents are characteristic features of religious beliefs’ 
contents as well.  
The high narrativity of religious beliefs’ contents is quite evident. Sacred texts – 
at least in the Judeo-Christian tradition – generally communicate ‘religious truths’ by 
means of stories.192 Indeed, the Bible is ‘the narration par excellence’, which goes from 
the Genesis of Universe to its Apocalypse. And, within this story, Jesus, too, speaks in 
parables to his disciples. Consequently, common religious ‘beliefs’ do not concern 
general, abstract truths, but stories where these general truths are framed in particular, 
contextualized episodes. While most theologians argue that God is a completely 
distinct reality, separated from us by an ontological gap and only indirectly knowable, 
common ‘believers’, by contrast, tend to tell stories where God is seen as ‘a character 
like all the others’: a highly anthropomorphic being, part of our human chronological 
history, who interacts with us in all sorts of particular circumstances. Various 
psychological and anthropological studies found that, even when people avow abstract 
theological beliefs on God’s properties, if they are faced with particular tasks where 
they are required to describe God or to answer questions about God, they typically fall 
back on more concrete, narrative representations of him/her and of his/her actions 
(See Barrett and Keil 1996; Barrett 1998; Boyer 2001, Ch.4). 
Moreover, as I noted in § 3 above, religious beliefs’ contents, like imaginative 
contents, are often characterized by internal incoherencies (e.g. God is omnipotent, but 
he cannot avoid natural disasters). Finally, they also display intrinsic incompleteness. 
                                                          
191 In fact, what I am calling ‘intrinsic incompleteness’ is not strictly speaking a feature of propositional 
contents themselves. It seems rather to be a feature of ‘fictional truth’ (as opposed to ‘truth’ tout court). 
I see that more work here is required to better articulate this point; and more generally to better clarify 
the (somewhat parallel?) relations between imagination and fictionality, on the one hand, and belief and 
truth, on the other. This is one respect in which, as I said, my considerations in this Section are still 
rather tentative. 
192 From this point of view, as far as I know Koran is quite different. If that is true, this would be an 
interesting difference, which would be definitely worth considering; but I do not do that here. 
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As Georges Rey observes, religious contents are “oddly detail-resistant” (Rey 2009: 17). 
Some details concerning creation, for example, seem to be inherently undetermined: 
questions as “In which language did God say: ‘Let there be light’?” sound as odd as 
questions like “What did Hamlet have for breakfast?”.193  
All these structural similarities – both at the level of the attitude and of the 
content – support the view that so-called religious beliefs are, in fact, better seen as 
kinds of imaginings: stories that religious people allow to play a great role in their lives, 
but that, nonetheless, remain accurately quarantined from their ordinary beliefs and 
can be ‘endorsed’ or not depending on people’s will.  
CONCLUSION 
In this chapter I have argued that so-called religious beliefs (or, at least, many instances 
of them) are actually not beliefs, but imaginings. Having rejected some reasons why 
they look like authentic beliefs, I have argued that they share many more functions 
with paradigmatic imaginings, pointing out also some striking similarities between 
religious and imaginative contents. I have argued that this view does not have the 
undesirable consequences that it may prima facie seem to have: it does not force us to 
say that most religious ‘believers’ are hypocrites, nor even that they have faulty self-
knowledge. On the contrary, it may help us to make more rational sense of religious 
believers’ avowals of ‘belief’ and to better understand the peculiar normative 
dimension of these states. 
 
 
 
.  
                                                          
193 As I said, these considerations here are very speculative, and need more refinements; but they pursue 
a line of thought which I think is worth exploring. Although nothing of what I said questions the 
assumption of the isomorphism of imagination and belief’s contents, it invites to a more serious 
consideration of this assumption, and more in general of the ways in which imagination and belief’s 
contents may (more or less systematically) differ. 
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